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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 35-5-224
TITLE:             The Partial Agreement Between Budapest and the Holy See: Ten Years Later
BY:                KK
DATE:              1974-10-10
COUNTRY:           Hungary
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Hungary/11
THEMATIC SUBJECTS: Hungary--1966-1975, Church and State, Hungary--Foreign Relations--Vatican

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

This material was prepared for the use of the
editors and policy staff of Radio Free Europe.

HUNGARY/11
10 October 1974

THE PARTIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN BUDAPEST AND THE HOLY SEE:
TEN YEARS LATER

Summary: This paper reviews the 10 years that have passed
since the partial agreement between the Holy See and the 
Hungarian government was signed. It notes the various topics that
have come up for discussion and decision. A number of issues
have been resolved by mutual agreement, and when this has not
been possible it has been agreed to shelve them until a mutually
acceptable solution can be found. The situation of the Catholic
Church in Hungary has been eased to a certain extent, but a good
number of questions remain unsolved. There has been temporary
improvement in certain limited areas, but the Hungarian regime
is adhering to its policy of building a society devoid of 
religion. Any gestures of good will and leniency must therefore be
seen as measures dictated by objective necessity and opportunism
rather than by a. genuine desire to find a permanent modus
vivendi with the Catholic Church.

* * *

The Agreement: Background and Circumstance

These past weeks have seen the 10th anniversary of the conclusion of a
partial agreement between the Hungarian government and the Holy See, the 
latter acting also on behalf of the Hungarian Catholic Church.[1] It was a 
partial agreement because, of a host of questions that had accumulated between
the Hungarian government and the Holy See and the Hungarian Church, only on a
few could agreement be reached. These were: a degree of normalization in the
personnel structure of the top hierarchy of the Hungarian Catholic Church;
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the state by all priests; the new
statutes of the Papal Hungarian Institute of Rome, which was removed from 
control by emigrant priests and put under the supervision of the Bench of Bishops
in Hungary, and hence under the control of the government. The limited scope
of the agreement thus becomes evident, though it was the upshot of difficult
negotiations and hard bargaining which had been dragging on since the spring
of 1963. At the end of the document both sides expressed the hope that "other
problems may also be solved in the future through further talks." Jozsef

-------------------------
(l) See RE/Hungarian Unit, "The Hungarian-Vatican Accord," Hungarian 
	Background Report, Radio Free Europe Research, 18 September 1964.


[page 2]

Prantner, then president of the Hungarian State Office for Church Affairs,
attributed the partial agreement to a more "realistic" appreciation by the
Holy See of the progress achieved by the Hungarian People's Republic and the.
enhanced reputation of the socialist countries. This, in Prantner's opinion,
had impressed the Vatican and was behind its readiness to settle relations
with the Hungarian state. Such a "realistic policy" might lead to the 
settlement of other pending issues as well, Prantner concluded. [2]

Looking back over the 10 years that have elapsed since the conclusion of
the partial agreement of September 1964 it cannot be denied that there has
been a slow and gradual improvement of the relations between the Hungarian
government and the Catholic Church. The degree of satisfaction is by no means
equal on each side, however. It can be said that the Hungarian government is,
on the whole, more gratified with the results (albeit not on all scores) than
is the Holy See, and not without good reason. It is curious that the 
dissatisfaction and disappointment of the Vatican are hardly ever mentioned by its
spokesmen -- let alone by those of the Hungarian Catholic Church, whose leaders 
keep absolute silence on the subject; only Western Catholic observers and
communication media from time to time advance the opinion that, after all, the
Hungarian government has received more as a result of the various compromises
of the past 10 years than did the Holy See and the Hungarian Church. This
statement may be open to discussion, but nonetheless it contains at least a
grain of truth.

Be that as it may, it is important to point out that the partial 
agreement ushered in a new era in the relations between state and Church. One is
confronted here with a principle that represents a real breakthrough and has
been respected by both sides as a solid foundation for their relations. Until
September 1964 the Hungarian government and the Holy See pretended to ignore
each other. They were, one might say, not on speaking terms. The Vatican
made decisions regarding the Hungarian Catholic Church -- e.g., by making
ecclesiastical appointments (of apostolic administrators and bishops) which
were valid de jure but could not be implemented in practice because they were
made without previous consultation with the Hungarian government, which the
latter regarded as inadmissible interference by a "foreign power" in Hungary's
domestic affairs. Conversely, the "accord" concluded under duress between the
Hungarian Catholic Church and the government in August 1950 [3] was regarded
as valid by the Hungarian state but considered null and void by the Holy See.
If this collision course was to be abandoned in favor of one of gradual 
convergence and co-operation, recognition of the fact that the Hungarian Catholic
Church is subject to double allegiance was essential: it is an organic part
of the universal Catholic Church, and as such subordinate to its world-wide
organization and discipline; but at the same time it must exist within the
boundaries of a communist state whose official ideology -- atheism -- is 
diametrically opposed to the doctrines of the Church. Therefore the Hungarian
Church had to develop "peaceful coexistence" with the Hungarian government,
which became possible only after the Holy See and the government had decided
to recognize each other in some way. This was the breakthrough that underlay
the partial agreement of September 1964. Since then it has become a strictly
adhered to practice to refrain from unilateral action and to resolve all 
pending problems by mutual agreement. If no agreement is possible the two sides
------------------------------
(2) Ibid.

(3) Kis Ujsag, 1 September 1950, P. 1 .



[page 3]

continue to negotiate until a common platform is hammered out; in the 
meantime the situation remains unchanged. Such tactics are unlikely to result in
spectacular achievements or rapid progress, as the past 10 years have 
demonstrated. But they have put an end to a period of cold war, and that in itself
is a considerable achievement.

How the Government Marked the Anniversary

The Church and the government marked the 10th anniversary of the partial
agreement in different ways. The communiqué issued after the September 11-12
conference of the Bench of Bishops contained only one terse sentence to the
effect that the chairman of the conference, Archbishop Jozsef Ijjas of Kalocsa,
had "commemorated the 10th anniversary of the partial agreement concluded 
between the Apostolic See and the Hungarian state on 14 September 1964." [4]
Some days later State Secretary Imre Miklos, president of the State Office for
Church Affairs, granted an interview to Homeland Radio, [5] which broadcasts
to Hungarians abroad, in the course of which he made no effort to hide his
satisfaction with the partial agreement. When it became clear that the 
Catholic Church (he meant of course the Holy See), he said, wished to pursue a
"realistic" policy consonant with its actual interests, not imaginary ones,
the Hungarian People's Republic was not averse to conducting talks on 
questions of mutual interest -- a practice, in fact, that was in complete harmony
With its foreign policy. The partial agreement recognized the "legal rights"
of the Hungarian state, and had stood the test of time to the satisfaction of
both sides, and the experience and the results of "our relations” augur well
for the future. Questions awaiting settlement can be resolved with good will
and respect for mutual interest.

The biweekly publication of the peace priests, Katolikus Szo,[6] was
almost exultant about the 1964 agreement. These priests felt that the 
agreement fully vindicated their proregime attitude, which has been frowned upon
for nearly 15 years by the Holy See and most of the Hungarian Catholic Church
hierarchy (the peace priest movement was founded in August 1950). In their
view the agreement had put an end to the "rear-guard" actions of the Vatican
and certain prelates of the Hungarian Church. In fact, said the paper, it was
long overdue. It had opened up new avenues within the Hungarian Church, and
in regard to external politics it was in line with "the objectives of our
socialist mother country, and also brought with it an increase in prestige."
The prominent peace priest Ferenc Weisz, deputy secretary-general of the peace
priest organization, went even further, saying that Hungarian peace priests were
harbingers of the spirit of the late Pope John XXIII. Without their efforts,
the favorable development of relations between the Holy See and the Hungarian
People's Republic would have been "inconceivable," but thanks to their
activities the Church's day-to-day policy is nonaggressive. Many problems have
been solved, the framework of the Church's activity has been enlarged, there
are forums and opportunities to solve newly emerging issues. There is contact
---------------------------
(4) Uj Ember, 22 September 1974.

(5) Homeland Radio, 3 October 1974.

(6) 15 September 1974.


[page 4]

between the Holy See and the Hungarian People's Republic, nor is the will to
settle (pending) issues lacking, he said. [7]

Church Personnel Changes Since 1964

The "achievements" recorded since the conclusion of the partial agreement
should be placed under various headings. The most conspicuous efforts 
centered around the renovation of the top hierarchy of the Hungarian Catholic
Church, an item that has always ranked high on the agenda of negotiations 
between representatives of the Holy See and the Hungarian government. The main
difficulty lies in finding outstanding clergymen whose loyalty to both the
Holy See and the Hungarian government is beyond question. This means that 
outright peace priests are barred from elevation to the supreme hierarchy, as are
clergymen who are felt to lean too far toward the Holy See. These 
preconditions necessarily narrow the circle of prospective candidates, which accounts
at least in part for the long intervals between nominations, despite the fact
that conditions within the top hierarchy leave much to be desired. Since the
1964 agreement was signed five changes have been made. [8] The most sweeping
of these took place in January 1969 [9]; those made in February 1972 were
disappointingly restricted, [10] and those of September 1971 and February 1974
were both connected with the "phasing out" of Cardinal Mindszenty. [11]

There are three archdioceses adn eight dioceses (of which one is Greek
Uniate) in Hungary, and at present there are two residential archbishops
(Jozsef Ijjas in Kalocsa and Jozsef Bank in Eger; the latter is also 
apostolic administrator of the diocese of Vac, of which he was residential bishop
between 1969 and 1974) and two residential bishops (Jozsef Cserhati in Pecs
and Imre Kisberk in Szekesfehervar). This means that one archdiocese 
(Esztergom) and six dioceses are governed by apostolic administrators who are also
titular bishops, while the Greek Uniate diocese (Hajdudorog) is governed by a
capitular vicar.

The Holy See's removal of Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty as the de jure head
of the archdiocese of Esztergom in February 1974 gave rise to some hope, shared
by the Hungarian government, that the road to a radical improvement in the top
hierarchy of the Hungarian Church had been opened. The existence of so many
apostolic administrators, even if they are titular bishops, is by no means
normal. The Greek Uniate diocese of Hajdudorog is in particularly poor shape
since it lacks even a titular bishop (the capitular vicar, Dr. Imre Timko, is

---------------------------
(7) 	Weisz's report to the joint session of Opus Pacis and the Catholic 
	Committee of the National Peace Council was delivered on September 10 and
	quoted in Katolikus Szo, 29 September 1974

(8) 	In September 1964, January 1969, September 1971, February 1972, and
	February 1974.

(9) 	See KK, "Hungarian Catholicism and the Kadar Regime: Do New Bishops
	Mean New Hope?" Hungarian BR/21, RFER (EERA), 5 May 1969.

(10) 	See KK, "New Vatican Appointments in Hungary," Hungarian BR/3, RFER
	(EERA), 10 March 1972.

(11) 	See KK, "Cardinal Mindszenty Removed as Primate of Hungary," Hungarian
	BR/3, RFER (EERA), 13 February 1974.


[page 5]

an excellent scholar but also an ardent peace priest (and therefore the 
diocese has to "import" a bishop from Yugoslavia whenever episcopal functions
roust be performed. [12]

On Mindszenty. . .

It is generally known that the Hungarian government made it a conditio
sine qua non for the further "normalization" in the top hierarchy that the
Holy See remove Cardinal Mindszenty as head of the archdiocese of Esztergom.
Hungarian news media stressed the" fact that Dr. Bank had been appointed 
archbishop of Eger, Dr. Kisberk residential bishop of Szekesfehervar, Dr. Laszlo
Lukai apostolic administrator of Esztergom, and Dr. Laszlo Kadar apostolic
administrator of the diocese of Veszprem (both the latter are titular bishops)
only after Pope Paul had declared the archbishopric of Esztergom "vacant." [13]
When the new dignitaries took their oath of allegiance, Archbishop Bank,
speaking on behalf of all of them, expressed the hope that, like earlier agreements
on appointments, the recent one would also be a prelude to a “new era." [14]

State Secretary Imre Miklos wrote in Nepszabadsag [15] that the 
appointments made after Mindszenty’s dismissal have clearly proved that even 
"complicated questions can be resolved." He pledged that the party and government
would continue to pursue a "principled policy," which should make it possible
to settle further issues through negotiation.

Eight months have passed since the removal of Mindszenty from the life
of the Hungarian Catholic Church, but the Hungarian government still does not
seem to be satisfied. In the above-mentioned interview with Homeland Radio
Miklos seemed to be almost "more Catholic than the Pope." He expressed the
opinion that while progressive and sober Catholics, both clerics and laymen,
had accepted Mindszenty's dismissal with "understanding" and supported Pope
Paul in this matter, conservative right-wingers had turned on him in wrath,
and Mindszenty had become a tool of extremist elements. He had also given
evidence of intransigence, by disregarding the laws of the Church and the
wishes of its head as he had previously failed to observe the laws of the 
Hungarian People's Republic. "Objectively," Miklos asserted, Cardinal Mindszenty
is harming the Catholic Church and undermining the authority of the pope. In
order to demonstrate that Mindssenty is an unrepentent offender, Miklos went
so far as to quote Jusztinian Cardinal Seredi, Mindszenty's predecessor as
primate of Hungary, who in 1943 wrote to Pope Pius XII that Mindszenty was an
excellent organizer but that his passionate temper made it "dangerous" to
appoint him a bishop; did not demonstrate sufficient respect for his 
superiors, and treated his subordinates with superiority and excessive severity.
Therefore, said Cardinal Seredi, it would be "hazardous" to raise him to the
rank of bishop. [l6]

----------------------------
(12) 	In May 1974 Dr. Joachim Szegedi, residential Greek Uniate Bishop of
	Zagreb, went to Hajdudorog for the third time (Katolikus Szo, 12 May
	1974) At the September 11-12 conference of the Bench of Bishops
	Dr. Timko reported on the pastoral problems of Hajdudorog (Uj Ember,
	2 September 1974).

(13) 	See, e.g., Magyar Nemzet, 6 February 1974.

(14) 	Uj Ember, 3 March 1974.

(15) 	3 March 1974.

(16) 	Radio Budapest, 3 October 1974.


[page 6]

One must ask, however, just what Miklos’s harsh criticism of Mindszenty
really means. It is not surprising that the Hungarian authorities are greatly
incensed by the cardinal's unflagging efforts to visit Hungarians in all 
corners of the world, in a show of activity that belies his advanced age. Even
when he refrains from making direct attacks on the communist system in 
Hungary, his mere appearance draws large crowds (and not only of Hungarians), and
his recently published memoirs contain more than enough "inflammable material"
to anger and annoy the leaders in Budapest. On the other hand, what can Pope
Paul do? Can he silence Mindszenty -- for example, by ordering him to the
Vatican to live out his days in prayer and seclusion? Obviously such a step
-- the only one that could extinguish the ire of the Hungarian regime -- is
out of the question. And while this thorny issue is hanging fire, a more 
practical question has arisen: Will the Hungarian government use Mindszenty1s
world-wide activity as a pretext for putting pressure on the Holy See to make
greater efforts to "normalize" the top hierarchy of the Church in Hungary?


. . . And His Possible Successor

After his appointment as apostolic administrator of Esztergom, Dr Lekai
made a highly significant statement. He declared over Homeland Radio [17]
that Esztergom has always been the "heart of the Catholic Church" in Hungary,
and that its archbishop is ipso facto the primate of the Church. At present
the see is vacant, he said, and the actual head of the archdiocese is the
Holy Father. But, he added, removing the incumbent archbishop of Esztergom
was the "first, decisive step toward strengthening and developing the 
relations between the Hungarian state and the Hungarian Catholic Church." It had
put an end to the "extraordinary situation" of having the head of the 
Hungarian Catholic Church permanently absent from his see. The archbishopric had
had to be run by an apostolic administrator, who did not, however, wield the
authority (nor can he now) of a primate-archbishop. Dr. Lekai ended by 
saying that the fact that the see had been declared vacant will provide a 
"definite possibility" of finding a solution for the archbishopric through talks
at the highest level. This statement by Dr. Lekai was also published in the
April issue of Magyar Hirek, a weekly paper published for Hungarians abroad and
thus not available in Hungary. It is both curious and typical of conditions
in Hungary that on a question of such great importance Dr. Lekai must address
himself to Hungarians living outside Hungary rather than to the faithful at
home, who might be expected to be equally if not more interested in the future
of the archdiocese of Esztergom. He would certainly not. have said more than
was implied in the statements of Imre Miklos, even though the latter did not
deal so specifically with this crucial topic.

It remains to be seen when and to what extent the Hungarian government
will be ready to "normalize" the top hierarchy of the Church in Hungary. For
instance, will some of the dioceses now governed by apostolic 
administrator-titular bishops receive residential bishops -- through promotion or transfer
of the incumbents - before an archbishop is appointed to Esztergom? That is
certainly a condition for full normalization of the hierarchy, even if a few
dioceses remain without residential bishops. It will not be easy to find an
archbishop for Esztergom acceptable to both sides. Presumably he will have
to be one of the archbishops or residential and titular bishops already in
office. In this regard, a few facts deserve attention. Jozsef Bank,

------------------------
(17) 26 March 1974.


[page 7]

the present archbishop of Eger remains apostolic administrator of the diocese
of Vac (one of the largest Church provinces in Hungary) though the diocese
has an auxiliary bishop (Dr. Jozsef Vajda) who could have been named apostolic
administrator upon Dr. Bank's appointment as archbishop of Eger. Thus Dr. Bank
is not only an archbishop but remains head of his former bishopric, which 
(besides being a double burden) makes him doubly eligible for advancement in the
hierarchy. He is an expert on canon law and a very good administrator, and
thus a suitable candidate for the primacy.

But the likelihood of Dr. Lekai's being appointed to that post should not
be underestimated. He studied in Rome, graduating in philosophy in 1931. He
was born in 1910, and is thus a year older than Dr. Bank. In 1944 he was 
secretary of the diocese of Veszprem (its bishop was Mindszenty) and was 
imprisoned by the Hungarian Nazis (as was Mindszenty) between November 1944 and 
February 1945. [l8] It is interesting that Pope Paul, appointed him a member of
the episcopal synod now meeting in Rome. (The other Hungarian representative
is Jozsef Ijjas, Archbishop of Kalocsa and president of the Bench of Bishops,
who was elected to sit in the synod by that body.) In all probability Dr.Lekai
was made a member of the episcopal synod by virtue of his office in Esztergom,
and this brings up the question of whether the appointment was due to the post
or the prelate, or to both. At any rate several residential and titular 
bishops and apostolic administrators, let alone Archbishop Bank, are senior to
Dr. Lekai.

A final question: from the purely ecclesiastical point of view Bishop
Imre Tiinko is the prelate best qualified for the post of Greek Uniate bishop
of Hajdudorog. But he is such a well-known peace priest that in accepting him
the Holy See might create a very dangerous precedent. Hitherto no peace priest
known to be dedicated to the movement has achieved a top post in the hierarchy,
though some of those who are close to the regime are not unacceptable to the
Vatican (e.g., the late Gyorgy Zemplen, auxiliary bishop of Esztergom between
January 1969 and March 1973, when he died, or Dr. Arpad Fabian, titular 
bishopapostolic administrator of Szombathely since February 1972). All in all, one
might say that high-level appointments in the Hungarian Catholic Church are the
outcome of a carefully gauged compromise.

So much for the question of "normalization," of the hierarchy, which is
so important for the orderly functioning of the Church. There are other 
problems which in their own way are also important and deserve discussion here.
Ecclesiastical Trips to Rome

Since the 1964 partial agreement was signed the Hungarian government has
not prevented bishops from going to Rome when they were appointed to 
pontifical committees or for other reasons. After the Papal Hungarian Institute in
Rome was placed under the jurisdiction of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops in
1964, eight priests have been allowed to take up scholarships for higher
studies at the papal universities each year. (Incidentally, in recent years,
three clerical scholarship holders were also permitted to go to France, one to
Paris and two to Strasbourg.) [19]

-----------------------------
(18) Uj Ember, 5 March 1974.

(19) Tbid., 1 September 1974 .


[page 8]
				
Another yardstick by which to measure the Hungarian government's attitude
toward the Catholic Church will be the extent to which clergymen and the 
faithful are allowed to go to Rome on pilgrimage during the Holy Year of 1975. In
the interview broadcast over Homeland Radio, State Secretary Imre Miklos 
declared that "preparations are already under way for pilgrims to travel to Rome
next year," and it appears from a pastoral letter issued by Bishop Lekai that
the president of the Hungarian Bench of Bishops (Archbishop Ijjas) has already
entrusted the Hungarian Actio Catolica with organizing pilgrimages to Rome
during the Holy Year. Dr. Lekai said that detailed information on the subject
would soon be forthcoming, but warned the faithful to beware of efforts by the
Hungarian travel agency IBUSZ to organize "private" tours of clergymen and lay
tourists who would go to Rome (or other places of pilgrimage) in the guise of
"Hungarian pilgrims." Such groups, he said, are not made up of "pilgrims," and
he explicitly asked the priests in Esztergom to refrain from organizing 
"private" groups. This does not, however, said Dr. Lekai, preclude priests and
other individuals from going to Rome at other times. [20] Obviously, his 
purpose was to prevent regime-run travel agencies, primarily IBUSZ, which is the 
largest, from representing Rome-bound tourists, of whom there are several
thousand every year, as devout pilgrims. It is true that any tours that may
be arranged by the Bench of Bishops will have to be handled by a travel agency,
but the bishops may try to lay down special regulations governing
participation in them. At any rate, the proper observance of the Holy Year is a matter
of serious concern to the Bench of Bishops. In fact, it is known to be one of
the chief problems facing the hierarchy, and the episcopacy has decided to
publish the papal letter on the Holy Year. [21]

State Financing of the Church

It is the internal life of the Hungarian Catholic Church, however, that
constitutes the real essence of its activity and will determine whether it
survives or withers away owing to the unfriendly, not to say hostile, 
environment that surrounds it. A political regime based on the ideology of atheism
certainly does not provide a favorable atmosphere for quiet, much less 
militant, profession of religion. The Hungarian authorities are known to take
much pride in the clause in the Constitution that guarantees freedom of 
conscience and freedom of religion to all citizens. [22] It must be pointed out,
however, that there are few instances in which a wider gap exists between the
letter of the law and actual practice. It is well known that the Hungarian
regime is striving to establish a society untainted by the "superstitions" of
religion. But since that ultimate goal cannot be achieved either overnight
or even within a few years, religion must be tolerated, because too many 
people cherish it and because -- as was noted in Katolikus Szo -- religious
tolerance redounds to the credit of the Hungarian government in the eyes of
the noncommunist world.

This fundamental consideration should not be forgotten when the 
authorities take ad interim measures that appear to indicate leniency toward the
Churches. In his interview with Homeland Radio State Secretary Miklos

---------------------------- 
(20) Magyar Kurir, 12 June 1974, quoted these passages from Dr. Lekai's
	letter, which was dated 28 May 1974.
(21) Uj Ember, 22 September 1974.

(22) Paragraph 63, Point 1 of the (revised) Constitution of 1972.


[page 9]

provided a catalogue of good-will gestures to the Hungarian Catholic Church.
He mentioned, for example, that the state finances the operations of the
Churches by giving them some 70,000,000 forint a year to cover their personnel 
and material expenditures. In 1968, only about half this amount was paid to
the Catholic Church [23] -- much less than would be warranted by its numerical
strength. Every five years, the government renews these donations, but their
value is minimal owing to progressive inflation. The current five-year
period expires on 31 December 1974 [24] and it remains to be seen whether the
amount will be increased again. At any rate, 70,000,000 forint represent only
a pittance when one considers the dividend, in the form of support, that the
regime receives in exchange. In fact, the government can take it for granted
that the Churches will unreservedly support both its foreign policy and 
domestic ventures, the latter designed -- as the customary explanation goes -- to
raise the living standard. A typical example of support for foreign policy
was the decision of the Bench of Bishops, taken at the September 1974 
conference, to endorse the appeal issued by the North Korean Republic on behalf of
the victims of "antidemocratic undercurrents" in the Republic of South Korea,
which also affect clergymen. [25]

In further praise of the regime's assistance to the Churches in general
and the Catholic Church in particular during his Homeland Radio interview,
Miklos laid heavy emphasis on the catechism classes held in schools and in
church buildings, on the education of young priests, on the publication of
papers and books, and on other activities connected with charity and religious
life. The teaching of catechism is "under settlement," he said and the 
necessary books will appear in editions of 140,000 to 150,000 copies every year,
with the required paper being supplied by the state. Moreover, he said, a
complete Bible is to be published this year, and the New Testament will also
be published in an edition of tens of thousands of copies. [26] Finally, he
cited the publication of scholarly treatises by such eminent Catholic 
professors as Ferenc Gal, Tamas Nyiri, Andras Szennay, and Imre Timko, all of whom
are professors at the Budapest Academy of Catholic Theology.

Catechism and Ideology

A few words should be devoted to the "settlement" of the teaching of
catechism to Catholic children. The saying Timeo Danaos et dona, ferentes
(I fear the Greeks even when they are bearing gifts) seems applicable in this
connection. It is generally known that the teaching of catechism has 
virtually ceased in the towns, thanks to the pressure exerted on the teaching
staff, though it lingers on in some schools in the countryside, where parents
are in a better position to defend their religious traditions. In Gymnasiums,
the only type of high school in which the teaching of catechism is permissible
under the law, such instruction is available only in the eight Catholic

-----------------------------
(23) Radio Budapest, 4 December 1968.

(24) Magyar Nemzet, 29 November 1968.

(25) U.j Ember, 22 September 1974.

(26) According to Uj Ember (22 September 1974) printing of the Hungarian
	Bible began on 5 September 1974.


[page 10]

Gymnasiums. [27] If the government plans to issue catechism books itself
there is a danger that it will try to influence, either through the texts or
by exercising "discreet control," what goes on during the teaching of 
catechism. It is an ideologico-educational tenet of the regime to wage an 
unrelenting struggle against so-called double education. Young people, say the
authorities, should be spared exposure to two diametrically opposite 
influences -- atheism and religion; they must grow up in a socialist society,
join the Pioneer organization and the Communist Youth League, in all of which
religion is anathema. Spokesmen for the party and government never tire of
hammering home the idea that practical co-operation with believers -- for 
example, in the Patriotic People's Front -- should never lead to a "fusion" of
the opposing ideologies. The rough administrative methods of the past have
been abandoned, but endeavors to convert religious believers to 
Marxism-Leninism by means of persuasion persist. The dividing line is now said to
run hot between believers and materialists but between the supporters and the
enemies of socialism. Despite everything, however, ideological differences
continue to exist, often within the same family, and this is a fact that
should not be lost sight of.

The situation was summed up with particular clarity by State Secretary
Miklos in Nepszabadsag earlier this year. [28] As president of the State
Office for Church Affairs, he rebuked some priests for failing to understand
freedom of religion "properly," for demanding that party and government
agencies cease to engage in "ideological educational work" because it runs
counter to freedom of religion. In Miklos1 s opinion, the two things are not
mutually exclusive. He did admit, however, that some state officials also do
not properly understand the legal provisions guaranteeing the rights of the
Churches. In another article [29] he said that the State Office for Church
Affairs had decided to publish the rules pertaining to Church activities and
send copies to all local councils. He also appealed to the clergy to take a
closer look at the agreements between the government and the Churches in 
order to set the stage for smoother co-operation.

All this boils down to the fact that although the Hungarian regime may
have ceased to coerce the Churches by administrative measures it has done so
with strong mental reservations and for reasons of expediency. It makes no
secret of its conviction that time is on its side, and in the meantime it
tries to reap the greatest possible benefit to itself from co-operation with
religious believers. Finding it hard to develop its own ethical rules under
the heading of "socialist humanism," the regime even welcomes the teachings
of the Churches with regard to labor ethics, morality within the family,
respect for parents, etc. [30] which foster the "building of socialism."

--------------------------
(27) At Gyor and Pannonhalma, run by Benedictine monks; at Esztergom and
	Szentendre, run by Franciscans; at Kecskemet and Budapest, in charge
	of Piarist Fathers (all six of these are for boys only); and at 
	Debrecen and Budapest (girls' high schools run by the School Sisters of
	Notre Dame). These eight schools had some 2,500 students at the 
	beginning of 1974, when they were placed under strict state supervision.
	(Bilanz des ungarischen Katolizismus [Munich, 1969], p. 120, and Die
	Presse Vienna, 6 April 1974.)
(28) 3 March 1974.

(29) Nepszabadsag, 19 August 1974.

(30) Miklos's interview with Homeland Radio.


[page 11]

On the other hand, Catholic bishops seem to take seriously both the letter and
the spirit of the constitutional provisions on freedom of religion. Eloquent
proof of this was provided by Archbishop Bank when, after taking the oath of
allegiance after his appointment as archbishop of Eger in February 1,972, he
made the following statement: "In the new social order a great many 
Hungarians cherish religion and remain attached to their old traditions. It is for
this reason that the Constitution guarantees full freedom of conscience and
religion. Now, when we take our oath on the Constitution, we think 
particularly of this paragraph. And I hope that the appropriate state organs will
increasingly act in accordance with that provision." [31] While one can only
admire Archbishop Bank's courage in speaking out in such unequivocal terms,
the present practice of the government seems to dissipate all hope that it
will respect either the letter or the spirit of the constitutional rule in
question. 

The Training of Priests

Finally, reference should also be made to an unfortunate circumstance
that seems to play into the hands of the authorities and weaken the position
of the Hungarian Catholic Church. The hierarchy is deeply alarmed by the
dwindling number of young people entering religious life. This is a burning
issue not only in Hungary but also in the world at large, and the faithful
are being asked to make every effort to encourage young men to opt for 
priesthood. The Hungarian clergy maintains that the initial responsibility was
within the family, that neither prayers nor material help should be spared in
order to lead promising young men toward a priestly career. [32] It is well
known that not all seminarians are ordained, and there is grave danger that
there will not be enough young priests to take the places of those who die.
This is not a problem that can be solved overnight. It must be recognized
that the social environment in Hungary does not encourage young men to become
clergymen. They are poorly paid, and except by the faithful are held in
little esteem. Today anyone who wants to become a Catholic priest wants to
serve the cause of religion, not to foster the aims of the atheistic regime,
which he can do with much greater profit and social recognition as a layman.
Young men who wish to enter seminaries are promptly called up for military
service, [33] in the hope that they will change their minds. And last but
not least, the peace priests are known to keep a watchful eye on the 
seminaries, trying to enlist followers. [34] While they may attract a few who
wish to enjoy a better life, the majority of seminarians and young chaplains
are not "Trojan horses," but believe their mission is to ensure the genuine
survival of the Catholic Church.

To sum up: The 10 years that have elapsed since the conclusion of the
partial agreement in September 1964 have brought about visible changes in the
relations between the Holy See arid the Hungarian government, and it cannot be
denied that these changes have affected the contacts between the Hungarian
Catholic Church and the authorities. These contacts have become more regular,

---------------------------
(31) Uj Ember, 3 March 1974.

(32) Ibid., 5 May 1974; Katolikus Szo, 29 September 1974.

(33) Magyar Nemzet, 27 September 1974.

(34) Katolikus Szo, 29 September 1974.


[page 12]

and run in established channels. They may even be courteous and cordial on
ceremonial occasions, when the substance of their relations is not touched
upon. On this, neither side is willing to yield. The objective observer
is confronted with an elegant fencing match in which the opponents try to
score points at each other's expense. If this is not possible, they stop
the match or call it a draw for the time being. The Hungarian, regime wants
to build an areligious society, while the Holy See and its Hungarian 
province are eager for survival. How can these antagonistic goals ultimately
be reconciled? In its 2000-year life the Catholic Church has learned to view
history sub specie aeternitatis and consequently has learned to "coexist"
with all sorts of hostile political regimes. Will it manage to do this also
with communism in countries where it is the ruling ideology? This will be a
crucial question for years to come. The Bible teaches the faithful to
"... render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things
that are God's." [35] This is precisely the course of action the Holy See
and the Hungarian Catholic Church have been adopting toward the Hungarian
regime. But how long will it be possible to render to God the things that
are God's without running counter to the interests of today's "Caesar" in
Hungary who controls all the levers of power and is intent on extinguishing
religion in the long run?

KK
Hungarian Unit

-----------------------------------------
(35) Luke, 20: 25.

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