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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 116-4-209
TITLE:             Hua Kuo-Feng in Yugoslavia: "Distant Water" Visiting the Balkans
BY:                Slobodan Stankovic
DATE:              1978-8-17
COUNTRY:           (n/a)
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/180

--- Begin ---

RFE-RL

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/180
(Yugoslavia)
17 August 1978

HUA KUO-FENG IN YUGOSLAVIA: "DISTANT WATER" VISITING THE
BALKANS
By Slobodan Stankovic

Summary: On August 21, China's supreme leader Hua
Kuo-feng will begin his official visit to Yugoslavia, after
having spent several days in Romania. Hua is returning
Tito's visit to China of 30 August to 8 September 1977.
Chinese-Yugoslav relations have suffered badly because of
Peking's staunch loyalty to Moscow from 1949 to 1961. The
Chinese were stubbornly followed the Soviet anti-Titoist
line and agreed to establish diplomatic relations with
Belgrade in January 1955 only after Nikita Khrushchev
persuaded them to do so. Later, however, after relations
between Peking and Moscow deteriorated, the Chinese
demonstrated their willingness to improve relations with
Yugoslavia, culminating in Tito's 1977 triumphal visit to
China. Still, Yugoslav communist leaders were a bit
disappointed after the Chinese rejected official normalization
of inter-party relations. Hua's visit to Yugoslavia is
expected to lead to a full-fledged normalization of
relations on both party and state levels.

+ + +

This material was prepared for the use of the editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

[page 2]

After visiting Romania (August 16-21)China's supreme leader,
Kuo Hua-feng, will pay a visit to Yugoslavia beginning on August 21,
in return for Tito's visit to China last year (30 August-8 September
1977). Hua's visit to Belgrade will mark the final reconciliation,
not only between China and Yugoslavia as states, but also between
the Chinese and Yugoslav parties. The expected (and indirectly even
announced) renewal of party relations between Belgrade and Peking
during Tito's 1977 visit in China failed to take place. At the time,
the Yugoslavs did not conceal their disappointment, particularly
since the Yugoslav information media had spoken of an "ideological
dialogue" between Tito and Hua in Peking. Still, the triumphal
welcome accorded to Tito in China did indicate that Yugoslav-Chinese
relations had entered upon a phase which, in the long run, had to lead
to a renewal of party relations.

However satisfied they may be about Hua Kuo-feng's impending
visit, which would increase Yugoslavia's political image in the
international arena, the Yugoslavs have been aware that the Chinese
interest in the Balkans has been geared to counter Moscow's
"hegemonic plans" in that part of Europe, rather than to any real
help for the small nations living there. No doubt, this is one of the
main reasons for Tito's anticipated visit to Moscow to see Brezhnev
soon after Hua leaves Yugoslavia: China is far away, while the
mighty Soviet Union is very close to Yugoslavia's borders. The
Yugoslavs could hardly forget the most memorable utterance of China's
late Prime Minister Chou En-lai, who told a Yugoslav journalist in
1971 that small communist countries in Europe (by implication, Romania,
Yugoslavia, and Albania) could not expect anything more than great
sympathy from Peking:

We will never betray our friends. We sympathize with small
and medium-sized countries. ... We sympathize with them,
and we shall extend as much support to them as we can. However,
we are far away from Europe and, as you know, one of our popular
proverbs says: "Distant water cannot quench fire." [1]

Of course, it would have been unrealistic for Tito and his
followers to expect anything more than sincere (although calculated)
sympathy from Peking for their struggle against Moscow's hegemony.
Nevertheless, Chou's August 1971 statement certainly gave them food
for thought. In the first place, the relations between Belgrade and
Peking suffered badly from two diametrically opposed consequences of
the Chinese attitude toward the Soviet Union. In the era of the
Moscow-Peking "honeymoon," the Chinese considered the Yugoslav
communists, headed by Tito, as "dwarfs kneeling in the mud and trying
with all their might to spit at a giant standing on a lofty mountain."[2]
After Chinese-Soviet relations turned to open hostility, the Yugoslav
communists became "dear friends."

------------------------------------------

(1) Vjesnik (Zagreb), 28 August 1971.

(2) People's Daily (Peking), 26 June 1958.

[page 3]

Ups and Downs in Belgrade-Peking Relations

Both the relations between Moscow and Peking and those between
Belgrade and Peking have not developed "normally," either in the
positive, or in the negative sense of that word. It goes without saying that
the relations between Moscow and Belgrade have also had numerous ups and
downs since the reconciliation between Tito and Khrushchev in May 1955.
However, unlike Peking's extreme sensitivity toward any political issue
that concerns relations with the Soviet Union, the Russians and the
Yugoslavs have never played their "Chinese card" too strongly in fighting each
other, either bilaterally, or within the international communist movement.
True, the Yugoslavs have been encouraged by the Chinese resistance to
Soviet aggressiveness and "hegemonic plans," but they have never forgotten
Chou's remark about "distant water" which "cannot quench fire," the more
so since the Chinese -- unable to "quench fire" -- have begun showing
interest in "inciting fire" in the relations between the individual
communist countries and parties and the Soviet Union.

This is the main reason why the Yugoslav leaders, however happy
they may be over their full-fledged rapprochement with China, have
remained rather reserved, fearing a far-reaching conflict with Moscow
over China. In their statements, the Yugoslav leaders and commentators
usually emphasize the fact that they maintain good relations with
both Moscow and Peking. Even so far as the latest deterioration in
the relations between Peking and Tirana are concerned, the Yugoslav
leaders have been trying to play it cool, undoubtedly afraid that a
rapprochement between the Russians and the Albanians could weaken
Yugoslavia's position in the Balkans, a position already affected by
the Yugoslav-Bulgarian conflict over Macedonia. After all, the Chinese,
in the past, have changed their minds several times.

Following Mao's assumption to power in October 1949, the Chinese
leaders immediately rejected any contact with Belgrade and Tito,
whom they considered a "heretic" involved in a merciless struggle with
China's "dearest friends and allies," the Russians. On 5 October 1949,
only four days after the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed,
Tito hurried to recognize the "People's Government of China," saying
in the official statement that "the magnificent victory of the Chinese
people means the realization of a really free and independent China." [3]
The Chinese "ignored this recognition, because of their full agreement
with the Cominform's policy against Yugoslavia," [4] i.e., with Moscow's
anti-Titoist line. How loyal Mao was to Stalin is best seen from the
fact that, between 1949 and 1954, the Chinese made great efforts to be
recognized by any government in the world.

Moscow Promoted the Belgrade-Peking Reconciliation

How unpredictable the relations among communist parties and
countries have been can easily be grasped if one remembers that Mao

----------------------------------

(3) Borba (Belgrade), 6 October 1949.

(4) Jugoslovenski Pregled (Belgrade)/ No.9, September 1962.

[page 4 ]

decided to establish state and party relations with Yugoslavia
only-after the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Bulganin visit to Peking in October
1954. It was the Soviet leaders who presented Tito and his colleagues
as "good guys" who deserved the full trust of all communist countries
and parties in the world. Less than three months later, on 10 January
1955, the Chinese and Yugoslav governments simultaneously published an
announcement in Peking and Belgrade that diplomatic relations between
the two countries had been arranged. [5] Good relations between Moscow
and Belgrade between May 1955 and November 1956 led automatically to
good (although not overwhelmingly warm) relations between Peking and
Belgrade.

After another worsening of relations between the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia, following the Soviet military intervention in Hungary
in November 1956, relations between China and Yugoslavia also worsened.
Yet, no break in diplomatic relations followed, because the Russians,
too, continued to maintain their party and state relations with
Yugoslavia. The situation abruptly changed in April 1958, however, when
Moscow expressed an exceptionally critical attitude to the draft
program of the Yugoslav party (published in March 1958), because of
which both Moscow and Peking (joined by all other ruling communist
parties) refused to send their party delegations to the Seventh Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, held in Ljubljana between
22 and 26 April 1958.

At the beginning of May 1958, the Chinese published a sharp
attack against the Yugoslav party program under the title "Modern
Revisionism Must be Criticized." [6] The Yugoslavs answered four days
later in even sharper form. [7] From that time on, increasingly sharp
attacks and counterattacks ensued, leading to the previously mentioned
accusation that Tito was "a dwarf kneeling in the mud" and trying "to
spit at a giant standing on a lofty mountain." Encouraged by Peking,
the Albanian leaders had tremendously increased their anti-Titoist
attacks, happy to have both "giants" (the Soviet Union and China) on
their side. Soon afterward, however, the "two giants" began "spitting"
at each other behind the scenes, as the Yugoslavs made publicly known
in January 1959. [8] However, the Yugoslav claims about the rift
between the Russians and the Chinese proved to be correct only two
years later, even though Tito could not yet profit from it, because
Peking continued to demonstrate its anti-Yugoslav attitude, usually
using Belgrade as a target when Moscow was really meant.

In the period between 1958 and 1970, Yugoslavia and China
maintained their embassies in each other's capital, but they were headed
by charges d'affaires. This was a period during which Chinese-Yugoslav
relations were on a very low level: all forms of interstate co-operation,

---------------------

(5) Politika (Belgrade), 10 January 1955.

(6) People's Daily, 5 May 1958.

(7) Komunist (Belgrade), 9 May 1958.

(8) Borba, 30 January 1958.

[page 5]

including cultural, scientific, and technical co-operation, interstate
visits and contacts between sociopolitical organizations were completely
frozen. On the other hand, this was a period during which Chinese-
Albanian relations were blooming. In the days of the Chinese "Cultural
Revolution" (notably in 1967), anti-Yugoslav demonstrations were
staged in Peking, but at that time Mao's objection to Tito stemmed
from the Yugoslav leader's improving relations with Moscow. It should
be recalled that, several years previously, anti-Yugoslav outbursts
in Peking were voiced against Tito's anti-Soviet stances.
New Improvement in Yugoslav-Chinese Relations
After the de facto dismissal, in 1967, of Liu Shao-chi, formerly
president of the Chinese PR, the Chinese adopted the practice (along
with occasional anti-Titoist outbursts) of sending greetings on the
occasion of Yugoslavia's Day of the Republic (November 29), while the
Yugoslavs continued sending their best wishes on the occasion of the
October 1 National Day in China. Even messages and expressions of
sympathy were exchanged several times, usually in connection with
natural disasters. The year 1969 brought gradual changes in the
relations between China and Yugoslavia and an abatement of the
attacks on Tito. At the beginning of that year, the Chinese increased
the number of diplomatic and other staff at their embassy in Belgrade
and invited a Yugoslav trade delegation to come to Peking to negotiate
the promotion of trade between the two countries.

Finally, in the spring of 1970, the two governments signed an
agreement on the exchange of ambassadors, and for the first time in
that year, a November 29 reception in the Yugoslav Embassy in Peking
was attended by many top-ranking Chinese officials. In June 1971
Yugoslavia's Foreign Minister Mirko Tepavac (purged in 1972 as a
"liberal") paid an official visit to Peking, while a Chinese trade
delegation came to Yugoslavia in September 1971.

During the next six years, i.e., up to Tito's August-September
1977 visit to China, the relations between the two countries improved
to such an extent that the Yugoslavs did not conceal their justified
hope that party relations would also be reinstated. Before and during
Tito's visit to China, the Yugoslav information media openly wrote
about the forthcoming renewal of party relations. This did not take
place, even though the pretext that Tito was visiting Peking solely
in his capacity as the President of the Republic was dropped. The
Chinese newspapers referred to him by his dual titles: President of
the Yugoslav Republic and of the League of Communists. This meant
that, after the ill-famed 1963 article in the People's Daily headlined
"Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?," the enthusiastic reception
accorded Tito in China indicated that, for Mao's successors, Yugoslavia
has become not only a real, but also an extremely valuable socialist
country. No doubt the main purpose of Hua Kuo-feng's visit is to boost
Yugoslavia's vigorously independent foreign policy, not only during
Tito's lifetime, but also after he disappears from the political scene.

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