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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 133-5-9
TITLE:             Tito and "Non-Alignment"
BY:                Slobodan Stankovic
DATE:              1967-12-6
COUNTRY:           (n/a)
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Foreign relations

--- Begin ---

RADIO RREE EUROPE Research

COMMUNIST   AREA

YUGOSLAVIA:  Foreign
relations

6 December 1967

TITO AND  "NON-ALIGNMENT"

In a speech on 4 October 1967 President Tito revealed that,
thus far, Yugoslavia has given to the underdeveloped countries -
of Asia and Africa aid in the form of credits amounting to about
600 million dollars.  He admitted, however, that "some people"
in Yugoslavia have been questioning this type of aid, "since we
ourselves have not enough."[1]  But, Tito added, Yugoslavia's
alliance with the underdeveloped countries has been chiefly
aimed at establishing Yugoslavia as "a strong moral-political
factor in the world."

On the very same day (October 4), while Tito was speaking
about the necessity for Yugoslavia to help the underdeveloped
countries of Asia and Africa, Jurij (Justine ic, the foreign
policy editor of the Belgrade daily Politika, insisted in an
article that before helping the poor countries of Asia and
Africa Yugoslavia must first become economically strong herself.
Gustincic advised that the Yugoslavs must first "put their own
house in order, the European house" because economically strong
countries "are not interested in talking to states that borrow
money" such as Yugoslavia.[2]  This disagreement over the approach
to the uncommitted world indicates that the predominance of the

---------------------------

1)  Borba, Belgrade, 5 October 1967.  In his speech before the
May 1963 Plenum of the Yugoslav Central Committee, Aleksandar
Rankovic had used almost the same wording in accusing "some
people" who were of the opinion that Yugoslavia's "natural
interests are linked [not with the underdeveloped countries
but] with Europe, because we are a European country,
especially with those European countries which, it is believed,
have for us the greatest economic significance...".  Borba,
21 May 1963.

2)  Politika, Belgrade, 4 October

[page 2]

foreign over internal policy in Yugoslavia has started losing
out.[3] However, before considering the latest phase in
Yugoslavia's non-aligned commitments, a review of the origin and
development of non-alignment is in order.

Sunrise -- Djilas Opens Gates Of Asia

Yugoslavia's interest in the so-called non-aligned world
can be traced back as far as 1953.  In January of that year,
Milovan Djilas, at that time still one of the most powerful
members of the Yugoslav Politburo and Party Secretariat,
attended the first Socialist Conference of Asian Countries in
Rangoon, Burma.[4] This happened two months before the death
of Stalin with whom the Yugoslav Communists had had to fight
after June 1948 when the Soviet dictator threw Tito and his
colleagues out of the Cominform.

Since most of the former Western colonies in Asia and
Africa had received their independence after World War .II,
i.e. after 1948 (which means in the period of Tito's fiercest
defensive struggle against the Soviet Union) what was more
natural for Yugoslavia but to seek and find allies among the
newly liberated countries?[5]  This was the more so because,
even during the struggle for liberation in the former colonies,
not only were demands for liberty loud, but so also were those
for radical social change.  Consequently, after former colonial
countries had received their independence, the
national-liberation movements in them faced a series of socio-economic
problems which they were pressed to solve and which, in turn,
brought about a gradual differentiation between various forces
within the national-liberation movements leading to a gradual
"shift to the left" among many of them.  Most of these countries
demonstrated therefore socialist tendencies in varying degrees,

----------------------

3)  In an article publishes in issue No. 3-4 (March-June 1967)
of the Zagreb periodical Encyclopaedia moderna, the Belgrade
professor Sveta Lukic said:  "Until several years ago
Yugoslavia was a country in which foreign policy was placed over
all other policies.  Generally speaking, internal policies,
which means also economic and cultural policies, were
considered only as by-products of foreign policy.  It remained
so even at times when the further development of various
fields and their own dynamics, could not be reduced to this
single source," i.e. to foreign policy.

4)  Borba, 7 January 1953.

5)  The following are the years of independence of the most
important Afro-Asian countries with which Yugoslavia entered
close alliances: Burms 1947; Indonesia 1949; India 1950;
Egypt 1952; Ghana 1960; Algeria 1962.


[page 3]

while showing opposition to Soviet or Chinese-style Communism.[6]
After Djilas' return from Burma and India the efforts made
by Yugoslav Communists to support the newly liberated countries
of Asia and Africa were chiefly aimed at bolstering Yugoslavia's
position in Europe.  The conflict' with Stalin had compelled Tito
to take many pro-Western attitudes[7] in foreign policy and to
adopt a more liberal course within the country. An alliance
with the neutral countries in Asia and Africa was both important
as a support for the struggle against "Western imperialism" and
against Russian hegemony.[8]

In December 1954 and January 1955, President Tito visited
India and Burma precisely at the time when it was decided that
the first Conference of Asian and African nations should take
place in Bandung in April 1955.  During Tito's stay in India he
and Nehru issued a joint statement on 23 December 1954 explaining
for the first time the meaning of the policy of non-alignment.[9]

---------------------

6)  On the occasion of the first Socialist Conference of Asian
Countries in Rangoon, R.M. Lohia, one of the leaders of the
Indian Socialist Party, gave an interview to the Belgrade
daily Borba (6 January 1953) in which he said the following:
"All we Asian socialists feel much closer to the Yugoslav
Comuunists, linked with them by emotional but firm ties,
firmer than with any other socialist movement in the world.
We wish to see at our first conference also the
representatives of those Communists who have impressed the world, but
above all who impressed the Asian socialists by their courage
in resisting and holding out to the last in the struggle
against the imperialist appetites of Russia."

7)  At the 6th Party Congress in Zagreb, in November 1952, Tito
and Kardelj defended West German claims against the GDR and
the Polish-German frontiers.

8)  While in Burma Djilas gave an interview to Borba (21 January
1953) in which he said:  "The [first Asian Socialist]
Conference has revealed that in Asia, especially in India, Burma
and Indonesia, there are very significant combat forces, able
to fight not only against the old colonialism but also against
Cominformism and the Soviet and Chinese hegemony... [These
nations] have unmasked the anti-Socialist soul of the Soviet
Union and its satellites."

9)  A section of the Tito-Nehru statement reads:  "The President
and the Prime Minister desire to proclaim that the policy
of non-alignment adopted and pursued by their respective
countries is not 'neutrality' or neutralism and therefore
passivity, but is a positive, active and constructive policy
seeking to lead to a collective peace on which alone collective
security can really rest...  The President and -the Prime
Minister therefore repudiate the erroneous conception which has
become prevalent in some quarters of a 'third bloc' or 'third
force8 of non-aligned countries.  This is a contradiction in
terms because such a bloc would involve them in the very system
of alignments which they regard as undesirable."  (New York
Times, 24 December 1954).


[page 4]

From the very beginning the neutrals were in trouble as to the
name they should use for their "non-bloc bloc." Sensing a
certain stigma of apathy or ambivalence in the word "neutral,"
they shifted their own style to "neutralists",. then to
"uncommitted" and finally to "non-bloc" or "non-aligned" countries.
As can be seen from the Tito-Nehru statement they also coined
the term "positive-neutrality" to dissociate themselves from
what they felt to be the "negative," conservative-and
insufficiently anti-imperialist variety exemplified by Sweden and
some other countries.

While in India and Burma, Tito had the pleasure of learning
that on TO January 1955 China had agreed to establish diplomatic
relations with Yugoslavia.  Actually, it was Khrushchev's
accomplishment far he had succeeded in persuading Mao during his
visit to Peking with Bulganin in the fall of 1954 (29
September-11 October 1954) to establish diplomatic relations with Belgrade.
This led Tito to retrain from any anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese
attacks while in Asia, although he rejected the idea of joining
either of the two existing blocs.[10]

On the other hand, Tito grasped that declarations for
socialism in the underdeveloped countries have often been louder
than -realization.  The Asian and African non-aligned countries
have been full of internal weaknesses resulting from the splitting
of the forces advocating socialism and the strength of the
antisocialist forces.[11]  External freedom for these countries has not
been matched by the growth of domestic liberties, still less of
parliamentary institutions after the Western model.  Only India,
Cyprus and Lebanon can be described as functioning parliamentary
democracies, although they all are entitled in varying degree to
the descriptive epithet "underdeveloped." Nearly all non-aligned

--------------------

10)  In his speech in Rangoon on 16 January 1955 (published in
Borba of 17 January 1955), Tito said:  "As underdeveloped
countries which only recently have received their
independence, these [non-aligned] countries are in a position
in which their interests cannot harmonize with the
narrowlyconceived interests of the large, developed states; this is
why they are not a bit inclined to join the blocs gathered
around these big states or to accept the policy of these
blocs."

11)  In his article "View of Socialist Orientation of Developing
Countries," published in the July-August 1964 issue of the
Yugoslav Central Committee monthly Socijalizam, Professor
Vojan Rus said:  "The manifestations of socialism under
conditions of underdevelopment, as a rule, contain specific
problems and contradictions which partly represent the
remnants of the pre-socialist past (concentration of
management in the state apparatus; specific interference in
individual, national and municipal property, and the like.)"

[page 5]

countries have been or are in receipt of aid from both the
Communist and non-Communist world,

At the Bandung-Conference (18-24 April 1955) the 29 Asian
and African countries represented attempted to define more
specifically the notion of neutralism.  The Communists,
represented at Bandung by China and North Vietnam, were then backing
neutralism as well as supporting anti-imperialism.  Countries
like Ceylon and Iraq which uncompromisingly took the Western
side in 1955 saw their governments deposed and replaced by
neutralist ones.  And even Indian Prime Minister Nehru, who
several months before had signed the above-mentioned declaration
with Tito which -claimed that the concept of a bloc of "the
nonaligned -is "a contradiction in terms," became an ardent advocate
of neutralism at Bandung, neutralism- which was suggestive of a
third bloc.

High-Noon — Conferences In Belgrade And Cairo

One month after the Bandung Conference ended Nikita
Khrushchev created a sensation by making a Canossa-like trip
to Belgrade.  Tito's reputation was enormously increased.
Consequently the initiative for organizing and coordinating the
activities of the non-aligned countries passed into his hands.
In the course of 1955 Tito's prestige was further enhanced by
visits to Belgrade of the Indian and-Burmese leaders, all
applauding "co-existence." At the end of 1955 and beginning of
1956 (28 December 1955--6 January 1956) Tito was in Cairo, joining
Nasser in a statement of devotion to the policy of non-alignment.
However, at the July 1956 tripartite (Tito-Nasser-Nehru) meeting
on Brioni Island, the Indian Prime Minister was the dominant
figure.  The meeting called for an Algerian ceasefire but spoke
of "legitimate" Western economic interests in the Middle East-
It was Nehru who stood up against any effort to form a third,
neutralist bloc between the American and Soviet blocs. In
September 1956 Indonesia entered the scene with Sukarno's first
visit to Yugoslavia.

Yugoslavia's strength vis-a-vis the existing two major blocs
was that, firstly, it was the only European country entering such
an alliance of non-aligned countries.  Secondly," it was the only
Communist country that had accepted a policy of "positive
neutrality" as the basis for active diplomacy.  The European
countries such as Austria, Sweden or Ireland, having acquired
their independence many decades ago, maintained a sort of
neutralism which has been of a practical rather than of an
emotional or ideological nature.  The Afro-Asian countries saw
in the Yugoslav system a type of Communism which was hailed both
by the American and West European "imperialists," and even helped
by them, while Tito, although "receiving aid from the West, was
recognized by-Moscow as an equal partner and a good Communist.
Obviously, the Afro-Asian neutrals were impressed by- Tito's
success in enjoying the best of both worlds by playing the ends
against the middle.  This game was possibly simply because it

[page 6]

appeared that the non-aligned countries had a chance of playing
an important role, primarily in a situation of tense relations,
between two great blocs headed by the Soviet Union and America.
On the other hand, it has been precisely this tension which is
unremittingly attacked by the non-alignees.  In the meantime
while China was gaining economic strength it was also actually
creating a third bloc.

As far as the Soviet bloc is concerned, the Hungarian and
Polish events of October 1956 shook the foundation of the
Communist house.  Tito's second break with Moscow and its satellites
following-the-October 1956 revolution and his refusal to. take
part in the November 1957 Moscow meeting helped him greatly in
the West and among his non-aligned allies. -On the other hand,
it was clear that Tito was deeply concerned for the survival of
the Yugoslav Communist regime and was greatly relieved by the
Soviet Army's intervention in- Hungary.[12] From 1956 to 1961 the
comings and goings to and from Yugoslavia were very frequent.
Meetings between Tito and Nasser were especially frequent.
Finally, the idea of a large-scale non-aligned conference was
born and -preliminary talks began.

Although the Western powers in 1955 approached the
conference of 29 Asian and African nations with trepidation,[13] their
attitude toward the idea of a non-aligned conference was not at
all apprehensive.  First, it did not become apparent until six
years after Bandung that Communist parties would expand under
the shadow of the non-aligned governments; and secondly, the
three initiators of the large-scale non-aligned conference which,
it was later decided, would take place in Belgrade in September
1961, were three ambitious statesmen who had prospered on
international defiance.  Nasser defied Britain, France and Israel over
Suez and survived; Sukarno created his empire by playing America
and Britain against the Netherlands; while Tito defied Stalin
and got away with it.  These three dictators, claiming to be
"building socialism" following their own models, were rather
reluctantly joined by the fourth non-aligned statesman, the
great mediator Nehru of India.

-----------------------

12)  Tito implicitly admitted this in his well-known speech in
Pula on 11 November 1956 in which he approved of the Soviet
intervention in Hungary:  "The first Soviet intervention
was absolutely wrong; the second, since it saved socialism
in Hungary, was justified."  (Borba, 19 November 1956).

13)  The April 1955 Bandung Conference was attended by the
following 29 Asian and African countries:  Afghanistan,
Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, the Chinese People's- Republic,
Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (now Ghana), India,
Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Laos, the Lebanon, Liberia, Lybia,
Nepal, Pakistan, Persia, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the
Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, (South) Vietnam, The
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Jordan and the Yemen.

[page 7]

The preparatory meeting was organized in Cairo 5-12 June
1961 and was attended by the delegates of 21 governments
(including the Algerian PLN movement).  This meeting was preceded
"by a 22 April 1961 meeting between Nasser and Tito in Alexandria
and a May 10th organizational meeting in Cairo. At the June
5-12 meeting in Cairo it was decided that only bona fide
nonbloc countries should be allowed to take part in the Belgrade
Conference.

In a speech held at the beginning of June 1961 Tito said:
"I emphasize once again that we shall not go to. the [Belgrade]
conference to attack any country but rather to raise a voice
against colonialism..."[14] Finally, on 1 September 1961, 25
countries gathered in Belgrade.[15] There were only 14 names
common to the Belgrade list and to that of the 1955 Bandung
Conference.  The most fully represented were the Arabs -- all
but Libya and Jordan.  Despite Nehru's insistance that Ireland,
Sweden and Finland be invited, Yugoslavia remained the only
European country.  Some countries considered in 1955 to be
aligned were barred-by Tito and Nasser: not only Western-aligned
states such as Iran, Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, South Vietnam
and the Philippines, but also less obviously committed ones
including Jordan, Liberia and Libya.  Additionally, there were
Communist China and North Vietnam.

The "Big Five" non-aligned leaders -- Tito, Nehru, Sukarno,
Nkhrumah and Nasser -- were the leaders of the conference, with
Tito provoking the Western powers because of his sudden
pro-Soviet attitude.  In his September 3 speech Tito lined up with
Moscow on just about every point, especially as far as the Berlin
crisis was concerned.  While Nehru attacked Moscow for having
resumed nuclear testing precisely on September 1, 1961, the day
the conference began Tito said he "could understand the reasons
given by the Soviet Government" for resuming nuclear testing. [16]
Actually the conference was opened in an atmosphere of shock,
confusion and mounting indignation over announcement of the
Soviet intention to resume nuclear testing.

In the final analysis, the Belgrade conference did not find
ways to impose their voice of neutralism more effectively on the
course of the cold war.  Tito's turn-about at the conference

----------------------------

14) Borba, 6 June 1967.

15)  The Belgrade non-aligned conference of September 1961
was attended by the following 25 states:  Afghanistan,
Algeria (FLN), Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Congo, Cyprus,
Cuba,-Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq,
Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia,
Sudan, Tunisia, UAR, Yemen, and Yugoslavia.

16)  Borba, 4 September 1961.


[page 8]

weakened his position among some of the non-alienees who could
not understand the Yugoslav claims that while non-alignment is
possible in foreign policy, there can be no non-alignment in
ideological matters.  The initiative passed to Nasser who in
October 1964 was the host of the second non-aligned conference
in Cairo (5-10 October 1964).  Several days after this conference
ended Nikita Khrushchev was deposed in Moscow.

The Cairo Conference was attended by 47 countries (as
against 25 in Belgrade) and 10 observer countries (in Belgrade
3).  There wene 18 new participants from Africa, 6 from Latin
America, four from Asia and one from Europe (Finland as observer).
Nehru died in May 1964 so Shastri came instead.  Ben Bella
represented Algeria.  In his speech Tito repeated his old thesis that
"the policy of non-alignment never was or ever could be a policy
of passive resistance to the division of the world, or a policy
of equidistance."[17] Still it became clear that a certain
pro-Moscow leaning remained in Tito's views.  Sukarno at that time
was moving closer to Communist China and in Cairo called for a
struggle against all imperialist powers.  He simply dismissed
"peaceful co-existence" as fruitless.  It was reported at that
time that President Tito was so disgusted with Sukarno's
pro-Chinese line in Cairo that he, in private talks, called the
Indonesian leader "an oriental Goldwater."[18]

Sunset -- Club Falling Apart

Soon after the October 1964 Cairo conference it became
clear that it was much easier to be non-aligned between two
blocs than between three.  In addition, changes within each
individual bloc led to conflicts between the internal force of
moderation and those of militancy.  In Yugoslavia itself the
struggle between "liberals" and "dogmatists" grew fierce and was
followed by loud voices demanding that Yugoslavia stop playing
a megalomanic role in the world, a role which assertedly was no
in accordance with the country's economic strength.  In a rather
short time only Tito and Nasser survived out of the "Big Six"
(including Ben Bella of Algeria).  Ben Bella was ousted in June
1965; Nehru died in 1964; Nkhrumah was deposed in February 1966;
while Sukarno's removal was completed in March 1967.  Tito's
old friend Mrs. Bandaranaike was unseated as Prime Minister of
Ceylon and replaced by the west-leaning Mr. Senananyke.  The
process of fragmentation now going on among the non-aligned is
gathering momentum every month.  President Nasser barely survived
the Middle East crisis of June 1967.  The danger of his overthrow
led Tito even to join Moscow in order to save his last friend
among the non-alignees.

------------------

17)  Politika, 7 October 1964.

18)  New York Times, 18 April 1965.

[page 9]

More indicative of the decline of the appeal of
nonalignment was the failure of Tito's ettempt in March 1965 to
persuade a group of non-aligned ambassadors in Belgrade to sign
a declaration denouncing the United States over the war in
Vietnam,[19] staunch opposition to Tito's anti-American line was
expressed in Belgrade by the Indian, Ceylonese and Ethiopian
ambassadors.  Instead of signing a condemnation of Washington,
the [14] representatives signed a multilateral appeal for
negotiations. It became clear that Tito could no longer consider
himself the leader of the non-aligned countries.  Moreover, it
appeared that no single leader existed at all.

It may be too early to declare that non-alignment is dead.
What can be said with some certainty, however, is that the
movement is greatly enfeebled and the Yugoslav Communists no longer
play the leading role they once played among the non-aligned
countries.  This is reported not only by foreign observers but
also by the Yugoslav Communists themselves.  As we have seen in
the case of Gustincic[20] and some other Yugoslav personalities,
there are a number of influential people, mostly young liberals,
who would like to see Yugoslavia return to a more realistic
foreign policy commensurate with her economic strength.  What
is considered important by these young Yugoslav liberals within
the Party is that the country's economy be stabilized, foreign
debts paid and living standards increased.  An economically
strong Yugoslavia based on a broad democratization of the Party
and state could become an example not only for the underdeveloped
countries of Asia and Africa but also for the other East European
countries which in the past have looked to Yugoslavia for
inspiration.  This political vista is seen to offer a far more
promising future for Yugoslavia than any potential ever apparent
in non-alignment.

-----------------------

19)  Ibid,  According to Borba of 16 March 1965, the ambassadors
from 13 non-aligned countries met in Belgrade with Yugoslav
representatives 13-14 March to discuss the situation in
Vietnam.  Nothing significant resulted from the meeting,

20)  In his above-mentioned article in Politirka of 4 October 1967
Gustincic dealt with the problem of non-aligned countries
as follows:  "It is both wise and strategically correct that
we have been fighting for the idea that the needs of
underdeveloped countries should be recognized, and that the gap
between them and the rich countries should be bridged. 
However, in doing so one must not cherish any illusions.  Also
in this respect big countries — big in the economic sense --
are important for us."  Gustincic even ridiculed Nasser's
attitude when he said:  "When de Gaulle needles the Americans
he has in the safe of his banks gold worth billions.  However,
when Nasser closes the Suez by doing so he unfortunately
empties hiw own pockets rather than those of the others."


[page 10]

That this is more realistic foreign policy has been gaining
in strength at the expense of any meaningful revival of
nonalignment per se is seen from a recent speech by Yugoslavia's
Foreign Minister Marko Nikezic.  Speaking in the Yugoslav Federal
Assembly on 5 December 1967, Nikezic stressed that his country
would continue to conduct a policy of non-alignment, but made
it clear that this policy would undergo a radical metamorphosis.
He recalled that Yugoslavia's non-alignment posture was the
result "of the cold-war period, which in itself had undergone
changes" and said that the policy itself would have to be
"adjusted" to correspond with the changed conditions of the world
today.[21]

Slobodan Stankovic

----------------------

21)  Borba, 6 December 1967.  In the discussion following
Nikezic's report, the Federal Assembly deputy, Bogo Gorjan,
insisted that the policy of non-alignment was very important
for Yugoslavia.  He, however, added:  "It seems to me that,,
in deciding what a scope the poli-cy of non-alignment should
have and in which way it should be expressed, we still
employ criteria from the era of the Belgrade [1961] and
Cairo [1964] conferences.  We observe the world as we desire
it to be rather than as it really is."  (Radio Belgrade,
6 December 1967.)

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