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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 42-3-217
TITLE:             Kazimierz Mijal -- Dogmatic Diehard or Political Adventurer
BY:                Antoni Marek
DATE:              1967-6-26
COUNTRY:           Poland
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Poland 

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

EAST EUROPE

POLAND
26 June 1967

KAZIMIERZ MIJAL -- DOGMATIC DIEHARD OR POLITICAL ADVENTURER?

Summary: Kazimierz MIJAL, former member of the PUWP CC and
chief, consecutively of several central offices, failed to
realize that the political changes which ensued in 1956
were limited in character. This misunderstanding strengthened
his dogmatic position. Guided by a particularly strong
desire to exert influence on political events, he disseminated
his view in Poland through illegal treatises. With time, he
approached the ideological concepts of the CCP. Compromised
in Poland, he proclaimed himself the chief of an illegal
Communist Party of Poland (KPP) and left, with a false passport,
for Albania, where he took charge of anti-Gomulka Communist
propaganda. Despite the dogmatic character of the main
theses of his political program and his lack of popularity in
any stratum of the population in Poland, Mijal may exert some
influence over the hardening ideological course of the PUWP.

x x x

Introduction

The person of Kazimierz Mijal [1] was, until recently,
completely unknown outside the narrow circle of people studying the

--------------

(1) Kazimierz Mijal, 56, was born near Warsaw to a peasant family. He
graduated from the Tradesmen's Association Commercial School in
Warsaw. Before the war, he was connected with pro-Communist
organizations, but was not politically active until the war, when
he became the secretary of Boleslaw Bierut (later the First
Secretary of the PUWP CC in the Stalinist era). After the war, he
was in turn mayor of Lodz, chief of the Presidential Chancellery,
chief of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, Minister of
Communal Economy, and director of the Investment Bank. He was a
long-time member of the CC of the Polish Workers' Party and then
the PUWP.

At the time of October he was one of the chief organizers of
the Natolin (Stalinist) faction. Since 1957, he has organized
various factional moves against Gomulka, publishing a number of
clearly dogmatic pamphlets. At the Third Party Congress in 1959,
he was not re-elected to the CC. In 1966, he left for Albania with
a false passport, proclaiming himself the chief of the Temporary
Central Committee of the (pro-Chinese) Communist Party of Poland
and apparently taking over the Polish section of Radio Tirana.

[page 2]

political careers of personalities in the East European Communist
parties. Even in this specialized circle, few people attached any
importance to Mijal, treating him rather as a politically defunct
remnant of the Stalinist era. If it were not for the periodical
appearance in Poland of some pamphlets [2] of which he was Relieved
to be the author, Mijal would soon have been totally forgotten.
However, in February 1966, Mijal became the subject of more general
interest. The reason was his "escape" from Poland to Albania, where
he was given political asylum. The circumstances of his departure
and the country where he "chose freedom111 gave a sensational flavor
to the affair [3]. Mijal named himself Secretary General of the
"Temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland"
and started an open propaganda campaign against the so-called
"Gomulkovsehina." Despite the bizare nature of Mijal's "schism,"
it should be worthwhile to take a closer look at the circumstances
preceding Mijal's present career, for they shed some light on the
general political situation in Poland.

Mijal's Career to 1956

Mijal became active in pro-Communist organizations before
the war, while still a student [4]. It was only during the war that
he became a formal member of the Communist Party (Polish Workers'
Party, PPR). At that time, he took active part in the underground
Communist resistance movement. Among other activities, he is
believed to have carried out the reconnaissance preceding the attack
on the KKO (Communal Savings Bank) in Warsaw, where he was employed.
He also helped publish the illegal paper, Proletariusz (The
Proletarian).

-------------

(2) There is no doubt that he was the author of three lengthy
pamphlets and he was probably the author of several other
anti-Gomulka publications distributed illegally in Poland. Some of
them were printed abroad.

(3) In February 1966, he left Poland, using the passport of an
Albanian citizen, "Serwet Mehmetko." After his departure, the
Albanian ambassador to Poland was declared persona non grata.

(4) It is hard to establish the school from which Mijal graduated.
According to some, he studied at the Higher Trade School in
Warsaw and graduated with a diploma. Other sources claim he
finished the Tradesmen's Association Commercial School
(secondary level) where bookkeepers were trained. His
publications and speeches give the impression that he is not
a college graduate. His arguments are primitive and he makes
frequent mistakes in economic matters.

[page 3]

After Bierut arrived in Poland from Moscow, Mijal became
his right-hand man, working as a secretary, messenger, and bodyguard.
He was in charge of the technical arrangements for organizing the
first session of the National Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa) and
was later a secretary of its presidium, as well as the editor of
the Biuletyn Sprawozdawczy Prezydium KRN (Information Bulletin of
the Presidium of the National Council). It was probably at that
time that he became one of the most trusted and best informed men
in Bierut's entourage.

After the war, he became mayor of the city of Lodz [5].
His friendly relations with Mieczyslaw Moczar [6] date back to that
time, when the latter was chief of Public Security in Lodz. Mijal
became most influential, however, when he was appointed chief of
the Civil Chancellery of the President (Bierut), a post he held
until 1950. At that time, he was also extremely active in the Party;
he made one of the most virulent speeches at the November 1949
CC Plenum, where Gomulka's group was being finally purged.

For a brief time thereafter, Mijal was Minister of Communal
Economy. In 1952 he also became the chief of the Bureau of the
Council of Ministers. In this capacity, he revealed himself to
be one of the most eager Party officials. He also displayed certain
characteristics: an inclination to extend influence beyond formal
prerogatives, suspicion of subordinate personnel, a taste for all kinds
of personal intrigues.

Undoubtedly, Mijal reached the peak of his influence, as
chief of the Bureau of Ministers. Through, various machinations,
he exerted an influence on the work of, and decrees issued by, the
Council of Ministers [7]. People who at that time collaborated
with Mijal knew of instances where he would question the decisions
of deputy premiers and the premier himself, reserving his personal
decision on suggestions submitted to the decision of the Council
of Ministers. In reality, he became the second most important
person after the premier, and public opinion regarded him. as
one of the "grey eminences" of the regime. He was also known, at
that time, for his close collaboration with the Committee for
Public Security, which he kept informed, not only about his

------------------

(5) The second largest Polish city, of particular importance after
the war since the majority of state offices were located there,
before being transferred back to Warsaw.

(6) Mieczyslaw Moczar -- present Minister of Internal Affairs and
head of the veterans' organization, Union of Fighters for
Freedom and Democracy (ZBoWiD).

This could explain the tolerant manner in which the
security authorities later dealt with the dissident Mijal.

(7) As the chief of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers, he was
in charge of assisting the government in its undertakings
according to the instructions of the premier. He was a member


of the government with the rank of full minister.

[page 4]

subordinate personnel, but also about the members of the Council of
Ministers. (At that time, the personnel department of the Bureau
of the Council of Ministers had a special file, where political and
other complaints directed against state officials were collected.)

It was no wonder, then, that one of the first results of
a political thaw in Poland was Mijal's dismissal from the office of
the Council of Ministers [8] This move certainly met with
widespread approval, not excluding approval of members of the Council of
Ministers, who were constantly threatened by Mijal's political
ambitions.

Reduced to his position of Minister of Communal Economy,
Mijal could concentrate on charting an important role for himself
in the rapid political changes then taking place in Poland. At
that time, the general division of the Party leadership into
supporters of the old forms of rule and supporters of far-reaching
changes was generally established. From the very beginning of the
emergence of factional groups, Mijal joined the supporters of the
old forms of rule [9]. His motivation seems clear. First, he was
generally hated among the most influential members of the Party and
state leadership and he knew that, as such, he risked becoming a
scapegoat. Persons who had offered him political support were
deprived of influence. [10] Most important, with the death of
Bierut, he lost his most powerful protector and sponsor. Second,
his direct and extreme involvement in the previous forms of
wielding power did not allow him to switch to a more flexible approach --
even if for only tactical reasons. One might suggest that, had he
not been so strongly engaged in the defense of the existing state
of affairs at the beginning of the October period, he could have --
like so many others of his kind -- seen that a reformed edition of
Polish Communism was necessary for tactical reasons. But he missed
that opportunity, if he ever noticed it existed. Third, one must
consider that, in his case, the will to power was particularly
intense. This ambition was incompatible with political calculation
and a more flexible approach. In contrast, a number of other
Stalin jets who were removed from power in 1956 managed, within a
few years, to regain at least their previous positions in political
life [11].

----------------

(8) In February, 1956.

(9) This was the so-called Natolin group -- openly pro-Soviet --
opposed to the Pulawy group (later supported by Gomulka).

(10) Such as Jakub Berman, member of the Politburo, in charge of
security; Hilary Mine, member of the Politburo, in charge of
economic affairs; Stanislaw Radkiewicz, chief of the Committee
for Public Security; and a few others.

(11) For example: Eugeniusz Syzr, Elazimierz Witaszewski, Julian
Tokarski.

[page 5]

It would seem that, while in the past dogmatic and conservative
inclinations dominated in determining Mijal's behavior, with his
first major political defeat (removal from the Council of Ministers)
his ambition to "get back his own" in politics and his extreme
desire for power began to dominate. His political program them
became subordinate to these ambitions.

In the months preceding the October events [12], Mijal
put his money on the victory of the conservative elements. This
did not demand any change of political conception, and it further
guaranteed him full power in case of the victory of this faction --
which grouped together men of similar moral and political
qualifications and was thus for good reason dubbed "the boors" [13].

In the beginning, like his like-minded companions, he did
not openly enter into factional struggle. He still acted under
so-called Party democracy, though giving full rein to virulent
attacks on more liberal groups. A few weeks after the Poznan
uprising [14], the Seventh CC Plenum met, in the course of which
the Natolin faction violently attacked the "thaw" tendencies in
the Party [15] and tried to push through the view that the Poznan
tragedy proved that the liberalization of rule had led the Party
into danger and demanded that a strong-arm policy be restored. For
the first time, clearly demagogical methods were employed, such as
anti-Semitic allusions, mention of purposely fanned anti-Soviet
feelings, etc. The plenum did issue a compromise resolution, but
it was known that it failed to solve the main problem -- the deep
rift between the Party factions. After the plenum, the final act
in the struggle for power began.

There is no doubt that -- barring outside interference
this struggle was as good as won in July 1956 by the Pulawy group.
This was the result of a certain moral and political breakthrough
within the Party leadership. Most factional divisions notwithstanding,

-----------------------------

(12) The Eighth Plenum of the CC in October 1956, when the Party's
previous activity was comprehensively criticized and Gomulka
was elected First Party Secretary.

(13) The representatives of the "liberal, Jewish" faction later
supported by Gomulka were dubbed the "Yids."

(14) In June, 1956, during the International Trade Fair, a spontaneous
demonstration by the population took place, in protest against
Party administrative practices. It turned into an uprising which
was put down by the army at the cost of many lives.

(15) Despite requests by many members of the Party leadership and the
pressure of public opinion, the debates at the Seventh CC
Plenum, where the views of the two factions clashed for the
first time, were views made public. The trend of the differences
and the important subject matters discussed at that plenum
could be deduced from references at the Eighth CC Plenum.

[page 6]

the majority of the CC, not to mention the Party as a whole, did
not desire a return to the forms of rule so compromised by the
20th Congress of the CPSU. To a large extent, this attitude
stemmed from the belief that only with a certain curtailing of the
security apparatus could the personal safety of the members of
the CC itself be increased; many of the CC members, despite their
high positions, had lived under constant threat. But one should not
underestimate the influence of public opinion, particularly intense
at that time, which unanimously demanded the rapid liberalization
of political life.

All in all, the so-called Pulavian faction was the only
group within the Party leadership which could claim -- at least
potentially -- public support. Numerically, this group, together
with its sympathizers, was in the majority, both in the CC and in
the Politburo. Feeling itself politically isolated, the Natolin
group decided on the most propitious move, in its estimation: a
coup d'etat with the help of the Soviets [16]. The masterly
countermove by the Pulavians nipped the attempt in the bud [17].
The plenum, which met on 19 October 1956, began its debates in
an atmosphere of overwhelming support for Gomulka and the Pulavian
group and complete isolation of the Natolinians.

The defeat of the Natiolinians was complete, since the
leadership of the CPSU, faced with a fait accompli, proclaimed its
support for Gomulka and halted Soviet intervention In the course
of the Eighth Plenum debate, members of the faction were reduced to
criticizing anti-Soviet attitudes, questioning the candidacy of
Roman Zambrowski, and suggesting the candidacy of Konstanty
Rokossowski (the Soviet general who had commanded the Polish Armed
Forces) as a member of the Politburo. One may deduce from the
number of votes cast for the candidates to the Politburo that the

-----------------

(16) It seems that there were two projects for the take-over of
power:

1) a coup was to be carried out while a delegation of the
Politburo was in Moscow, at the summons of the Soviet
leadership, on the eve of the Eighth Plenum of the CC;

2) when the delegation refused to go to the USSR, about 700
Party and government leaders were to be arrested just
before the plenum and the meeting faced with a fait
accompli.



In both variations of their plan, the Natolinians counted on
the support of the armed forces under the command of Marshal
Rokossowski and on intervention by the Soviet armed forces.

(17) This was made possible chiefly by the active support of the
population of Warsaw. On the eve of the plenum, organized
groups of workers intercepted the list of persons to be arrested
and paralyzed action by the Natolin group. The Polish Army,
still smarting from the shameful intervention in Poznan, was
openly on the side of the population ( see, inter alia Z.
Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (Cambridge, 1960), Chapter II).

[page 7]

balance of forces at the Plenum was 59 to 19 to the advantage
of the Pulavy group [18].

Mijal was directly involved in all these events; he
was in the inner sanctum of the Natolin group. He could not make
a speech at the Eighth Plenum, [19] but he added his prepared text
to be published later with the reports from the debates. This
speech does not differ much from the speeches of other Natolinians;
perhaps the attack on the press is particularly strong, with such
charges as: misinformation, anti-Soviet bias, "quite shameless
struggle against the political system," etc. The speech also
contained statements which he was to expand on later, in his illegal
publications, particularly with reference to the character of the
changes taking place in Poland. At that time, however, he was
not yet bold enough to call these changes "counter-revolutionary."

"Dogmatic" Opposition

Following the Eighth Plenum, a new stage in Mijal's
political career began -- on the one hand, he still held state posts
and participated in Party activity, but on the other hand, he began
publishing illegally distributed treaties attacking the Party for
its retreat from socialism. At the beginning of 1957, Mijal was
removed from the Ministry of Communal Economy and named the
director of the Investment Bank [20]. His degradation seems to
have been the result, not so much of his earlier factional activities,
as of the dissemination, in January 1957, of an illegal Letter to the
Peasants in Tomaszewski County and various other regions of the
country. In this letter, he accused the new Party leaders of
"agrarian" tendencies and made demagogical use of the Hungarian
revolution. At about the same time, The People's Daily published
an article by a certain Pawlak with similar statements. The
authorship of that article is generally attributed to Mijal [21]
During that time, various other leaflets ascribed to Mijal were
circulated in Poland.

The decisive stand taken by the new Party leadership at that
time arose from the fact that the electoral campaign was then being

------------

(18) According to the votes cast for Zambrowski. The candidacy
of Rokossowski got 23 voices (thus, the ratio was 52 to 23),
but one must consider that a couple of undecided CC members
may have voted for him, while surely not a single Natolinian
voted for Zambrowski.

(19) For tactical reasons, the list of speakers at the plenum was
limited, and it was proposed that those who had been excluded
could later add their speeches to the public record in written
form.

(20) A position of incomparably lesser importance. As Minister of
Communal Economy, he was a member of the Government. As a
director of the Investment Bank, he was subordinate to the
Minister of Finance.

(21) Dziennik Ludowy, 31 January 1957.

[page 8]

conducted, and the elections were to be a kind of a plebiscite
voicing support for the recent changes. Any attempt at
factional activity was then particularly dangerous, hence the
rapid reaction and demotion. At another moment, similar
behavior by Mijal would probably have drawn much milder sanctions
The strong measures against Mijal, including the Party's effort
to compromise him openly in the press, also showed the role of
public opinion, always ready at that time to support the new
Gomulka leadership against Stalinist elements.

However, Mijal did not give up. He prepared more
extensive underground opposition, without abandoning open forms
of criticism of the new leaders. Moreover, while in the past
he had been only one of many Natolinians, now -- after the political
neutralization, for all practical purposes, of the faction – he


became its leading representative. Around him there gathered the
"Party of the unjustly treated," later called the "dgomatic
faction."

Why did Mijal become one central figure among the dogmatic
elements in the Early after October? Many factors seem to have
combined here. First -- Gomulka's skillful cadre policy, which
left several outstanding representatives of the Natolin faction in
positions of influence, confused the group and undermined its
unity. Perhaps the most influential among the Stalinists, Aleksander
Zawadzki, as well as Edward Ochab, joined forces with Gomulka
supporters even before the Eighth Plenum. The leader of the
Natolinians, Zenon Nowak, on the other hand, was given the
prestigious position of deputy premier. Second -- Hilary Mine
and Franciszek Jozwiak retired from political life, and, in practice,
played little part in the intra-Party struggles. Konstanty
Rokossowski, after a brief vacation, was recalled to the USSR and
ceased to play any role in Poland. Third -- the most important
among the remaining Natolinians, Franciszek Mazur, was retained
in Moscow, [22] and after his return he officially supported
Gomulka at the Ninth Plenum.

Others, [23] despite their reservations about Gomulka's
policies, were motivated by the possibility of obtaining new and
profitable positions.

Thus, three extremists, namely Mijal, Stanislaw Lapot, and

-------------

(22) Mazur's stay in Moscow at the turn of the years 1956-1957 was
interpreted as an attempt to blackmail Gomulka with the
possibility of creating a new leadership (somewhat analogous
to the Janos Kadar regime in Hungary). After the USSR gave
up any idea of opposing Gomulka, Mazur returned to Poland
as a humiliated political bankrupt; as a rewards, he was sent
as ambassador to Czechoslovakia a few months later.

(23) For instance: Boleslaw Ruminski, Julian Tokarski, Kazimierz
Witaszewski.

[page 9]

Wiktor Klosiewicz [24], remained on the battlefield. It would seem
that the total disintegration of the Natolin group was helped by
the desperate attempts of the latter to keep his post. Apparently,
Gomulka wanted to fill the position of the chairman of the Trade
Unions with a man he trusted, namely Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, at
present a Politburo member. Hence a persistent campaign against
Klosiewicz. Although it should have been obvious that, with his
popularity and political power, Gomulka would achieve his aim.
Klosiewicz decided not to give in. He paid for his lack of
political skill with a complete personal disgrace, resulting from a
violent press campaign, and he compromised, by the same token, most
of the Natolinians who supported him. United in supporting
Klosiewicz, they became involved in public discussions in a sphere
where any basic criticism of the "Gomulkovschina" was no longer
permissible. Finally, in November 1957, Klosiewicz was deprived
of his post. A few months later, at the Eleventh CC Plenum in
March 1958, he was removed from the CC. This was the end of the
active, official opposition of the dogmatists within the Party.
At the following, 12th Plenum, attacks on Gomulka were anemic,
the majority of "unjustly treated" concentrating on securing new
positions.

Thus, the three extremists mentioned above (generally known
as the "hardheaded" ones) were isolated from even their close
ideological friends. Of the three, only Mijal -- though with the
approval of the other two -- was bold enough to enter into open
intra-Party subversion.

It would seem, from the events which followed, that this
boldness was mainly the result of Mijal's particular virulence,
and ambitions, which prevailed over his reason. The opportunism,
which made him accept the Chinese Communist views, appeared only
later. Resentful of the Party leadership, Mijal wrote, in the
second half of 1957 [25], under the pen name of Jan Kosa, a longer
pamphlet entitled To the Comrade Communists [26]. This pamphlet was
illegally distributed in Party circles; its particularly simplistic
style suggests that it was addressed to the lower, provincial,
professional Party apparat. Mijal (whose authorship, while not
proved, seems certain) undertook in this pamphlet to defend the
old Stalinist system, treating the 20th CPSU Congress as a "disaster."
His main attack, however, was directed against the then most recent
liberalization moves, seeing in them signs of capitulation before
capitalism Although, compared to later pamphlets, the author
does show some circumspection as far as full rehabilitation of

---------------

(24) Stanislaw Lapot was deputy premier before October, and Wiktor
Klosiewicz was the chairman of the Central Board of the Trade
Unions even after the October changes.

(25) After the Ninth CC Plenum, at which he again accused Gomulka
of restoring capitalism and giving in to the Church, and at
which he made anti-Semitic demands.

(26) Trybuna Ludu, 13 November 1957, "Once again about Dogmatism --
Precious Avowals."

[page 10]

Stalinism and accusations against Gromulka are concerned, still,
the pamphlet essentially contained, all the arguments which
he would later invariably use. He called for resistance against
the "capitulatory" Gomulka leadership "Can, under these
circumstances, the comrade Communists keep on observing --
cowed by the October coup -- this work of liquidation?" He
also clearly called for conspiratorial factional activity in
preparation for the Party Congress, which was to take place within
two years.

Trybuna Ludu, polemicizing with the pamphlet, called it
"a peculiar encyclopedia of current Polish dogmatism" and
announced the pending liquidation of activities undermining Party
unity. One could deduce that Mijal was to be thrown out of the
Party in the immediate future. But a long time was to pass before
this actually took place.

Despite the failure of the promised sanctions to
materialize, Mijal suspended his illegal activities for some time
(at least, there is no indication that he continued them).
Perhaps the violent reaction of Trybuna Ludu, which so successfully
disgraced him, had some effect. Nevertheless, he did demonstratively
abstain from voting when Klosiewicz was removed from the CC at the
11th Plenum, and he attacked Gomulka's agrarian policy at the 12th
CC Plenum [27].

At the Third Party Congress, in March 1959, Mijal was not
re-elected to the CC. In practice, this meant that the Gomulka
leadership had given up trying to "re-educate" the enfant terrible
of the Party at a moment, when it was attempting to rationalize
its dictatorship. Although there is no evidence that Mijal was
at that time continuing illegal activity, it is not impossible
that -- as before -- he kept in close touch with the remaining
elements of the "unjustly treated" group. It does seem certain
that he concentrated on preparing more fully documented treatises
against the leadership. His job as director of the Investment Bank
could have been of great help to him in this work, since he could
easily collect data to use against the Party's economic policy [28]

Nineteen fifty nine seems to have been a particularly
difficult year for Mijal. In that year, two other outstanding
Stalinists, Julian Tokarski and Eugeniusz Szyr, received important
government posts as deputy premiers. It was widely known that
advancements of other Stalinists, previously removed from positions
of authority, were being prepared. This increased the isolation
of the group, even among sympathetic Party members. Naturally, the
fact that former Stalinists were taking over important posts could
have constituted a fortunate development for the extreme dogmatists --
provided they had stuck together. But this was not so; appointments

----------------

(27) The 11th and 12th Plenums of the CC took place in 1958.

(28) Because of its financing of investments, the bank had at its
disposal a large department of research and analysis of many
economic problems, not just investments.

[page 11]

were in fact given to men who had abandoned their opposition to
Gomulka, and the fact they were close to the extremists could only
be harmful to the latter.

At that time, Stanislaw Lapot -- least likely of the three
to play an important political role -- ceased to support Mijal's
undertakings actively. Thus, apart from Klosiewicz, a couple of
retired Stalinists and a group of provincial Party functionaries
which was practically meaningless politically -- no one seemed
ready to become involved in active opposition with the Party
leadership. The stabilization of Gomulka-ist apparat was clear.

The only horse on which Mijal could bet was inter-Party
struggles. This required time, however, since -- first of all --
the Sino-Soviet conflict had not yet entered a phase offering
any hope of profit from engagement on either side and since --
second -- the views of Mijal himself still had to evolve in the
direction of the more primitive Chinese Communist arguments.

This process continued through 1963. At the beginning of
1964, in the atmosphere of discussion preceding the 4th Party
Congress, a new, 90-page illegal pamphlet by Mijal, entitled,
The Struggle for Victory! Silence and Passivity Mean Disaster!,
was distributed. The contents of the pamphlet clearly showed the
evolution in Mijal's thinking; in the pamphlet, the first attempt
is made to adapt Chinese dogmatism to the Polish situation. While
in previous pamphlets the virulent tone, the violence of arguments
hung in a void, as it were, in this pamphlet the individual
arguments were brought together into one critical ideological
concept. Compared with previous works, the author was faced with
a much more difficult task. Obviously, many parts of the treatise
repeated the criticisms of the economic achievements current among
the population. Here, Mijal took advantage of the data available
to him through the Investment Bank. He questioned, for instance,
the evaluation of the results of the five-year plan in terms of
the standard of living; he ridiculed unpopular investment decisions;
etc. In this part of the pamphlet, he certainly satisfied an
intelligent reader, although only repeating wide-spread complaints.

In other parts of the treatise, however, devoted to an
assessment of the earlier activities of the Party, of Stalin and
Bierut, and suggesting the trend ideological and political change
should take, he offers to the reader statements which are nothing
but adjusted copies of the main theses of Sino-Albanian "dogmatism."
He lacks consistency in one thing only, the pamphlet does not once
mention the source of its ideological inspiration. This silence
is understandable, however, in the light of the general lack of
popularity enjoyed by the Chinese Communists among Polish Communists
as well as the wide-spread jocular approach to the various phases
of the Sino-Soviet conflict. [29]

---------------------

(29) The Chinese press failed to mention the appearance of the pamphlet.
This could be explained by a realistic evaluation of the situation
by the Chinese, realizing that any suggestion as to the source


of inspiration would be the last nail in Mijal's coffin. But
even later, the CCP failed to mention Mijal's KPP.

[page 12]

Mijal's treatise was dismissed by the Party as a
backstage scandal on the eve of the Party congress. Because of the
publication date and several parts devoted to polemics with Party
policy or to the presentation of alternative programs, the
pamphlet was dubbed the Anti-Theses.

Against this background, a telling incident took place
in Katowice. In the office of Ryszard Nieszporek -- chairman of
the Katowice Voivodship National Council a number of copies of
the Anti-Theses were found in April 1964. As a result, Nieszporek
was suspended from duty and, a few months later, sent as ambassador
to Bulgaria [30].

Mijal himself was recalled from his bank directorship and
kept under house arrest for a few weeks (until the end of the Fourth
Party Congress). [31]

Mijal's pamphlet apparently had no influence whatsoever
on the political atmosphere of the Fourth Congress; there is no
evidence that any attempt was made publicly to present its point
of view during the debates. But this did not discourage him, as
is explained by his motives. Mijal wanted to gain an outstanding
position; since he could not get it in the Party, he attempted
it outside the Party.

The sanctions against Mijal in mid-1964 only hastened the
process of the crystallization of his action program, as well as
connections with Foreign Communist opponents of the
"counter-revolutionary conspiracy of Khrushchev and his followers." Thus in December
1965, a new Mijal pamphlet appeared, entitled, Under the
Marxist-Leninist Banner, into Battle for Socialism: Two characteristics
distinguish this pamphlet from the earlier ones. First, it is the
political program of a new political group, called the "Communist

---------------

(30) At the same time, a certain Wlodzimierz Zawadzki, a friend of
Mijal's, was dismissed from his job as director of a foreign
trade enterprise and charged with spreading information
discrediting the Party leadership. His case concerned the meat
scandal, which Mijal had mentioned in his pamphlet.

(31) In judging the severity of the punishment, one must consider
that, barely two years later, two young scholars from Warsaw
University Kuron and Modzelewski, who wrote and distributed
an oppositional pamphlet -- written from a position of
intellectual honesty and no more rebellious than Mijal's treatises --
were brought to trial and sentenced to several years
imprisonment. A double standard seemed to apply: gentle measures
against a "dogmatic” former leader, but harsh measures against
"revolutionary" critics who were not connected with the
ruling elite.

[page 13]

Party of Poland." [32] Second, it is an example of the full adoption
by Mijal of Sino-Albanian views. [33]

While the second characteristic came as no surprise (it
was obvious from the earlier publications what political forces Mijal
intended to woo), the announcement of the creation of the "KPP"
certainly startled public opinion. What was important was not actually
the question of the creation of an illegal party -- which seemed to
be largely or entirely fictitious [34] -- but the attempt to subvert
and disorganize the existing system in Poland and the fact that this
might attract ever more numerous anti-Gomulka elements in the country.

A few months later, the reason "behind Mijal’s creation on
a "Communist Party in Poland" became obvious: in the middle of
February, with the aid of the Albanian Embassy, he left Poland under
an assumed name and obtained political asylum in Albania. In this
way, he sought to become an emigré, not as a political bankrupt, but
as the chief of a "revolutionary," illegal Party of Polish Communists.
The fact that the Party was non-existent hardly seemed to matter.

Mijal in Exile

The first signs of Mijal's activity after his departure
from Poland came from an unexpected direction, namely from Belgium.

-----------------

(32) The pre-war name of the Polish Communist organization. Its
use, resulted in many jokes, because it was almost devoid of
popular following in pre-war Poland and because its
leaders were almost all killed by Stalin, the man whom Mijal
would like to restore to full glory.

(33) One might suggest that the only difference between the views
of Mijal and of the Chinese Communists lies in the lesser
emphasis among the latter on anti-Semitic elements. One can
hardly expect, however, that the Chinese, even considering
the demagogic character of their propaganda, should engage
in criticizing events so unknown to them.

(34) In practice, there was no evidence of an illegal party, if
we dismiss timid attempts at exchanging critical views (usually
in friendly gatherings) by embittered, but not very numerous,
Stalinist apparatchiks.

Analysis of the text of the pamphlet suggests that the idea
of creating a party arose in Mijal's mind as he wrote. In
the final pages of the pamphlet, he writes about the need of
creating "a new Communist Party"; further on, he mentions
the creation in the provinces of "illegal organizations of the
KPP," and at the end, he ascribes the authorship of the pamphlet
to a Temporary Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland.

[page 14]

The publication of the pro-Chinese Belgian Communists, La Voix du
Peupls, printed the text of the latest Mijal pamphlet (with the
significant omissions of its most demagogic passages, including
anti-Semtic attacks), with an editorial note hailing the creation of a
"KPP." A new partner had emerged among the pro-Chinese Communists.
At the same time, illegal leaflets continued to circulate in Poland,
probably brought in from Albania on ships visiting Polish harbors.
It appeared from the leaflets that the revolutionary spirit of their
author had greatly increased in the Albanian climate, From sources
Whose credibility was hard to ascertain came reports that attempts
had been made to organize strikes in factories.

In the fall of 1966, the pamphlet Under the Marxist-Leninist
Banner into Battle for Socialism! was again distributed in Poland,
this time most assiduously. This edition of the pamphlet was
reportedly printed in Belgium and brought to Polnad on Chinese ships.
Tart of the shipment was allegedly intercepted by the Polish militia
and destroyed.

As far as Mijal himself is concerned, alter his arrival in
Tirana, he reportedly started working in the Sino-Albanian Joint
Stock Shipping Company -- probably only a formal pretext for
supporting him. At the same time, there were rumors that he had visited
Peking and later Italy. In September 1966, Mijal was reported to
have taken over as chief of the newly-established Polish Section of
Radio Tirana. Indeed, shortly after their inception, the programs
of that radio in Polish began mentioning the Communist Party of
Poland. [35]

In the fall of 1955, Albanian Party media, too, began to
mention the "KPP!" The report on the Fifth Congress of the Albanian
Communists, published in November 1956, included a fragment about
secret organizations of KPP being active in Poland. At that meeting,
the head of the pro-Chinese Belgian Communists, Jacques Grippa, read
a proclamation addressed by the KPP to the congress. But there was
no mention of Mijal, and no indication that he addressed the congress

--------------------

(35) For example, the report of 3 November 1965, that the KPP had
its "men" in the security services and the armed forces.
Addressing the High Party School of the CC, CPC in spring 1960,
Albanian leader Hysni Kapo had referred to "Marxist-Leninist"
"groups and Parties" in East Europe, explicitly mentioning
Poland, (Zeri i Popullit, 10 May 1966).

[page 15]

This reserve suggests that, despite the unity of political
aims and despite Albania's role in Mijal's escape from Poland, the
Albanian Party wanted to give the impression that he was still in
Poland. Thus, it delayed two months in answering the servile
telegram which Mijal sent Enver Hoxha on the 22nd anniversary of the


proclamation of Communist rule. The delayed reply was addressed to Mijal
as Secretary-General of the KPP, which could be taken as official
recognition of his Party. Mijal's presence in Albania has still
never been admitted. Nor, curiously enough, have the Chinese
Communists ever referred publicly to the KPP, although they have reported
alleged sympathy from individual Poles. [36]

Even before, factual support for Mijal was shown by the
placing of Radio Tirana at his disposal.

He has taken full advantage of this opportunity. The anal is
of the texts suggests that he is most probably the sole author of the
programs. The texts are studded with bad grammar and the Tirana
announcers can hardly speak Polish -- but this must seem
insignificant to Mijal, compared with the fact that he can present himself to
the world as the leader of a group of "revolutionary" Communists. [37]

The Thought of Kazimierz Mijal

Quoted below are Mijal's opinions on current events and
leading personalities, as expressed in his pamphlets, leaflets, and
radio broadcasts.

The PUWP -- "A Social-Democratic party of the bourgeois type...."

Wladyslaw Gomulka [38] -- "Betrayer of socialism," "marches into
capitalism like a sheep into a slaughterhouse," "he is not, and
never was, a Communist," "lackey of capitalists."

Gonuilka's clique -- "Red bourgeoisie."

----------------

(36) See CAA report, "Peking's Inter-Party Relations, I,"
11 May 1967, by jck.

(37) Some of the most recent programs are well-written,


suggesting a different author, and contain detailed analysis of
topical problems broadcast with a delay, suggesting
collaborators in Poland.

(38) Most frequently, Mijal calls Gomulka "Wladyslaw the Liar."

[page 16]

Description of some members of the PUWP -- "Millionaires with a
Party card. They steal now and they will steal more, because the
socialist system is degenerating into a thieves' system, a
capitalist system whose foundation and whose moving spirit is the daily
robbing of the working man."

Description of the socio-economic situation in Poland -- The outflow
of the national income from the pockets of the workers into the
pockets of the bourgeoisie is constant and increasing. The bourgeoisie
increases in economic power, as well as in political importance.

The daily practice of every citizen of our country at every step
shrieks against the betrayal of socialism, against the approach of
destitution and rebirth of capitalism, against fascist ways of
ruling over the proletariat, of the biological destruction of the nation
conducted by the Zionist-bourgeois, rightist-nationalist clique."

The Polish worker -- "Is supposed to work his fingers to the bone,
for measly pay, which in the majority of cases does not even provide
for a subsistence-level existence for the worker's family."
"Earnings suffice for a few days of existence."

The October changes in Poland in 1936 -- "The greatest betrayal
within the bosom of brotherly Communist Parties,"
"Counter-revolutionary upheaval."

Reasons behind the political defeat of the Natolinians in 1956 --
"We were unable to use our forces in an organized fashion against
this gang of renegades and plotters, simply because we were not
organized."

Communist Party of Poland (KPP) -- "The only rightful headquarters
of the struggle.

Loyalty of Party members to the PUWP -- "The creation of the KPP
permits all real revolutionaries to separate illegally from the
Gomulkovschina, from the traitors to socialism... removing the
internal obstacles from the point of view of revolutionary morality."

Class struggle -- "Knows no boundaries, and despite Gomulkovschina
drivel, is also being waged in Poland."

The "paper tiger" theory in Mijal's version -- " When the masses are
politically aware and appropriately prepared, then even without
tanks and guns, but with paving stones, they can wipe off the face
of the earth the hated revisionist clique."

The influence of the US on political evolution in Poland -- "During
the last 10 years, at the insignificant cost of about half a milliard

[page 17]

dollars in grain and in lard, the revolutionary party known as the
PUWP has been transformed into a Social-Democratic Party. Tito is
selling himself dearer."

Appeal to the workers -- "Keep on studying Marx, Lenin, Stalin, and
Mao Tse-tung."

Boleslaw Bierut -- "Great son of the Polish nation, outstanding
politician and unforgettable revolutionary."

Threats -- "One should take down the names and note the activities
of agents-provocateur as well as of people who are servile to
Gromulkovschina."

Prospects -- "The defeat of revisionism in the international arena
and in Poland is inevitable," "The hour of victory is near."

Relations with the USSR -- "Nothing separates our peoples. All that
had been controversial in the past was settled through mutual,
good-neighborly agreements under Bierut and Stalin."

Jews -- "Long experience has shown that it is in that milieu that
most traitors and agents are recruited." "We must carry through to
the end the decisive struggle against Zionist agents in Poland."

The Church -- "There is no reason why there should not be regulated
relations between the Church and the state, mutually profitable ones."

The Vatican -- "The greatest of enemies."

The prospect for Polish agriculture -- "There is no point in pulling
wool over the peasants eyes and leaving them open to exploitation
by the capitalist market economy. The question must be put clearly:
the rural road to socialism lies in production cooperatives."

Jozef Stalin -- "A great Marxist." "He helped the creation of the
socialist camp, strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat,
applied the principles of proletarian internationalism, of the
international solidarity of working people. This historic role and the
merits of Stalin ... cannot be effaced by the lies and slanders of
the revisionists." "A famous leader, a great Marxist-Leninist."

Nikita Khrushchev -- "Directing the main line of the attack against
the person of Stalin, Khrushchev, in fact, attacked the Leninist
principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat." "A drunkard, a
story-teller, renegade and political deviate." "Following the best
example of Goebbels, he slandered the whole achievement of the CPSU
and of the socialist camp." "He was ready to trade our Western
territories."

[page 18]

Changes in the Communist movement -- "The center of the revolution
has shifted East." "Marxist positions are maintained by Parties such
as those of China, Indonesia, Korea, Vietnam, Albania, and New
Zealand."

An assessment of Albanian Communists -- "The stand of the Albanian
Workers' Party in defense of the principles of the revolutionary
theory of socialism offers an example for all true revolutionaries."

Radio Free Europe -- "The heart of the ideology of the 'Polish
October' (is to be found) in the Free Europe studios in Munich."

A sample of Mijal's style -- "The garbage heap of the red
bourgeoisie, created by the Gomulka-ist revisionists, will flow away like the
waters of a crystal-clear mountain stream which has been polluted by
gutter dirt."

* * *

Although the above quotations are authentic, still, as with
any anthology, they might give the reader an oversimplified image of
Mijal. In fact, he uses even the most incredible statements with a
certain demagogic skill, [39] The purpose of this section was to
present the scale of arguments Mijal exploits in his attempt to build
an "original" political platform for himself and to gain as large a
number as possible of the "displeased" as his followers. [40]

Mijal's Influence

Who in Poland could be a potential ally of Mijal? How
extensive is his influence?

The influence of his slogans and appeals must in general be
extremely limited, since the language he employs, as well as the
political program behind the language, is hateful to most Poles. Moreover,
the public is rendered immune by a generally jocular attitude to the
various ideological principles at issue in the Sino-Soviet conflict.
When looking at' the matter from the point of view of various social

-----------

(39) With some exceptions: e.g., the call for an uncompromising
struggle against revisionism, since "the Albanians stand ready
to defend us."

(40) Mijal's authorship of a map circulated in Poland which shows
Poland with boundaries extending East beyond Kiev remains
unproven. This map was captioned: "Such a Poland is guaranteed
to you by -- " and a stamp "The Temporary Central Committee of
the Communist Party of Poland." If this was truly Mijal's
work, he must be clutching at any straw in his desperate
attempts to win some measure of popularity.

[page 19]

strata, the rural population, spontaneously hostile to any suggestion
of collectivization, can be eliminated first. One can also eliminate
the youth (taken as a whole), which is generally not interested
in political problems. The groups of ideologically-motivated
Communists in student circles, representing either naive, "romantic" or


"humanistic" viewpoints are a small minority. The vulgarity and
inconsistency of. Mijai's propaganda would suggest that he also cannot
hope for any success among the intelligentsia. Hie influence among
workers, and especially the least well-paid groups, would seem to
be limited solely to cases of immediate grievances (a strike against
living conditions or lack of social services). This is an influence
that is purely organizational in character, since the workers are,
at present, probably immune to any ideological appeal.

Mijal has an equally small chance of finding support among
Party members, taken as a whole. The main problem of the PUWP
leaded-ship at the present time is counteracting ideological passivity and
the influence of "liberalizing" ideas within the Party ranks. [41]
But as far as the leaders are concerned, as mentioned before, despite
certain political inclinations, no one can officially support Mijal's
views, since they would lead to complete discredit. The only
element which constitutes potential support for Mijal are those
Stalinists who still consider themselves "unjustly treated" as a result
of the October 1956 changes, small-time, provincial apparatchiks.
But few of them remain, and, second, they are people who are in the
main incapable of political action and have been disgraced in their
local areas. There is a possibility, however, that Mijal's theses
might find support among such dogmatists at a politically opportune
moment.

But there is no evidence of such support at present, if
one disregards Mijal's own boasts about strikes and an organized
network of Communist Party of Poland (KPP) cells throughout the
country. [42] Thus, one may assume that the destructive influence
of Mijal on present-day political life in Poland is small. Although
it sounds like a paradox, one can suggest that he makes the present

-------------------

(41) The latest, Eighth Plenum of the CC PUWP (16-17 May 1967)
was devoted, in part, to these matters.

(42) There is undoubtedly another aspect to this question.
Similarly absurd slogans were expressed in 1948, during the
anti-Gomulka campaign in the Party, and -- despite their lack of
logic -- they actually prevailed. At that time, however,
these views were backed by the group in power and by pressure
from the USSR. At present, the possibility of serious pressure
from China or Albania does not exist.

[page 20]

Gromulka leadership more popular, since, compared with the alternative
Mijal offers, they appear as worthy "liberals."

This does not mean, however, that Migal has no influence
whatsoever on political life in Poland. On the contrary, it could
be that his influence is growing. The regressive measures lately
adopted by the Party are some of those recommended by Mijal. The
stiffening of the Party's course could be hastened by the impact
of Mijal's propaganda on the leadership reacting to his accusation
of loss of revolutionary spirit. Having "disarmed" the dogmatic
opposition, the leadership, in fact, is becoming more similar to it.
One example is the latest, Eighth CC Plenum, devoted to" restrictive
policies in culture, education, and propaganda. The view has also
been Expressed that the recent more energetic and successful moves
to reduce unemployment in Poland are a result of Mijal's violent
attacks on the Party leaders, accusing them of purposely creating
limited unemployment. One can find other cases where the Party
leadership seems to be collaborating with Mijal. Thus, when Migal
opposes sending diplomats of Jewish origin abroad -- the PUWP
leadership is indeed trying to limit this. Mijal attacks young
"Trotskyites" -- the PUWP leadership has imprisoned them. But this
should not come as a surprise -- although opponents, the Gomulka
leadership and Mijal still have much in common. Only against this
background can one understand why Mijal's "rebelliousness" was
tolerated for so long, although he openly called for the overthrow
of the ruling elite through revolutionary upheaval. At that same
time, after all, people were being imprisoned for expressing much
milder views. This is an aspect of "Party" solidarity: Mijal shall
always be one of "us," while Prof. Leszek Kolakowski, for instance,
will be an "ideologically-alien" element. Still today, anti-regime
invective matches that of Mijal over Radio Tirana, nevertheless,
the propaganda campaign in Poland is directed solely against
Western influences without a mention of Mijal. [43]

A sign of the tolerance of Mijal is the circumstances


of the publication and distribution of his tracts. [44] The security
apparat would seem to be able to uncover the sources of distribution
and to stop more effectively at least a repetition of such activity.

-------------------------

(43) Only three attacks against his activities have been
published in the last 10 years.

(44) The majority have been printed in Poland, formerly on
the printing plant of the Investment Bank. The remainder
seem to have been printed in Belgium, Albania, or
other countries.

[page 21]

Similarly, the circumstances of Mijal's departure suggest the
complicity of the Ministry of the Interior. Thanks ultimately
only to the tolerance shown him by the PUWP leadership and -- all
things considered -- certain similar attitudes, can Mijal today
lead the least realistic political movement in the whole history
of Poland.

Antoni Marek

(Polish Unit)

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