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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 3-2-40
TITLE:             New Elements Of Nationalist Manifestations In Kosovo
BY:                lz
DATE:              1972-7-18
COUNTRY:           Albania
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Nationalities

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YUGOSLAVIA: NATIONALITIES
18 July 1972

NEW ELEMENTS OF NATIONALIST MANIFESTATIONS IN KOSOVO

Summary: "Hostile" church activities and the
reactivization of "Chetnik" and "Ballist" forces
are the latest inclusions in the array of
nationalist elements in Kosovo, the largely Albanian
inhabited Yugoslav province. This paper reviews
recent Kosovar developments, with special attention
given to statements by Dushan Mugosha and Mahmut
Bakalli, two high provincial officials with
contrasting backgrounds.

Nationalist rumblings are a familiar feature of
present-day Kosovo though they often tend to get lost in the maze of
other Yugoslav issues. Periodic flare-ups, however, bring the
political situation of the largely Albanian inhabited autonomous
province to the attention of the general Yugoslav public. Only
six months have elapsed since Kosovo's last nationalist-inspired
unrest was brought under control and already there are signs
that the province is experiencing another wave of nationalist
tensions. Though the consequences of nationalist aspirations have
not been as heavy in Kosovo as in Croatia, [1] practically all
spheres of activity in Kosovo--political, economic, social,
cultural and religious--are used as fields for its expression.

Clergy Under Attack

In connection with the church's role in promoting nationalist
ambitions, lately a topical issue, the Kosovar League of
Communists held a plenary session to discuss "the hostile activity of
the clergy and the religions." [2]

-------------------------

(1) See lz, "A Review of Current Developments in Kosovo,"
CAA Report No. 1273, Radio Free Europe Research, 24 Jan. 1972.

(2) Rilindja, 6 July 1972 and Radio Belgrade, 5 July 1972.

[page 2]

It was asserted that Orthodox priests are increasingly
involving themselves in the protection of nationality interests.
They have been collecting data on the emigration of Serbs from
the province and are presenting the situation in the region "in
an unfavorable light." Outdoor meetings, it was alleged, are
being organized by Orthodox priests during which "fiery speeches
with nationalist contents" are delivered. The session also spoke
of the "perfidious activities" of the Roman Catholic Church
which "presents the state as unable to solve certain problems." On
the whole, the plenary meeting delivered a very harsh indictment
on the church's role in the province:

"The clergy and religion, by exploiting the freedom of
religion, act from anti-socialist positions. By spreading their
influence in the ranks of the citizens, they introduce intolerance
and inter-nationality confrontations. The entire clergy appears
as protectors of their respective nationalities."

Although the plenary session tried to give the impression
that all three major confessions in the province--Moslem, Orthodox,
Catholic--are guilty of misbehavior, in actuality it is the
Orthodox clergy which took the brunt of the attack. This was
underscored by the provincial league chairman Mahmut Bakalli in a
recent interview with 30 foreign journalists. [3] In answer to
a question by the correspondent of the Bulgarian news agency
BTA, Bakalli stated:

As regards church-state relations, both sides show
a certain tolerance, although at times one can feel
the reactionary role of the church. We will,
therefore, not permit the church's interference in politics
and inter-nationality relations. Such attempts have been
made recently by a section of the Orthodox clergy.

Certain representatives of Kosovo's Serbian nationality group
who feel threatened by the so-called Albanian "majority," for
"protective" purposes seek the aid of the Eastern Orthodox Church
and that of influential former high party officials whose records
date back to the partisan days.

Partisan Veterans Appear on the Scene

It is no secret that the old partisan veterans who maintain a
strong lobby in Belgrade form a powerful block of Serb-Montenegrin
supporters in Kosovo. Lately they have increased their activities
in the province, too. [4] The communal conference of the city of
Mitrovica, for example, in examining the fractionalist activities
of a local party organization, spoke of outside pressures. The
case was cited of a retired colonel from Belgrade who demanded
the reversal of a decision to dissolve the party organization.

---------------------------

(3) Rilindja, 30 June 1972.

(4) See Slobodan Stankovic, "After the 34th Session of the
Yugoslav Party Presidium," CAA Report No. 1483, Radio Free
Europe Research, July 19, 1972.

[page 3]

The most intriguing aspect of the new developments in
the province, however, is the re-introduction of the alleged
threat posed by such old enemies as the Serb "Chetnik" and
Albanian "Ballist" forces. Whether by coincidence or by
deliberate intention (and the latter is more likely), the identification
of another group creates in Kosovo a situation similar to that in
Croatia where the Ustashi serve as a rallying point for external
hostinationalist elements. The specter of the two wartime nationalist
groups was raised by no less than Dushan Mugosha during the
unveiling of a partisan memorial in the city of Peja (Pec).
Mugosha was one of Kosovo's top figures in the Yugoslav partisan
leadership and is well known for his important role as Tito's
emmissary in helping launch the Albanian communist movement. He
handled military assignments at that time. Following Rankovic's
downfall, Mugosha's influence in Kosovo decreased perceptibly and
he moved to Belgrade. The power subsequently shifted to the
younger generation of provincial leaders and to the ranks of the
Albanian ethnic group led by Mahmut Bakalli. In fact the most
revealing aspect of the Peja meeting was the striking contrast
between Mugosha's speech and that of Bakalli who also addressed
the gathering. [5] The former's stress was on issues related
to the past whereas the latter dealt with problems of the present.
Not once did Mugosha mention Rankovic by name in his attack on
all sorts of anti-Socialist forces in the province, whereas
Bakalli repeatedly attacked Rankovic directly. Instead Mugosha
unexpectedly raised the specter of the "Chetnik" and "Ballist"
danger:

The Chetniks, the Ballists, and the irredentists
were militarily defeated here among us.
Ideologically, however, they are still active among us.
They view our democratic society as suitable for
their anti-popular and anti-Yugoslav activities.
Today, they do not appear on the scene as Chetniks
and Ballists although they act from the same
positions.... Both groups claim that their national
interests are being threatened: the Albanians by
the Serbs and the Montenegrins and vice-versa.
They have a common name: enemies of self-managing
socialist Yugoslavia. They are ready to make a
pact even with the "devil himself...." We must
treat them in the same manner as we do the rabid
enemies of self-managing socialist Yugoslavia.

This line serves Mugosha well in his attempt to justify
the principles of those who fought in the national-liberation
movement. It is possible that with Tito's era coming to an end,
Mugosha and other old partisan forces are beginning to reactivate
themselves in Kosovo by concentrating their guns mainly on the old
enemy. It is a tactic which finds a favorable response among some
dissatisfied stratas of the population.

---------------------------

(5) Rilindja, 5 July 1972.

[page 4]

In contrast to Mugosha, the progressive, young (38 years
old) Bakalli concentrated his attention on the "social and
national liberation" platform of the post-Brioni era, i.e., the
period since Rankovic's fall. He first delivered an implicit
attack on the hardliners, boldly declaring that "we are neither
impressed nor convinced by the various propaganda sheets charging
us with having revised Marxism-Leninism." He then reiterated
the favorite theme of the Albanian ethnic group today in Kosovo:

The bureaucratic deformations of socialism in
our midst led to an inevitable slow-down in the
affirmation of national equality and encouraged
unitarian and hegemonistic relations. The
disregard shown to inter-nationality relations
had grave consequences for Kosovo and the Albanian
ethnic group. As a result of the revolutionary
vision of Tito, the Yugoslav League of Communists
reaped a great victory at the Fourth Plenum
against the bureaucratic-dogmatic Rankovic forces.
A new phase was instituted in the affirmation of
national equality and in the reaffirmation of the
party policy in inter-nationality relations, which
was the basis of the national liberation movement.

Thus, both speakers defend the basic principles of the
national-liberation war, but with entirely different purposes.
Mugosha uses them to attack the war-time enemy which allegedly
continues its activity even today, whereas Bakalli uses the
occasion to attack the enemy of more recent origin.

Bakalli's implicit rejection of recent Albanian anti-Tito

polemics [6] was also a shrewd move. He tries to dispel any
misconception regarding the Prishtina leaders' demands for complete
national equality, which presupposes the further improvement of
Kosovar-Albanian relations. Bakalli's main interest, however, is
to re-emphasize the fact that the achievements, interests and fate
of Yugoslavia's 1.5 million Albanian ethnics are closely linked
with Tito's name:

Like all other peoples and nationalities of
Yugoslavia, so the Albanians in Kosovo and in
Yugoslavia have connected the fate of their own
liberation and affirmation with Tito, with Tito's
self-managing socialist Yugoslavia, with the unity
and equality of the peoples and of the nationalities
with which they live and experience their true social,
national and human aspirations. Precisely for this
reason, the smallest attack, from wherever it may come,
against the personality of Tito--not only as chief of
state and head of our Party, but also as a symbolic
figure in our revolution, our freedom and
affirmation--will be considered as an attack against our revolution,
an attack against what is dearest and most sacred to

----------------------------

(6) See lz., "The Meaning of the Anti-Yugoslav Attack," CAA
Report No. 1450, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 June 1972.

[page 5]

us; we will consider it a direct attack
against us and therefore, like true revolutionaries,
we will be merciless against these attacks. Because,
Tito--we are here!

The contrast which can be noted in the speeches delivered
by the two high Kosovar functionaries is evidence of the efforts
by various powerful forces in the province to gather support for
their present positions and future intentions. It is quite
obvious that Tito's personality now acts as a very strong unifying
force in this restless area. The big question to be answered is:
what will happen after Tito?

lz

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