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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 29-4-101
TITLE:             Tactical and Policy Statements of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, January-February 1957
BY:                pc
DATE:              1957-3-6
COUNTRY:           Hungary
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  General Desk
THEMATIC SUBJECTS: Hungary--1956-1965, Political Persecution

--- Begin ---

H-1

6 MARCH 1957

RFE NEWS & INFORMATION SERVICE - EVALUATION AND RESEARCH SECTION

"E" Background Report
(General Desk)

TACTICAL AND POLICY STATEMENTS OF THE HUNGARIAN
SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY JANUARY - FEBRUARY 1957

Introduction

The Hungarian Communist regime has been waging an
intense struggle for domestic support for its policies and has
instituted an all-out drive for members for the four-month-old
Hungarian Socialist Workers Party. According to the February
26 Resolution of the Provisional Central Committee of the HSWP,
this membership drive has not "been without success. The
resolution stated that Party membership now exceeded 190,000 persons
and is adding 1,200 members a week. The influx of new members
has, however, been a mixed blessing. Already Party officials
are warning that many of the new members are joining the Party
for "careerist" reasons while many "honest comrades" are still
refusing to join.

The case of Imre NAGY remains topical and current.
References by MAROSAN to the "treasonable" actions of NAGY and
an ominous statement by Karoly KISS that not a few "ordinary
people" were demanding that NAGY be tried for his crimes gave
rise to rumors that NAGY might be the object of a Communist
"show trial." Despite an official dementi by a Foreign
Ministry spokesman to the contrary, the possibility for such a trial
is not out of the question.

The CC Resolution, although not mentioning specific
actions to be taken NAGY and his "followers" also termed NAGY's
actions as "treacherous." The document was of the opinion that
the "final liquidation of the anti-Marxist views of this group
will be a prerequisite for our success in the future."

The intervention of Soviet troops in the October
revolution is bluntly justified by the KADAR government as
necessary for the defense of "socialist achievements in Hungary."
According to Gyorgy MAROSAN, if the HORTHY government had the
right to call in foreign troops to destroy the 1919 Soviet
Republic of Hungary, then the KADAR government had all the more
right to call in the Soviet troops to defend the working class
against the "counterrevolution."

The moral and ideological gulf existing between the
regime and the Hungarian intelligentsia appears to be as deep
and wide as in the period immediately following the revolution.
The repressive measures employed by the regime against dissident

[page 2]

intellectuals have given rise to charges, which the regime
evidently takes seriously, that the Hungarian Communist Party is
"anti-intelligentsia." Party officials at various activist
meetings throughout the country have indignantly rejected such
accusations as "vile counterrevolutionary slander." Party leaders
maintain that such arguments are fallacious since it is
"impossible for a Marxist-Leninist to be anti-intelligentsia."

On the issue of destalinization, regime theoreticians
are energetically defending the system while placing the entire
blame for past errors on the shortcomings of individual leaders.
In this connection, the "good resolutions of the July Plenum"
are often cited to prove that the Party was well on its way to
rectifying the mistakes of the past when the "counterrevolution
struck its blow at socialism in Hungary."

Also in this connection, massive attacks were launched
against the concept of National Communism. KADAR equated National
Communism with National Socialism in Germany stressing that both
of them were "imperialist weapons against socialism." He
maintained that National Communism, as well as Rakosiism and
Stalinism, were imaginary concepts designed by the imperialists to
divide the unity of the socialist camp.

Repressive measures against the Workers Councils
continue. The HSWP apparently has had no little success with its
slogan of "Communists to the Workers Councils." The regime seems
to be determined to shear away any residue of political and
economic power which these revolutionary institutions might still
possess and make them an instrument of Stalinist exploitation
instead of an institution which protects the economic interests
of Hungarian workers.

(pc)

Party Membership and Inner-Party Strife

On the occasion of reorganizing the Provisional
Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers (Communist)
Party (February 26) the Central Committee announced that Party
membership now exceeded 190,000 members and is growing at the
rate of 1,200 members a week. The Central Committee also stated
that Party organizations have been formed in 75 per cent of the
villages and that the number of basic Party organizations
"considerably exceeds 8,000."

The document said that former members of the
Hungarian Workers (Communist) Party "who register for admission to the
HSWP by May 1 1957, must be admitted to the Party by giving
recognition to their former Party membership." The Party
statement sharply condemned "the uncomradely and intrigue-seeking
attitude which is looking for fault at all costs and in everyone."
Although the Party alleges that it has had considerable success
in a number of individual factories, the document admitted that

[page 3]

in "BUDAPEST and in the provinces, the organizational work among
intellectuals is relatively slow." Shortcomings of provincial
organizations were also criticized.

Karoly KISS in a February 9 Radio BUDAPEST interview
stressed that it was necessary to strengthen Communist Party
provincial organizations. He said that the old Hungarian Workers
(Communist) Party had neglected the provincial and regional Party
organizations so much that they consisted "mostly of old and sick
people and housewives." KISS revealed that "many outstanding
comrades have gone over to the regional Party organizations from
the Party apparatus and Party offices."

Reports on the progress and methods used by Communist
Party recruiters vary considerably. A Reuter dispatch (January
14) reported that factory workers at CSEPEL and elsewhere were
being told that they would be fired or laid off if they did not
join the HSWP. Engineers and other white-collar workers were
threatened with dismissal if they did not join, the report stated.
According to the February statements of Party officials this
campaign for new members with its open and implied threats of
unemployment or possibly other means of coercion has met with too
much success. It would also appear that national Party leaders
are meeting with the resistance from those rank and. file Party
members who "remained true to the Party during the difficult
days of November and December" and who now want to confine the
privileges inherent in Party membership in a Communist state to a
select "elite."

"Nepszabadsag" (February 21) carried an article which
outlined the current policy of the Party as regards the number
of people to be admitted to the Party. According to the article
it would not be right to prescribe in advance the size of the
Party. The paper warned, however, that the "new strength of
the Party... may create an unbiased situation in which
careerists will want to join the Party for calculating reasons."

KISS, in his Radio BUDAPEST interview, tried to
assuage the fears of the "old comrades" which the February 22
CC Resolution described as "uncomradely," that the onrush of old
HWP members to the Party would, perhaps, prevent them from
receiving their share of Party jobs. He reported that some Party
organizations think that the admission of Party members should
be closed forthwith. KISS demurred. He stressed that the date
of admission to the Party of an individual member is no criteria
for judging this members qualifications as a good or poor Party
member. He also said that the time limit for transferring
membership from the HWP to HSWP is now under discussion by the
Central Committee and that after a certain date all persons
would be admitted as new members.

The extent of distrust which apparently exists
between those persons who immediately joined the new HSWP and
those now joining the Party was indicated by KADAR in a speech

[page 4]

(February 4) to Party activists in SALGOTARJAN. Speaking on
the need of Party strength and unity, KADAR said: "Comrades,
I have found that you are judging people very sternly and that
there is some sectarianism. Here you have stopped taking
members, and in another place you announced that the majority of
the intelligentsia had supported the counterrevolution."

Despite these optimistic statements as to size and
rapid growth of the Party which undoubtedly is being swelled by
"opportunists" as the "old comrades" fear, the regime obviously
feels that many of the 8-900,000 members who comprised the
pre--revolutionary Hungarian Workers Party are genuinely opposed to
the present government and Communist Party and are remaining
outside of the Party on ideological and moral grounds.

"Nepszabadsag" (February 14) stated that it would
not be right to close the Party's gates to the latecomers on
the grounds that there is no need for "waverers." The Party
organ pointed out that some people managed to overcome their
hesitation which resulted from the erroneous policy and the
confusion of the events, sooner, others later. Similar views were
expressed by KISS over Radio BUDAPEST. He explained to present
Party members that there were also former MWP members "who
sustained a greater mental shock, and it will take some time before
they clearly realize what dangers were inherent in the October
events..."

An example of a former HWP member who is hesitating
was described over Radio BELGRADE by the Yugoslav correspondent
Branislav DADIC (February 4.) According to DADIC, a former
"fanatical" member of the Hungarian Communist Party is at
present refusing to join the new Communist Party because he is "
man whose illusions have been destriyed, who has lost all
confidence in the Party. "DADIC indicated that this was in contrast
to many people who were "hurrying to join the Party for
opportunist reasons... (they) are afraid of being caught by working
place reductions." DADIC also stated that the number of people
is not small, who have the most insulting word for the Party and
who described the Party as useless. But, said DADIC, "these
people also favor the idea that Hungary does not need socialism."

The number of people who believe that "Hungary does
not need 'socialism'," is, indeed, not a few as DADIC so aptly
stated. The dissatisfaction of a large segment of the Hungarian
intelligentsia with the present course and composition of the
Party and government is well documented (see section on
"Anti--intelligentsia Bias of the Party"). That this is also the case
among the workers was admitted by Karoly KISS. He stated that
the consolidation of the HSWP organizations in the large factories
and enterprises is being hampered by the "internal confusion
which still exists in many places."

"Nepszabadsag" reported similar difficulties. The
paper stated that although as its name implies, the Hungarian

[page 5]

Socialist Workers Party is primarily a workers' party, this is
at present not the case. Thus, it would appear that the new
Hungarian Communist Party compromised by its attitude toward
the October revolution, temporarily swamped by applicants
joining for "careerist" economic reasons and meeting the stubborn
resistance of former but "disillusioned Communists" is having
more organizational difficulties than even the serious troubles
to which it admits.

In order to combat these organizational difficulties
and "deficiencies" of the Party, the reorganized Central
Committee resolved to:

1. Set up a Central Committee Secretariat.

2. Re-establish the Central Control Committee to
supervise the "purity of the Party."

3. Begin regular cadre work.

4. Organize a Party school with six-month courses
in Marxism-Leninism.

5. Establish a theoretical journal, "Tarsadalmi
Szomle."

6. Inaugurate a "central lecture series to clear up
the most important theoretical problems, to unmask the
"revisionist views" of the NAGY-LOSONCZY group which falsify the teachings
of Marxism-Leninism and to work out the correct Marxist-Leninist
evaluation of the October events..."

7. Prepare and call for a National Party Congress
within the next few months.

The concluding resolution contradicts a Karoly KISS
interview in "Rude Pravo" (February 9.) In this interview KISS
stated that the Party is planning a National Conference of the
Party for early summer. He said that a National Party Congress
would not be held until the beginning of 1958.

The Case of "Imre NAGY and His Friends"

The February Resolutions of the reorganized
Provisional Central Committee sharply criticized the person of Imre
NAGY and the "revisionist" views which are connected with him.
The resolution placed full blame on NAGY for the "ideological
confusion" which, according to the resolution, exists among
"certain strata of the workers." The resolution declared" the
paralysis of the forces of the Party and of socialism was caused
primarily by Imre NAGY and his followers with their anti-Marxist,
revisionist, bourgeois nationalist and anti-Soviet views which
in fact amounted to a negation of the proletarian dictatorship."

[page 6]

This concise definition of NAGY and his followers'
alleged role is in line with other recent Party spokesmen
statements on the "NAGY group." In an interview with the Czechoslovak
Party organ, "Rude Pravo" (February 9) Karoly KISS boasted that
the KADAR regime was winning ever more strength and people were
placing more and more confidence in the government" because in
November and December we did not succumb to pressure demanding
the government negotiate with Imre NAGY and his group." KISS
rejected as false the contention of "various groups and
delegations that without Imre NAGY the leadership of the Party and
the government would be isolated on a narrow basis."

According to KISS, the greatest Party shortcoming
existing during the October events was the antagonism between
two hostile groups in the Hungarian Workers Party. Imre NAGY
and his friends, said KISS, "called the rebels great heroes...
(but)... these 'national heroes' hanged Communists." KISS then
asserted that it was not the Party which erred but only certain
individuals in the Party. This created confusion among the
rank and file Party members leading to psychological
demoralization, he stated.

Gyorgy MAROSAN. Hungarian Minister of State in the
KADAR government declared (February 20) before group of
"enthusiastic" Party activists" that the NAGY group, far from
trying to correct the mistakes of the "old leaders of State", not
only tried to capitalize on these mistakes but "strove to draw
a sunder the existing forces and, primarily, to bring about a
rift in the Party."

In the "Rude Pravo" interview KISS ominously stated
that there is "no question of a narrow basis" of the government
without NAGY and "... more and more ordinary people are of the
opinion today that Imre NAGY ought to be tried by a court,
because he caused great damage."

Developing this theme further in a speech before an
alleged crowd of 3,000 DOROG miners (February 14), MAROSAN
charged, "amid tumultous applause," that "NAGY played a
treasonable role in the counterrevolutionary events and did not oppose
the counterrevolution for a single moment. The fact that he
covered up the murder of Communists and progressive persons
will not be forgotten either."

The latter reference as to the nature of NAGY's
actions in connection with the October events plus the statement
from KISS that people were demanding that NAGY be brought to
trial would seem to indicate that a future show trial is not
out of the question. A Reuter dispatch (February 26), however,
reported a "Foreign Ministry spokesman as stating that the KADAR
government had no intention of bringing Imre NAGY to trial. The
dispatch also said that in some parts of BUDAPEST
slogans -- "a rope for Imre NAGY" -- had been seen.


[page 7]

The Provisional OC Resolution final reference to
NAGY and his group, although not mentioning specific actions
to be taken against NAGY or his followers, declared that "our
Party membership is viewing the treacherous activity of the
Imre NAGY-LOSONCZY group with increasing clarity and is of
the opinion that the final liquidation of the anti-Marxist
views of this group will be a pre-requisite for our successful
progress in the future."

over

[page 8]

Soviet Intervention

Regime propagandists have made little or no, effort to
make excuses for the Intervention of Soviet troops. On the contrary,
Communist leaders have bluntly stated that Russia acted according
to her "class obligation" and every "true son of the working class"
easily understands this action.

In an interview with Radio BUDAPEST (Feb. 23) Gyorgy
MAROSAN revealed how he dealt with the "inevitable question of who
called in Soviet Troops and what justified the use of such troops."
MAROSAN declared that he always answered this question openly:
"Before you stands the man who during the night of October 23-24
who not only requested the use of Soviet troops but demanded their use.."
MAROSAN stated that KADAR formed his government for the sole purpose
of not asking - "but demanding the use of Soviet troops in the
fighting."

MAROSAN recalled for his radio audience that the calling
in of foreign troops to Hungary for the purpose of quelling an
uprising against the established authority is not a Communist
innovation:

"Why? If Miklos HORTHY...had the right to call in
Czechs, Rumanians, Yugoslavs and French Senegalese into Hungary in
1919 to drown in blood the Soviet Republic, the dictatorship of
the proletariat, then I, too, have the right to make use of all
arms to defend the power of the workers and socialist achievements
in Hungary."

MAROSAN assured his listeners that the above statement
was received with understanding by Communists "and other
progressives" at over 30 activists meetings throughout the country.

KADAR told Party activists at SALGOTARJAN (Feb. 4)
that there are no "foreign troops in Hungary" but only the troops
of a "friendly socialist republic, sons ,and daughters of the
October revolution." KADAR maintained that it was impossible to
regard these troops as alien forces. He said that if the
counter-revolution had remained in power for a few more weeks then the
nation would really experienced what it means to have foreign
troops - "those of the imperialist governments..."

At DIOSGYOR (Feb. 16) MAROSAN declared that Soviet
troops would remain on Hungarian territory as long as this is
warranted for the "securing of peace and consolidation of the
workers power in Hungary."

Anti-Intelligentsia Bias of the Party"

The sensitiveness of the Party and the KADAR government
to the charge of furthering an "anti-intelligentsia" bias in Party

[page 9]

and government policy was revealed also in the February
Resolutions of the Provisional Central Committee of the HSWP. In
connection with a call for present Party members to establish "patient,
comradely and friendly relations with those former HSWF members who
have not yet joined the Party", the Central condemned "as harmful
and sectarian the reserved attitude taken by certain Party members
against intellectual workers."

Despite this official disclaimer, Party leaders in the
recent past have, however, not only accused "certain writers" of
fomenting "counter-revolution", but complained that these
intellectuals "stubbornly insist on maintaining their anti-Party and
anti-Socialist views."

Thus, MAROSAN, according to a Yugoslav Radio correspondent
in BUDAPEST (Jan. 29) declared that only one part of the writers
had perceived the present situation in Hungary. "All others, he
stated, "have taken hostile positions against the peoples democratic
order and the socialist camp." The Yugoslav dispatch reported
MAROSAN speaking of the writers' treason as a proven fact.

At activists meetings on February 3 and 4 KADAR
condemned the continued resistance of writers toward his regime and
accused them of "terrorizing the honest-minded writers, who
declared at a meeting that a counter-revolution coup had been
attempted in Hungary, and claimed instead that it had been a revolution."
The same thing also happened in the Journalists' Union, KADAR
declared.

According to KADAR, many writers protested the arrest
of Gyula HAY and others, KADAR warned the intelligentsia that his
was a Worker and Peasant government which would cut short the
outburst of "such villains as HAY, ZELK and others." He then
pointed out that the government had "held back for weeks, because we
thought, although they did a great wrong to the people, their (ed.
the writers) confused thinking would clear and they would sober
down...We waited in vain." KADAR then maintained that none could
blame the regime for not giving such dissident writers a chance
to live "the life of an honest person." He dismissed the
accusations of ruthlessness emanating from home and abroad by stating
that the "peoples1 lives, blood and happiness are far more
important to us than causing Radio Free Europe to be satisfied with
our democracy."

Antal APRO, speaking to Communist activists from
BUDAPEST'S Ninth District (Feb. 10) repeated and expanded on
KADAR's earlier charges:

"Certain intellectual circles in Hungary -- a group of
writers and journalists - were the organizers of the slander
campaign against Party workers and state employees. These organizers
included, among others, such people as Tibor DERY, Gyula HAY,

[page 10]

Zoltan ZELK and his associates, who, as chief spoilsports and
correspondents of the hostile Radio Free Europe, were the
precusors of the counter-revolution. They did their utmost to slander...
everyone who raised his voice against boundless demagogy and
championed the leading role of the Party and the working class."

From the vehemence of the regime denials that the Party
and Worker and Peasant state were anti-intelligentsia in their
policy and actions, it may be surmised that the regime has by no
means overcome the feelings of resentment to which its
repressive measures against the writers mentioned above apparently gave
rise. MAROSAIT, the marathon spokesman for the Party and
government on matters of policy, declared (Feb. 16) at the heavy
industry center of DIOSGYOR that the "counter-revolution accuses the
government and Party of being anti-intelligentsia." This accusation
MAROSAN said is not only "unfounded,.. but also wicked and silly."
How, asked MAROSAN, can a Communist be "anti-intelligentsia?"
Despite the fact, MAROSAN said, that we have been waging a bitter
struggle and will continue to fight against "certain attitudes"
prevailing among intellectual circles, "we are guided by scientific
Marxism-Leninism, therefore no Communist can be anti-intellectual,
anti-science, anti-literature or anti-art."

In his last major speech, MAROSAN (Feb. 23.) again
returned to the charge that the government and Party were
"anti-intelligentsia" and termed such "vile" accusations as an attempt
of the "counter-revolution to compromise them externally and
internally." He warned the workers against such allegations coming
from "misled intellectuals" and called on the people to be more
"vigilant regarding the social composition of students in future
admissions to the universities.

At the same time as MAROSAN was dismissing the
"anti-intelligentsia" charge as an invention of the "counter-revolution",
"Nepszabadsag" (Feb. 23) protested against the attitude of certain
Party functionaries toward intellectual in general: "Not only
certain writers, journalists and recently pedagogues are being
condemned, but everyone whose profession it is to write..."

It would appear from the foregoing that the regime is
determined to stamp out all resistance emanating from the intelligentsia
by physically supressing all criticism, while at the same time
offering intellectuals an opportunity to regain their old
privelged status in the "Worker and Peasant state." It is doubtful whether
MAROSAIT's protestations as to the affection which the KADAR regime
allegedly holds "honest-minded" writers and journalists would
carry much conviction to the bulk of intellectuals in Hungary who
placed themselves on record as approving the aims and principles
of the October revolution. They are more apt to be guided by the Party's
repressive measures against the Writers Federation. In January
the regime dissolved the Writers and Journalist Federation and
brought their activities directly under the Ministry of Interior.

[page 11]

"Destalinization"

The February resolution of the Provisional CC stressed
that the HSWP has sucessfully "repelled" the efforts of the
counter-revolution" to hinder the re-organization of the Party. The document
said that "under the false slogans of 'Rakosiism and Stalinism'
a systematic attempt was made "to blacken and persecute honest,
active Communists."

The resolution further stated that a "determined stand"
has been taken against "the danger of a sectarian policy." The
defeat of the "false slogan" of destalinization plus an awareness
of the danger of "sectarianism", the document said, has enable the
Provisional CO to assure "the leading role of the Party in the state
and social life of the Hungarian Peoples Republic with ever
increasing efficacy." The resolution termed the securing of the leading
role of the Party to be "the formost and most important task of
every Communist."

In this connection, the resolution would seem to be a
continuation of the regime's past efforts to convince Hungarians
that it condemns both "rightist deviation" and "leftist sectarianism"
with equal vehemence. For this reason the value of the Resolutions
of the July Plenum, 1956 for the KADAR government is becoming
increasingly apparent. It is recalled that the July Plenum
condemned, among other things, "rightist deviation" and "sectarianism"
as well as "certain writers of the PETOEFI Club."

The Party has on several occasions claimed that; the July
Plenum of the Party created the conditions for rectifying the "just
complaints" of the Hungarian Communists and non-Party people. In
all its efforts to turn back the clock and establish pre-revolutionary
conditions, the HSWP has never denied that the past leadership
committed mistakes but has insisted that these mistakes were the faults
of individuals and, therefore, were not inherent in the system.

The current line of the HSWP would seem to be designed,
on the one hand, to single out individuals for the role of
scapegoats for past errors and, on the other, to defend rank and file
Communists, as well as other Party leaders, from the
"counter-revolutionary" accusation of collective guilt. Thus, Antal APRO
(Feb. 10) defended the actions of Party and state functionaries
prior to the revolution:

"Have these leaders committed mistakes in high and low
jobs? Yes, many of them have committed mistakes. When we revealed
the faults of Party and state management in 1953, we dismissed a
considerable number of functionaries from responsible positions....
It is true nevertheless, that we should have gone further...the
dismissal of Matyas RAKOSI was already timely in 1953.

[page 12]

... But for the faults committed by the leaders, the
subordinates in lower posts who are dutifully executing orders and
instructions are not responsible...Yet the counter-revolution
attacked these people in the same way as leaders who bore responsibility
for the mistakes."

The new Party organ, "Nepszabadsag" (Feb. 3) discussing
whether the October events constituted revolution or
counter-revolution objected to current "reasoning" that without the October
events the country "could not have gotten rid of clique of the old
leadership and there could be no realization of the just demands
of the people." The paper declared that already before October,
i.e., after the XXth Party Congress, democratization along
"socialist lines was progressing irresistibly toward realization."

(over)

[page 13]

The official organ further stated that although
these efforts at democratization resulted in the dismissal of
RAKOSI and the acceptance of a "number of good resolutions,"
the increase in "beneficial changes did not keep pace with the
growing wrath of the people." Unfortunately, the paper said,
the counter-revolution intervened in this democratization of
Party life and the elimination of past bad policies, and,
although playing a part in eliminating these policies and old
leadership, tried to reinstitute an "anti-people regime."

KADAR (Feb 3) speaking at NOGRAD differed somewhat
with the above interpretation of the October events. He
stressed that "every honest Communist saw that the July Plenary was
the turning point in our Party's life. It was when the
counter-revolution sensed the danger of our Party correcting its
mistakes that it struck...."

Communist Party spokesmen are stressing that
"Stalinism" and "Rakosiism" are gone forever from the Hungarian public
life without, however, mentioning the specific steps which have
been taken to remove these influences. Indeed, there is an
increasing effort to equate attacks on "Rakosiism" with
attacks on the socialist order. Karoly KISS (Feb 9) in a "Rude
Pravo" interview stated that "among Communists, hostile slogans
are still to be heard on the replacement of "Stalinists" and
"Rakosists," but the Party is ....fighting against these slogans
because they waste a great deal of energy."

Janos KADAR has on two occasions stated that the
slogans of "anti-Stalinism" were only tools of the
counter-revolution against the peoples democratic order. In an attack on RFE,
KADAR declared (Jan 16) the "imperialists used the distorted
slogans of the process of destalinization and the fight against
Rakosiism" to launch an attack against Hungarian independence.
Addressing a Party activist meeting in SALGOTARJAN (Feb 3,)
KADAR warned that the counter-revolution, by calling for a
rectification of STALIN's errors, meant by this rectification
that the "socialist revolution itself must be killed."

In a live interview with Radio BUDAPEST (Feb 23)
MAROSAN, recalling the days when Communists were set in
opposition to each other by being labelled "Rakosi-ists" and
"Stalinists," said this was only a maneuver to disrupt the unity of
the Communists and the workers. This may also be equated, MAROSAN
declared, with the current slogan of "anti-intelligentsia" policy
of the government and the Party. This only serves the purpose
of bringing the working class into opposition to and against
the intelligentsia, he said.

In a speech at PRIESZOL (Feb 16) MAROSAN discussed
the contention that the "Stalinist-Rakosist methods" derive from
Marxist-Leninists ideology. This is impossible, the Minister
stated, if only for the simple reason that that Marxism-Leninism

[page 14]

existed before STALIN was even alive. Further, MAROSAN
announced that the "RAKOSI methods cannot return because the Worker
Peasant government born in battle, and the Hungarian Socialist
Workers Party will see to it that it does not...."

It may be only concluded from the foregoing that
"Stalinism" has, by definition, disappeared from Hungary.

National Communism and Revisionism of Marxism-Leninism

Hungarian Communist leaders are resolutely combating
any attempts at deviation from the established MOSCOW ideological
concept of "international proletarianism." They have publicly
stated that the "solidarity of the socialist camp" is the most
important prerequisite for the building of socialism in any one
country and have aligned themselves solidly with other members
of the socialist (Poland excepted) in acknowledging the
leadership of the Soviet Union.

Recognizing the necessity of ideological unity in
the Party, several sharp attacks against national
Communism -- rightist deviation, and sectarianism -- leftist deviation, are
common features of regime and Party statements.

Bearing in this mind, the recent Party resolution
warned that the "final annihilation of the anti-Party,
anti-working class and anti-Soviet Union ideology of the
counter-revolution, of national Communism and neutrality demands more
serious ideological work and political agitation from our Party."

"Nepszabadsag" (Feb 6) reporting on a Party meeting
in BUDAPEST'S XlVth District quoted MAROSAN as saying:

"To the fallacious slogan of National Communism
we reply that there is no power on earth that will divert
Hungary from the socialist camp. Party life will be more
democratic, the Party members will have freedom of discussion before
resolutions are issued, but once they are issued we shall apply
them with united, iron discipline. There will not be two trends
in our ranks: this we could not tolerate, for we can see where
it would lead us."

The same paper on the preceeding day warned the Party
on the danger of "revisionism and dogmatism" in the Party. The
article stated that the "main danger lies in dogmatism and events
have taught us that we do not always fight with sufficient energy
against this main danger."

Janos KADAR has todate given the most extensive account
of the Hungarian Communist Party attitude toward National
Communism. At a meeting on February 4, he declared that "National
Communism is a false slogan aimed at misleading the workers

[page 15]

because Communism is international and is the ideology of the
workers of the world."

KADAR drew a parallel between the rise of National
Socialism in Germany and the "imperialist attempt to introduce
National Communist into the socialist camp." KADAR argued that
"monopolistic capitalism," unable to return openly to power in
the WEIMAR Republic launched the fascist Adolf HITLER, and the
invention of National Socialism. He asserted that it has long
been known that this National Socialism was neither socialist nor
nationalist.

Recently, KADAR continued, the imperialists have
conjured up a new slogan called National Communism and openly
stated that the aim of this slogan was to disrupt the unity of
the socialist camp and separate the East European countries from
MOSCOW; to promote discrimination among Communist by calling
one a soft Communist and another a hard Communist or one an
international Communist or a national Communist. KADAR
stressed that this sort of reasoning is only an imperialist
invention designed to fool the workers: "There is no such thing as
national Communism."

In this connection KADAR expressed the conviction
that the "Stalinist and Rakosiist ideas have had their day in
Hungary." On November 4, he declared, "it became clear that we
were fighting against counter-revolution and not against some
imaginary Stalinism or Rakosiism because while we argue over
such imaginary concepts the counter-revolution strangles the
dictatorship of the proletariat."

Thus, it becomes increasingly clear why KADAR holds
the long article in the Chinese Communist Party's theoretical
journal, "Jan Min Jih Pao," in such high esteem ("a priceless
document.") This article advanced the theory that STALIN's
merit outwieghed by far any faults he might have had; that
the system was not responsible or affected by such
mistakes -- apparently even those listed by KHRUSHCHEV in his secret speech:
the unity of the socialist camp is above every other
consideration; acknowledges the leading role of the Soviet Union and
condemns all attempts at revising the Leninist theory which
would endanger the principle of the dictatorship of the
proletariat under the leadership of the Party.

On January 16, KADAR called on Party propagandists
and activists to hold firm to the "true tenets" of
Marxism-Leninism. Referring to the work of the press and radio, KADAR
demanded a radical improvement in the political and ideological
work conducted among the masses. KADAR observed that it has
become a habit "with certain journalist comrades, that under
the slogan of some kind of objectivity, the news from the
wideworld is often completely...compiled of news items from
capitalist countries, as if there are no socialist countries in the
world. Ideological work, and within in this press and radio
propaganda, must be considered as a question of the greatest

[page 16]

importance.... in the fight against counter-revolution.  The
place of armed struggle has been taken by the battle of words
and letters, and the forces of the revolution must also win in
this."

Workers Councils and Trade Unions

The regime's struggle against Workers Councils and
to a lesser extent Trade Unions has been characterized by almost
the same kind of violence which occurred during the armed phase
of the revolution. KADAR's efforts to reimpose the economic
chains of the RAKOSI era on the workers and Workers Councils
have not been without bloodshed on both sides.

The resolution of the provisional CC of the HSWP
declared that the "consolidation of the Trade Union... has
started and is continuing as a part of the struggle against
revisionist right-wing views. We have rejected the reactionary
demands...(of) the right to strike against the state of the
Workers and for Trade Unions 'independent' of the Party...."

In connection with Workers Councils the resolution
stated that "for a long time after their formation the Workers
Councils represented the reserve forces of the
counter-revolution." The document claimed, however, that after the
"disbanding of the Territorial Workers Councils," these institutions
underwent a "phase of serious and positive development." According
to the resolution, this "phase" is by no means complete. The
document declared that in Workers Councils a "paramount task
remains to eliminate the vestiges of alien and hostile political
influence still predominant in them." The resolution also
deplored the existence of a "sectarian" attitude in some factories
and pointed out that "dual direction" of production must be
avoided.

As is well known, the regime has confined the
activities of the Workers Councils to matters of production only.
Workers Councils, however, have rejected this definition of its
tasks and have as a rule refused to exercise economic
responsibilities if shorn of their political influence. Thus the CSEPEL
Workers Council in BUDAPEST inspite of bitter resistance, felt
itself compelled to resign (Jan 10) since under the existing
circumstances, i.e. deprived of political power, "we cannot
discharge our tasks. All we may do is to carry out government
instructions. But we cannot comply with orders which run counter
to our convictions. We cannot look idly on while members of
Workers' Councils are being arrested and harassed without cause
and the whole Workers' Councils are branded as
counter-revolutionaries."

The resignation of the Central Workers' Council in
BUDAPEST, spurred the government and Party on to greater efforts

[page 17]

at infiltrating the remaining councils in the individual
enterprises and factories. That this was no easy task was further
indicated by MAROSAN (February 23). He said that the
government is succeeding on all fronts, "even into those where one
almost has to force one's way with bayonets." On a different
occasion (February 9), MAROSAN declared that the relationship
between the Party and the Workers' Council is steadily
improving and that the Party is carrying out the slogan "Communists
to the Workers' Councils."

MAROSAN also declared (February 23) that working
class unity has now reached the point where this unity could
not be disrupted by any kind of strike: "In Hungary today one
cannot get the workers to lay down tools... They stand by us."

In connection with Workers Councils, KADAR
(February 3) stated that Party members should concern themselves with
ideological work among the workers and the key problem of
production. The Workers' Councils, KADAR said, "should work
directly with the working people. There should be Communists on
the Councils but it is not necessary for them to be in a
majority."

Obviously, once the regime has undermined the
political power of the councils, there is no need for "Communists to
be in the majority." KADAR was even more specific on the
following day. At SALG0TARJAN he claimed that "if we can bring the
workers councils under the ideological guidance of the Party,
they will definitely be able to carry on useful work for the
benefit of the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship... The tasks
of the Workers' Council is to take part in the direction of
production, to function for the benefit of the working class
and to help in making the management less bureaucratic..."

There is no doubt that the Party can in the end
establish formal power over the Workers' Councils. Indeed, it
would appear that this is rapidly becoming the case. It is
well known, however, that the revolutionary innovation of
Workers' Councils in Hungary was one of the most popular and
promising events of the October revolution. It may well be that if
the Party removes or heavily infiltrates this institution, it
will achieve a questionable political victory and a probable
economic set-back.

(pc)

End

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