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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 143-4-75
TITLE:             Akhromeev on Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe
BY:                Douglas Clarke
DATE:              1989-4-26
COUNTRY:           (n/a)
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/68

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE
RADIO LIBERTY

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/68
(Military Affairs)
26 April 1989

AKHROMEEV ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE

by Douglas Clarke

Summary: Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeev has
revealed new details about the Warsaw Pact's
holdings of short-range nuclear missiles. He
claims that the Pact's superiority in this class
of weapon is offset by NATO's advantages in
other tactical nuclear systems. Both his
arithmetic and his logic are suspect.

* * *

Since stepping down as Chief of the General Staff last
December, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Akhromeev has been
a special adviser on arms control to Mikhail Gorbachev, the
Soviet President. He has played a leading role in the current
Soviet propaganda campaign against any modernization of NATO's
tactical nuclear weapons--particularly the 88 Lance short-range
missile launchers stationed in Europe.

Akhromeev's latest move in this campaign took the form of
an interview printed in Pravda on April 19.[1] The Marshal argued
that the Warsaw Pact's admitted 12 to 1 advantage in short-range
nuclear missiles was offset by what he claimed was a NATO
advantage in aircraft that could carry nuclear bombs and
missiles. He denied the NATO claim that Soviet forces had just
modernized their short-range missiles.

A Balance of Forces? Akhromeev maintained that tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe had to be considered as an indivisible
triad consisting of short-range missiles, strike aircraft, and
nuclear artillery. Akhromeev claimed that while the Warsaw Pact
had 1,608 short-range missiles compared with NATO's 136 (Lance
and French Pluton missiles), NATO had 4,075 strike aircraft
compared with the Warsaw Pact's 2,783. Akhromeev also said that
each side had more than 6,000 artillery pieces capable of firing
nuclear weapons. When the two columns are added up, both sides

This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

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RAD BR/68

are found to have "more than 10,000" tactical nuclear arms, an
apparent one-to-one correlation of forces. (See Table 1.) NATO
supporters argue that it is misleading to lump the various
tactical systems together and that Akhromeev's figures are wrong
to boot.

Table 1

Marshal Akhromeev's View of NATO and Warsaw Pact
Tactical Nuclear Systems in Europe

	Warsaw	Correlation	NATO
	Pact	of Forces

Missiles	1,608	12:1	136

Artillery	More Than	1:1	More Than
	6,000		6,000

Strike	2,783	1:1.5	4,075
Aircraft

Total	More Than	1:1	More Than
	10,000		10,000

The respected, London-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies (IISS) sees the balance of tactical nuclear
forces in Europe very differently. It believes that NATO has
3,000 fewer nuclear-capable artillery pieces than claimed by the
Warsaw Pact. Next, it says that the Warsaw Pact has an
advantage in what Akhromeev calls strike aircraft. Table 2 is
comparable to Akhromeev's but uses IISS data. Instead of the
vague estimate of totals of more than 10,000 for each side, it
results in a more exact finding of 4,531 nuclear-capable
tactical systems for NATO and 9,379 for the Warsaw Pact.[2] This
calculation of nuclear equipment suggests more than a two-to-one
advantage for the Warsaw Pact. It does not take naval strike or
bomber aircraft into account. The IISS estimates that NATO's
aircraft carriers have 458 strike aircraft in European and
Atlantic waters. Taking into account these and the 286
Soviet land-based naval bombers, the Warsaw Pact still retains
an advantage in tactical nuclear systems of just under
two-to-one.

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RAD BR/68

Table 2

The IISS View

	Warsaw	Correlation	NATO
	Pact	of Forces

Missiles	1,432	11:1	127
Artillery	5,598	1.9:1	3,022
Strike	2,349	1.7:1	1,382
Aircraft

Total	9,379	2.1:1	4,531

Warsaw Pact Modernization Denied. Akhromeev went to some
length to refute the NATO charge that the Warsaw Pact was
hypocritical in opposing the modernization of Western
short-range nuclear missiles just after it had completed its own
modernization program. He tried to belittle the SS-21 missile,
singled out by NATO as the key to the modernization, by saying
that it was 15 years old. He reminded readers that the Soviet
Army's one "modern" shorter-range missile, the SS-23, was being
eliminated in accordance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty. By revealing new figures on Warsaw Pact
missiles, however, Akhromeev undermined his own argument.

For the first time, Akhromeev broke down the Warsaw Pact's
arsenal of 1,608 short-range nuclear missiles by missile type.
He revealed that the total comprises 658 Luna (called Frog by
NATO) missiles, 289 Tochka (SS-21) missiles, and 661 R-17
(Scud-B) missiles. This indicates that the process of replacing
the older Frog rockets with the much more accurate SS-21s has
gone further than NATO was aware. Just one day before
Akhromeev's interview appeared in Pravda, General John Galvin,
NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, claimed that the
Warsaw Pact had "more than 150 launchers" of the newer missile,
while it still retained large numbers of the 70 kilometer-range
Frog weapon.[3]

Akhromeev's suggestion that the SS-21 is just another
component of the Warsaw Pact's aging missile inventory is
misleading. The SS-21 belongs to the same generation as the
weapon that he admits is "modern"--the SS-23. Both were
developed in the late 1970s within a few years of each other.
They were designed as replacements for the first generation of
Soviet tactical nuclear missiles: the SS-21 to replace the Frog
in the divisional support role; the SS-23 to replace the Scud at
higher army and front command levels. Because of either

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RAD BR/68

development problems or decisions to give higher priority to
other weapons, neither was deployed in substantial numbers until
well into the 1980s. An authoritative Western study of Soviet
missiles has estimated that there were 30 SS-21s deployed in
1983 and predicated that this stockpile would grow by 50
missiles a year.[4] Akhromeev's figures seem to bear this
prediction out.

The Warsaw Pact's "Nonmodernization" Will Continue.
Numerous Soviet spokesmen have supported Akhromeev's denial that
the USSR is modernizing its short-range nuclear missile force.
The Marshal's explanation seems to leave the door open for the
continued replacement of the Frog by the SS-21, because, in
Soviet eyes, the latter is an "old" missile, and therefore using
it to replace an even older missile does not constitute
"modernization." Lieutenant General Konstantin Mikhaylov, the
deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Arms Limitation and
Disarmament Department, has flatly stated, "The USSR is not
replacing old missiles with SS-21 missiles. . . "[5]; but
Akhromeev's figures seem to contradict this assertion.

Within the last two years, SS-21s have been identified in
the armies of two Soviet allies: East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. NATO sources have revealed that the East
Germans have at least eight of these missiles. They reportedly
belong to the Seventh and Ninth Tank Divisions, stationed
respectively in Dresden and Eggesin.[6] According to the latest
edition of the IISS's Military Balance, Czechoslovakia has also
started replacing the Frog with the SS-21 and has four of the
newer missiles.[7] Forming the Warsaw Pact's front line on the
Central Front, East Germany and Czechoslovakia would be obvious
choices to be the first non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact to
upgrade their short-range missiles.

Soviets Reconsider the SS-23. When the Soviets agreed to
include the SS-23 in the treaty banning intermediate and
shorter-range land-based nuclear missiles in Europe, they were
forced to abandon the possibility of using this missile to
upgrade the Scud-B missiles used by the army. Some observers
suspected at the time that the reason the USSR did not resist
American pressure to include the SS-23 in the INF package was
that they were having technical problems with this new missile
and would be content to retain the aging Scuds. General Galvin
believes that the Soviet Army has been improving the Scud
missile. It has now been in the inventory for more than 20
years.

The INF Treaty defined shorter-range missiles as those with
ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. It also specifically
listed the SS-23 in this category, leading one to assume that
the SS-23 must have a range of at least 500 kilometers. It
probably, in fact, does not. The US objective during the INF
negotiations was to include the SS-23 no matter what its range.
Although United States has claimed the maximum range of the

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RAD BR/68

SS-23 is 500 kilometers, most analysts believe that the missile
has a shorter operational range. This discrepancy did not
become a major issue during the talks, probably because the
Soviets felt that it was worth sacrificing the SS-23 to get rid
of the American Pershing II and cruise missiles that could hit
the USSR.

Now Marshal Akhromeev seems to be having second thoughts.
In the Pravda interview he admitted that the SS-23 has a range
of less than 500 kilometers, adding that "its range was no
secret to the US representatives at the talks." He objected to
the idea that the Americans might deploy a new missile with a
range of up to 450 kilometers, which, according to Akhromeev,
would be "virtually equal to the range of the Soviet Oka [SS-23]
missile being eliminated." Yet both the United States and the
Soviet Union can deploy a new 450 kilometer-range missile
without violating the terms of the INF Treaty. Such a missile
is one of the options that NATO is considering to replace its
obsolescent Lance missiles. Akhromeev's response is a threat:
". . . if we are forced to ... we will find a way to respond
to the NATO actions."

* * *

1 "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Superiority or Equality," Pravda, 19 April 1989.

2 Taken from the "Atlantic to Urals" column of Table 2, pp. 220-221, in The
Military Balance: 1988-1989, (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1988). As Akhromeev had done, INF and French strategic
forces are not included.

3 General John R. Galvin, "Nuclear Modernization: Points for the Discussion,"
International Herald Tribune, 18 April 1989, p. 4.

4 Barton Wright, World Weapon Database, Volume I: Soviet Missiles,
(Brookline: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1986), p. 86.

5 TASS (in English), 18 April 1989.

6 C. Graf Brockdorff, "NATO: Short-Range Rockets In The 'GDR' Have Been
Modernized," Die Welt, 14 December 1988.

7 Military Balance, p. 48.

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