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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 53-2-20
TITLE:             40th Anniversary of Annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina
BY:                George Cioranescu
DATE:              1980-7-23
COUNTRY:           Romania
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  RAD Background Report/183

--- Begin ---

RADIO FREE EUROPE Research

RAD Background Report/183
(Romania)
23 July 1980

40TH ANNIVERSARY OF ANNEXATION OF BESSARABIA AND NORTHERN BUCOVINA

By George Cioranescu

Summary:On 26 June 1940 the Soviet Union sent
Romania an ultimatum demanding the "return" of
Bessarabia and the transfer of Northern Bucovina
to Soviet jurisdiction. This study reviews the
particularly harsh diplomatic preliminaries to that
ultimatum, which left Romania no option other than
to accept willy-nilly, or to expect war, a war in
which Romania would be isolated, with no possibility
of aid from either France, which was partially
occupied, or Great Britain, which has hard-oressed
and organizing its own defense, or by the Third
Reich, which had divided Europe into spheres of
influence in a Secret Protocol appended to the
Soviet-German nonaggression Treaty. Under such conditions
Romania had to give in to force, but did not recognize
any historical, legal, or ethnographical justification
for the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia and northern
Bucovina, which it considers simply occupied
territories.

+ + +

Germany Stands Aside

The Soviet ultimatum of 26 June 1940, worded in unusually
harsh terms, came as a surprise to Romania and under conditions
which left no option other than acceptance or war. Although
Soviet intentions had been fairly well veiled, the
disintegration of the European collective security arrangement first organized
after World War I by France and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain,
the establishment of the Third Reich's "new order" in its place
meant important political changes in Eastern Europe. Since Romania
was caught between the Soviet Union in the East and the Third
Reich, which was extending its dominion to the West, King Carol II

This material was prepared for the use of the staff of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

[page 2]

RAD BR/183

approached Berlin the spring of 1940 to see how much he could
rely on German support as a counterweight to Soviet pressure
and its claims to Bessarabia. [1] The answer received from
German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribberitrop was hardly
encouraging, however, for he said bluntly that the question
"whether and to what extent Romania might be disposed to agree
to any revisionist demands by its neighbors, as for example
by Russia on the Bessarabian question," [2] was a prerequisite
for German support.

The Soviet Union Raises the Bessarabian Question

As a matter of fact, the Bessarabian question had been raised
by Soviet Foreign Minister Vjacheslav M. Molotov about two
months earlier, in a speech delivered on March 29 to the Supreme
Soviet, in which the Soviet Foreign Minister said:

Of the neighboring southern states I have mentioned,
Romania is one with which we have no pact of
nonaggression. This is due to the existence of an
unsettled dispute -- the question of Bessarabia,
whose seizure by Romania the Soviet Union has never
recognized, although we have never raised the
question of recovering Bessarabia by military
means. [3]

Shortly after these statements, which presaged no good for
Romania, von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador to Moscow,
reported to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that Molotov had told
him the following on June 23:

The solution of the Bessarabian question brooked
no further delay. The Soviet government is still
striving for a peaceful solution, but it is
determined to use force should the Romanian
government decline a peaceful agreement. [4]

In order to justify this change in Soviet attitude Molotov
pointed out the "long time" - that had elapsed since his speech
to the Supreme Soviet, with Romania doing nothing to help find
a solution to the Bessarabian problem. Von der Schulenburg

-----------------------------
(1) See the telegram sent by German Minister to Bucharest Wilhelm
Fabricius to the German Foreign Ministry, dated Bucharest, 29
May 1940, in Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945
(London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956) Vol. IX. pp.466-467.

(2) Joachim von Ribbentrop's telegram to the German Legation in
Romania, dated Berlin, 1 June 1940, ibid., p. 493.

(3) Viacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet,
Moscow, 29 March 1940, in Documents...., op. cit., Vol. X.
(London, 1957), p. 3.

(4) Friedrich Werner, Count von der Schulenburg's telegram to the
German Foreign Ministry, dated Moscow, 23 June 1940, Ibid.,
p. 3 .

[page 3]

RAD BR/183

replied that he had not expected this new decision by the Soviet
government, that Soviet claims to Bessarabia were not contested
by Germany, but that, since Romania was then supplying Germany
with very large amounts of essential military and civilian raw
materials, difficulties in its foreign relations would lead to
a serious encroachment on German interests. Consequently, he
requested Molotov not to take any decisive step before the German
government had decided on a stand concerning the intentions of
the Soviet government. That same day Molotov let von der
Schulenburg know that the Soviet government would wait until June
26 for the German government's reply on the matter.

Commenting on von der Schulenburg's communication, Ernst von
Weizsaecker, State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry,
defined Germany's attitude to Moscow and Bucharest as follows:

With regard to the matter itself, the Russians
already knew that we agree to their demand for
Bessarabia; however, there has been no
discussion of Bucovina thus far. [5]

He thought that direct; negotiations should be conducted
between Moscow and Bucharest, adding that:

Molotov could be told that we knew that Romania
was prepared in principle to negotiate and
that Germany could, if desired, suggest that we,
on our part, induce Romania to send a
plenipotentiary at once.

According to Weizsaecker, it would be said in Romania that
"the Romanian government was not apparently aware of the gravity
of the situation and was counting, at least in part, on our help
against: Soviet Russia." In reality, the Third Reich was "fully
sympathetic to the idea of settling the Bessarabian problem," as
Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop wrote to his ambassador to Moscow.

-----------------------------
(5) Ernst Freiherr von Weizsaecker's telegram to Wolfsschantz
(code name for Hitler's East Prussian field headquarters)
(dated Berlin, 24 June 1970), Ibid., pp. 7-8. While
Bessarabia had belonged to the Russian Empire between
1812 and the collapse of the czarist order (with the
temporary loss of Danubian southern Bessarabia between
1856 and 1978), Bucovina was historic Hapsburg territory,
acquired by Romania, along with the Banat, Crisana,
Maramures, Transylvania, and Bessarabia, when the two
neighboring empires collapsed in the wake of World War I.
Northern Bucovina is, however, predominantly Ukrainian,
and the USSR claimed it on ethnic grounds, as it later
did with Czechoslovakia's ex-Hapsburg Transcarpathian
Ruthenia. The population of Bessarabia, by contrast,
is largely ethnic Romanian. Moscow has by no means held
a monopoly on the Machiavellian practice of using or
ignoring historical, ethnic, or other arguments as they
suited or did not suit its own interests.

[page 4]

RAD BR/183

His only concern was to salvage German economic interests in
Romania, which was a good source of supply of oil and grain for
the Third Reich. For this reason, von Ribbentrop added in his
communication to von der Schulenburg:

Please point out clearly, once again, to Molotov
our great interest in Romania's not becoming a
theater of war. [6]

On 21 June Fabricius reported to Berlin that the Soviet
Envoy to Bucharest, Anatolii Iosifovich Lavrentiev, had arrived
in Bucharest, but that the Romanian government did not know what
he was going to demand of it. If he demanded Bessarabia, Romania
would have to draw Germany's attention to the danger threatening
the Balkans; if he demanded bases, Romania was fully aware of
the sad experience of the Baltic countries. In any case, the
Romanian government was hardly disposed to abandon the
population of Moldavia, the majority of whom were ethnic Romanians, to
Bolshevism and Russification.

Reporting on a discussion he had with Premier George
Tatarescu on June 26 Fabricius, the German Minister to Bucharest,
said that the Romanian premier had confirmed to him that, were
Lavrentiev to claim Bessarabia during his audience with the king
"the Romanian government and the king were determined to fight
rather than simply give in." [7] Tatarescu added that:

The surrender of this region would, therefore,
mean handing over 2,000,000 of their own people
to Soviet Russia, to say nothing of all the
other dangers it would entail for the Danube
region in the wake of Russian influence
penetrating beyond the Dniester.

Tatarescu thought of offering the Soviet Union an exchange
of populations which would not have affected the existing borders:
possibly he would have confined himself to offering an exchange
of Ukrainians, Russians, and Jews from Bessarabia for the
"Moldavians" (Romanians) living east of the Dniester, but
Fabricius considered that this solution would not satisfy the
Soviet Union.

In another conversation on the same day (June 26) with Ion
Gigurtu, who claimed that a Soviet invasion was imminent, Fabricius
asked the Romanian Foreign Minister whether the Russians could be
offered something more than the prime minister had told him.

-----------------------------
(6) Ribbentrop's telegram to the German Embassy in Moscow
(transmitted by telephone) (Berlin, dated 25. June 1940),
Documents. . . , op. cit., pp. 12-13.

(7) Fabricius's telegrams to the German Foreign Ministry (dated
Bucharest, 21 and 26 June 1940) op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 656, and
Vol. X, pp. 19-20.

[page 5]

RAD BR/183

Gigurtu then mentioned Romania's frontier of 1856-1878, when
Russia's Bessarabian frontier was pushed back from the Danube.
But Fabricius replied that he could not take any stand on that
issue,, although it would be advisable, in any case, to find some
peaceful compromise. [8]

An Ultimatum Full of Surprises

As a matter of fact, none of these anticipated scenarios
came true, for the Soviet Union surprised diplomatic circles both
with the speed and bruatality of its June 26 move and with the
extent of its claims.

At 1100 hours on 26 June 1940, George Davidescu, Romanian
Minister to the Kremlin, was summoned by Molotov, who handed him
an ultimatum in which the Soviet Union called upon Romania to
surrender Bessarabia and northern Bucovina, claiming that Romania
had taken advantage of Russia's military weakness in 1918 and
wrested some of its territory, Bessarabia, away, "thus destroying
the centuries-long union of Bessarabia, inhabited principally by
Ukrainians, with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic." The,
note went on to say that now, when the military weakness of the
Soviet Union was a thing of the past, the Soviet Union considered
it necessary and opportune, in the interest of re-establishing
justice, to reach, together with Romania, an immediate solution
concerning the restitution of Bessarabia. Consequently, the
Soviet government proposed to the Romanian government: a. that
Bessarabia be returned to the Soviet Union; and b. that northern
Bucovina," as shown in the attached map," be transferred to Soviet
jurisdiction. The note ended with the following sentence: "The
Soviet government expects the reply of the Romanian government
in the course of June 27." [9]

Davidescu tried to counter the statements in the ultimatum,
replying that up to 1812 Bessarabia had always been an integral
part of the Principality of Moldavia. He also protested that
such a grave issue should be raised in the form of an ultimatum,
without having previously been submitted to negotiation between the
parties concerned, which still, nevertheless, maintained correct
relations. Finally, Davidescu added that the deadline set for a
reply to the note handed him so late in the evening was too short
and that he was unable to convey to Bucharest the plan attached to
the ultimatum on time. [10]

-----------------------------
(8) Summary of Fabricius's 26 June 1940 telegram to the German
Foreign Ministry, Ibid., p. 20.

(9) TASS statement on the notes exchanged with the Romanian
government concerning the transfer of Bessarabia and northern
Bucovina to the Soviet Union, Mirovoe Khoziaistvo, 29 June
1940, in Jane Dearas,Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy
(London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1953,
Vol. Ill, 1933-1941), pp. 458-460.

(10) Grégoire Gafenco. Préliminaires de la Guerre a l'Est. De
1'Accord de Moscou (21 Aout 1939) aux Hostilités en Russie
(22 Juin 1941) (Fribourg," Switzerland: Egloff, 1944), p. 337.

[page 6]

RAD BR/183

Molotov accepted none of these arguments. His tactics were
to launch a strong attack, without allowing Romania any alternative
but surrender or war. There was nothing left for Davidescu to do
but to send a coded message to the Romanian Foreign Ministry.
This message began: "The following is the text of the ultimatum
which was handed to me this evening at 2200 hours by Molotov."
At that point, telegraphic connections with Moscow broke off
abruptly and the interruption lasted 7 hours, thus reducing the
deadline from 24 to 17 hours. Alexandru Cretzianu, . who was then
Secretary-General of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, said that he
and newly appointed Foreign Minister Gigurtu went to see Prime
Minister Gheorghe Tatarescu to discuss how to reply. Since
the Franco-British forces had been eliminated from the continent
following the collapse of France and the British evacuation, the
only possible counterforce capable of opposing the Soviet Union
was to be sought in Germany and Italy. Tatarescu decided to
inform the German and Italian governments that Romania could not
accept an ultimatum of a military character, and that his country
was determined to defend itself, declaring a general mobilization.
At that time Fabricius reported to Berlin: "war is to be
expected." [11]

Germany and Italy Abandon Romania

At 1000 hours on June 27 Fabricius was summoned to the royal
palace where Prime Minister Tatarescu read the text of the Soviet
ultimatum to him in the presence of King Carol II and Foreign Minister
Gigurtu. King Carol II told the German representative that Marshal
Hermann Goering had given him (the king) clearly to understand
(during the king's 1938 visit to Germany) "that a Romanian
rapprochement with Germany excluded a rapprochement between
Romania and the Soviet Union." Consequently, the king' considered
that Germany "bore some responsibility for the present situation."

He called on Germany and Hitler to seek "some way to assist
Romania." [12] But during the audience with King Carol II, who
was trying in this way to get German help to save Bessarabia
from Soviet annexation, Fabricius received an urgent telephone
message from von Ribbentrop in Berlin, who ordered him to convey
a message to the Romanian Foreign Minister. Basically, Ribbentrop
said: "In order to avoid a war between Romania and the Soviet Union,
we can only advise the Romanian government to yield to the Soviet
government's demands." [13] Upon hearing this the king "launched

-----------------------------
(11) Alexandre Cretzianu, The Lost Opportunity (London, Jonathan
Cape, 1957), pp. 40-48; Fabricius's telegram to the German
Foreign Ministry (dated Bucharest, 27 June 1940), in
pocuments. . . , op. cit., Vol. X, p. 28.

(12) Fabricius's 27 June 1940 telegram to the German Foreign Ministry,
Documents. . . , op. cit., Vol. X, p. 33.

(13) Telephone message from von Ribbentrop (on a special train) to
Minister Paul Otto Schmidt in the German Foreign Ministry; the
latter subsequently relayed it to German Legation Counselor
Gerhard Steltzer in Bucharast at 1030 hours. Ibid., p. 28

[page 7]

RAD BR/183

forth into criticism of our policy. How could they ask him to
cede one third of his territory without fighting? After all he
had obtained the Fuehrer's word. One cannot depend upon the
Reich." King Carol was so angry that Fabricius had to interrupt
him; interjecting that, in his capacity as a representative of
the Reich, he "could not listen to such rash words from His
Majesty." [14]

At 1500 hours of the same day Radu Crutzescu,
Romanian Minister to Berlin, unaware of events in Bucharest and
following instructions which had become obsolete, went to the
German Foreign Ministry and asked Weizsaecker weather Germany
would be prepared to act as mediator in the Bessarabian issue.
The reply was that his question was out of date in the wake of
Fabricius's step. [15] Using King Carol II's reproaches as a
pretext, despite the fact that Prime Minister Tatarescu had
apologized to Fabricius, [16] Hitler informed the Romanian king
that Germany had never had any political interest in Romania, and
therefore refused to exert any influence in the current dispute.
To make his refusal the more categorical, Hitler added that
Romania had for decades been a steadfast and active ally of the
German Reich's enemies. [17]

Half an hour after Fabricius had delivered his disappointing
message, Italian Minister to Bucharest Pellegrino Chigi reported
to the Royal Palace conveying the advice of the Italian
government: Romania was advised to accept the Soviet ultimatum and
execute it without offering any resistance, although earlier
Italian advice had been to resist any Soviet attack in the
interest of civilization and of the Latin world. [18] In fact,
on June 2 6 Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano, informed by
German Ambassador Hans Georg Mackensen about the June 25
Molotovvon der Schulenberg meeting, "remarked that he did not see any
reason why the Italians should not suggest to the Russians that
they should not close the door to a peaceful solution, and offered
to exert their influence in Bucharest, if this is desirable for
us or for the Russians." Ciano added that he was going to talk to
Mussolini on the following day about the whole issue and was
confident that the latter would agree. [19] As expected, the Duce
expressed agreement with this handling of the Bessarabian question
and concurred with the German position.

-----------------------------
(14) Fabricius's 27 June 1940 telegram to the German Foreign
Ministry, Documents. . . , op. cit., p. 34.

(15) Ernst Weizsaecker' s Memorandum, Documents. . . , op. cit,
p. 31.

(16) Fabricius's 27 June 1940 telegram to the German Foreign
Ministry, Documents. . . , op. cit., p. 37.

(17) Adolf Hitler's message to King Carol II (telephoned to
Fabricius), Fuehrer's Headquarters, 29 June 1940, Ibid.,
pp. 58-59.

(18) Gafenco, op. cit., p. 393.

(19) Hans Georg Mackensen's telegram to the German Foreign
Ministry, Rome, 26 June 1940, Documents. . . , op. cit.
Vol. x, pp. 18-19.

[page 8]

RAD BR/183

Fears of a Concentric Attack

Romania might possibly have resisted the Soviet Union if
Bucharest had received assurances from Germany that Hungary and
Bulgaria would not take advantage of a war on Romania's eastern
frontier to attack it for the sake of their own claims to Romanian
territory (i.e., Transylvania, Crisana, Maramures, and the Banat
for Hungary; and Silistra for Bulgaria). The Romanian government
therefore asked Berlin, through Minister Crutzescu, "whether the
German government would be in a position to indicate if Hungary
and Bulgaria would refrain from any move in the event of a
Russo-Romanian war." Weizsaecker gave an evasive answer. He said
that "the question regarding the attitude of Hungary and Bulgaria
is based on an assumption of something that we wish to see avoided,
a Russo-Romanian war," [20] which did not mean that Germany
committed itself in any way.

The Bulgarian government was following the evolution of the
Bessarabian question with particular interest, and the Bulgarian
Minister to Berlin Parvan Draganov informed Ernst Woermann,
Director of the Political Department in the German Foreign
Ministry, that

Czar Boris III and the Bulgarian government
would find themselves in an extremely difficult
position if they did not take advantage of the
present moment. [21]

The Hungarian government, in its turn, submitted a memo to
the German Foreign Ministry in which it said that

In the opinion of the Hungarian government, if
Romania, on its own initiative, enters into
agreements with another state on territorial
questions, Hungary must also be included. [22]

The possibility of opening a second front was also taken into
consideration by the Crown Council when it reached a decision on
27 June 1940.

The Crown Council Answered Evasively

The Crown Council, made up of advisers of King Carol II, met
at the royal palace immediately after the German answer was
received. At this meeting the historian Nicolae Iorga spoke

-----------------------------
(20) Weizsaecker's Memorandum, dated Berlin 2 7 June 1940,
Documents. . . , op. cit. p. 37-38.

(21) Ernst Woermann's Memorandum, dated Berl in 27 June 1940,
Documents...,op. cit., p. 38. It should be recalled
that Romania originally acquired Silistra from Bulgaria in the
Second Balkan War of 1912-1913 by similarly taking advantage
of a neighbor's weak position.

(22) Memorandum, dated Berlin, 27 June 1940, Ibid., p. 39.

[page 9]

RAD BR/183

categorically in favor of resistance at any cost, claiming that
a country willing to surrender a part of its territory without
fighting would run the risk of losing everything. His opinion
was shared by the representatives of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and
Transylvania. The majority of the council's members, however,
realized that Romanian resistance would have no chance of success,
for Romania stood quite alone politically. According to this
viewpoint, which was presented by the Ministry of War and strongly
supported by the Chief of the General Staff, even if Romania would
succeed in resisting the first frontal Soviet attack, it could
never mount a resistance of any duration, for there was no way
for it to obtain supplies of military material. In fact, Germany
had agreed, according to the terms of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact,
not to supply arms and war material to any country at war with
the Soviet Union. This meant that Romania could not hope to
become a second Finland. Consequently, the decision to give in,
made by the Crown Council, was justified as follows:

Because of its desire to preserve peaceful
relations with the Soviet Union, the Crown
Council approves of the decision of the
Romanian government to ask the Soviet
government to set a time and place where the
delegations of both governments could meet to discuss
the Soviet note. [23]

The Second Soviet Ultimatum

This answer did not mean explicit acceptance of the Soviet
ultimatum, but neither could it be regarded as a refusal.
It left the question of deciding on the substance of the matter,
the Soviet claims, up to the forthcoming negotiations. Under
such conditions, since the Crown Council's announcement that it
would send plenipotentiaries to discuss the Soviet conditions
might be considered unacceptable by the Kremlin, the Soviets might
have invaded.

On June 27 Molotov told Davidescu that the Soviet government
considered the Romanian government's reply of June 27 unacceptable,
since it made no direct reply to the question whether it accepted
the Soviet government's proposals of an immediate transfer to the
Soviet Union of Bessarabia and northern Bucovina. When Davidescu
replied that the Romanian answer meant acceptance, Molotov demanded
that the Romanian authorities evacuate Bessarabia and northern Bucovina
within the next four days, starting at 1400 hours on June 28. Romania
had 12 hours in which to respond to this new ultimatum. On that
day -- June 28 -- the Red Army was going to occupy key positions
in the claimed areas Chisinau, Cernauti, and Cetatea Alba.
Romania would be held responsible for any damage caused to
communications, warehouses, airports, factories, etc. [24] Molotov added:

-----------------------------
(23) Communiqué No. 4, from the royal palace, Universul, Bucharest,
28 June 1940.

(24) TASS statement . . . , op. cit., p. 461.

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RAD BR/183

My colleagues, especially the military, are
very dissatisfied with the answer of the Romanian
government, for it does not seem to have a clear
understanding of the situation on the frontier.
The Soviet government expects a reply before noon
tomorrow. After that hour we shall proceed to
act [25]

Implicit and Explicit Romanian Reservations

On June 28 at 1100 hours the new Romanian Foreign Minister
Constantin Argetoianu sent the final reply, reproduced on June
29 by TASS as follows:

The Romanian government, in order to avoid the
grave consequences of recourse to force and the
commencement of hostilities in this part of
Europe, is constrained to accept the demand that
it withdraw from the territories specified in
the note of the Soviet government.

Romania did, however, request that the deadline be extended,
since it would have been extremely difficult to complete
evacuation of the territory in four days because of damage caused by
rains and floods. Molotov conceded that in case of need a
newly created Romanian-Soviet Commission, which would meet in
Odessa, could take up the question of postponing the evacuation
for a few hours.

From the text of the answer delivered by Davidescu it emerges
that Romania had only accepted the demand that it withdraw from
those territories, without, however, recognizing any legal
justification for the act of surrendering the territories.

Prime Minister Tatarescu told parliament that the government
rejected the historical and ethnic arguments invoked in the Soviet
ultimatum to justify the annexation of Bessarabia. He said:

Bessarabia is a Romanian province torn away
from the territory of Moldavia in 1812 and
returned to the fatherland in 1918 by the will
of a population which, after a century of
oppression, had not forgotten its forefathers' language,
had not allowed its feelings or mores to become
alienated. The union of Bessarabia with Romania
was not an act of conquest but one of liberation,
based on rights which have been and still are
inalienable in the eyes of our nation.

-----------------------------
(25) Alexandre Cretzianu, La Politique de Paix de la Roumanie
á l'Écgard de 1'Union Sovietique (Paris, 1954), p. 10.

[page 11]

RAD BR/183

Speaking about the ethnic character of Bessarabia the
Prime Minister added:

Some 1,800,000 Romanians live in Bessarabia.
This province has been and still is one of the
oldest bastions of the Romanian nation, and the
foreign populations which have settled there
have changed neither its character nor its
appearance. Bessarabia, with its free peasants,
its fortresses and other buildings from the
days of the voivode, has been and still is
Romania.

Tatarescu went on to say that capitulation in the face of
superior force had been the real reason why Bessarabia had
been surrendered:

In the final hour when we still had time to
give our answer, we decided to accept. I
declare here, before this parliament and the
country: we have decided to withdraw from
Bessarabia and northern Bucovina in order to
save the Romanian state and not to jeopardize
the future of the Romanian nation. I declare
here that we made this decision under pressure,
at one of the gravest moments of our history,
leaving it to the future to pass judgment on
our act. [26]

Therefore, the stand adopted by the Romanian government in
the Bessarabian crisis in 1940 was to agree not to the cessation
of Bessarabia and Northern Bucovina, but only to evacuate those
territories under the threat from a greater force, which did not
entail transfer of the legal title of possession to that territory.
Romania considered that, in this way, it would preserve its
historical and national right's to the provinces occupied by the
Soviet Union, rights that could be reclaimed under more favorable
conditions.

Brutal Enforcement of the Ultimatum and Its Consequences

At the beginning of June 1940 numerous Soviet divisions,
backed by armored brigades, had been concentrated along the
Dniester River and in northern Bucovina. On June 25 these
units were operationally ready and had gone on the alert.
According to the program prepared by the Russians, the Romanian
army and authorities were to withdrawn in four stages, one per
day, back to previously set lines. During this operation Romanian
and Soviet troops were to be kept separated in order to avoid
any incidents. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops failed to observe
the timetable set by their own government. They advanced at a
far quicker pace, with some units reaching the Prut River at 1300

-----------------------------
(26) "Statements of George Tatsrescu, Royal Adviser and Prime
Minister," Universul, June 1940.

[page 12]

RAD BR/183

hours on June 30 instead of on July 3. During their advance the
Soviet units acted in a provocative and hostile manner to the
Romanian troops, who had been categorically ordered not to resort
to arms. Under such conditions King Carol II complained to
Hitler that the Soviet troops had insulted and disarmed Romanian
soldiers and asked for Germany to help by sending a German
military commission to Bucharest. [27]

The withdrawal of Romanian troops under constant pressure
from the Soviet army, which tried to cut off their route in order
to confiscate Romanian supplies, ammunition, and war materiel,
as well as the abandoning, without struggle, the population
humiliated the Romanian army.

Prime Minister Tatarescu told Fabrceiusthe following about
the mood of the Romanian public:

The people are extremely indignant, and the king
has called the Russian demand unbearable, while
a large part of the Romanian nation is willing to
go to war and will not forgive government for 
unconditionally ceding the entire area.

The Error of Too Heavy a Red Pencil

Molotov had given Davidescu a l/1,800,000 scale map on
which the new Romanian-Soviet border was traced with a heavy
stroke of red pencil which covered a seven-mile-wide band of
territory. As a result, the new demarcation line inadvertently
cut Herta and the northern corner of Romania off, a territory
that belonged neither to Bessarabia nor to northern Bucovina,
since it was a part of Dorohoi County in Moldavia.

The Romanian government proposed to the Kremlin that a mixed
commission should meet to negotiate a definitive settlement in a
friendly way of this additional territory, while Prime Minister
Tatarescu asked Germany to bring its influence to bear upon
Moscow to leave at least this territory to Romania. However,
his attempt failed. [28] But the Soviets ignored these Romanian
suggestions so that Herta, which had not been mentioned in the
Soviet ultimatum, was nevertheless occupied by Soviet troops. This
is how the Soviet Union came to appropriate a 10-kilometer-strip
of territory (about six and a quarter miles) that belonged to

-----------------------------
(27) Fabricius's telegram to German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop,
dated Bucharest, 2 July 19A0, in Herbert Michaelis and Ernst
Schraepler, Ursachen und Folgen vom Deutschen Zusammenbruch
1918 and 1945 bis zur Staatlichen Neuordnung Deutschlands in
der Gegenwart, (Berlin; Dokumenten-Verlag Dr. Herbert Wendler &
Co. n.d.), Vol. XIV. pp. 266-267

(28) Fabricius's telegram to German Foretign Minister von Ribbentrop,
Bucharest, 28 June 1940, Documents. . . ,op. cit., Vol. x.
pp. 52-53.


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RAD BR/183

Moldavia. In Herta Soviet units disarmed two Romanian battalions
and killed two officers and four soldiers of the 16th Cevalry
Regiment who died not knowing what mischief a heavy Soviet
pencil had caused.

Bessarabia -- a Victim of the Soviet-German Nonaqression Treaty

In point of fact, the dice deciding the fate of Bessarabia
had been cast even before the Soviet ultimatum was sent, under
Article 3 of the Secret Protocol to the 23 August 1939
Soviet-German Nonagression Treaty establishing zones of influence
partitioning Europe. The article reads as follows:

With regard to southeastern Europe the Soviet
Union calls attention to its interest in
Bessarabia. Germany declares its complete lack
of any political interest in that area. [29]

In partitioning Europe into zones of influence according to
the terms of the Secret Protocol, Bessarabia, together with
Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and eastern Poland, fell
into the Soviet sphere. Ribbentrop explained that when the
spheres of interest in southeastern Europe were marked out the
Russians had expressed their interest in Bessarabia and the
southeastern parts of the continent. He allegedly did not want
to "put down in explicitly written form recognition of the
Russian claim to Bessarabia because of the possibility of
indiscretion"... and he preferred "a formulation of a
general nature for the protocol (emphasis in the text). He went
on to say that he had proceeded in accordance with the general
instructions given by the Fuehrer about southeastern Europe and
with a special directive, received before his departure for
Moscow, "in which the Fuehrer authorized me to declare that Germany
was not interested in the territories of southern Europe, even,
if necessary, as far as Constantinople and the Straits. The
latter, however, were not discussed." [30]

Romania's leaders in 1940 did not know of the existence of
the Secret Protocol. That is why they still placed their hopes on
German support or mediation, unaware that Germany had formally
declared itself not interested in the fate of Bessarabia, surrendering it
to the Soviet Union. By yielding Bessarabia to the Soviet Union
Hitler not only made an old wish of czarist Russia to push its
borders as far south as possible come true, but also made Romania
less able to enter the forthcoming war at the side of France and
Great Britain, by weakening its military, physical, and moral
strength. Hither expressed this opinion only a few days after the
signing of the Soviet-German Nonaggression Treaty, when he wrote
to Mussolini:

-----------------------------
(29) Secret Protocol of 23 August 1939, in Documents. . .,
op. cit., Vol. V, p. 10.

(30) Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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RAD BR/183

Thanks to these arrangements, Russia's
favorable attitude in case of a conflict is guaranteed
and the possibility of Romania's joining such
a conflict is eliminated as of now. [31]

Mussolini shared this view, for he replied:

The Moscow treaty blocks Romania and might
modify Turkey's stand... [32]

The Gold Reserves of the National Bank Withheld as "Reparations"

When Molotov informed von der Schulenburg on June 26 of
the Soviet decision to occupy Bessarabia militarily, the German
ambassador told him that the cession would be facilitated if
the Soviet Union were to refund to Romania the gold reserves
of the National Bank, which had been transferred to Russia for
security reasons during World War I. These were the reserves
of the Romanian National Bank on which constituted the guarantee
for the issuing of 314,580,446 lei worth of gold. [33] On the
basis of the protocol signed between Russian Minister Poklevsky
Koziell and Romanian Minister of Finance Nicolae Titulescu on
27 July-9 August 1917, the Romanian treasury contained a total
declared value of 7,000 million gold lei. [34] When
Romanian-Soviet diplomatic relations were resumed in 1934 the Soviet
Union returned only a few symbolic items that had belonged to the
, Romanian treasury (a standard meter /yardstick/ and kilogram
weight, and nine highly accurate thermometers). Later, around
1956, the Soviet government returned to the Bucharest authorities
several artistic items from the Romanian treasury in Moscow:
35,000 old coins, 1,400 paintings, ecclesiastical objects, etc., [35]
but nothing of the gold reserves of the National Bank. However,
von der Schulenburg's suggestion brought no response, for the
Soviet Foreign Ministry replied:

-----------------------------
(31) Lettre de Hitler a Mussolini, 25 August 1939, in La Vérité
sur les Rapports Germano-Soviétques de 1939 a 1941 (Paris:
The US Department of State, Editions France-Empire, 1948), p. 86.

(32) Ibid., p. 88.

(33) The Romanian Encyclopaedia (Bucharest, 1943), Vol. IV, p. 514.

(34) Ion Popescu-Puturi, "For a Just Cause. Romania's Joining the
War in August 1916" (II), Anale de Istorie No.2, 1978, pp. 7-8.

(35) "The Solemn Ceremony at which the Soviet Union Handed Over
Historical Treasures of Romanian Art," Scinteia, 7 August
1956.

[page 15]

RAD BR/183

There can be no such discussion, for Romania
exploited Bessarabia for a fairly long time. [36]

Why Was Northern Bucovina Annexed?

The Soviet claim to northern Bucovina took both the Romanians
and the Germans by surprise for that territory had never belonged
to czarist Russia -- it had also not been included in the zone
of Soviet influence established by the Secret Protocol in 1939.

When Molotov informed Ambassador Schulenburg that the Soviet
Union claimed not only Bessarabia but also the whole of
Bucovina, the latter replied that a peaceful solution would be
considerably facilitated "were the Russians to give up Bucovina,
which has never been a part of czarist Russia." Molotov responded
by arguing that

Bucovina is the last missing part of a unified
Ukraine and it is on this account that the Soviet
government is obliged to attach particular
importance to a simultaneous settlement of this
issue with that of Bessarabia. [37]

Molotovapparently did not plead convincingly enough for Schulenburg
concluded that:

I was left under the impression that Molotov had not
completely closed the door to the possibility of
giving up Bucovina during the negotiations with
Romania. [38]

Furthermore, when meeting with Italian Ambassador Augusto Rosso,
Molotov did not say a word about Bucovina whendiscussing Soviet claims
to Romanian territory. [39]

In any case Molotov again summoned von der Schulenburg on
June 26. Referring to the discussion they had had on the previous
day, he said that the Soviet government had decided to limit its
demands to the northern part of Bucovina and the city of Cernauti:

According to Soviet opinion, the boundary line
should run from the southernmost point of the Soviet
western Ukraine at Mt. Kniatiasa, east along the

-----------------------------
(36) Von der Schulenburg's Telegram to the German Foreign Ministry,
Moscow, 26 June 1940, Documents..., op. cit., Vol. X, p. 26.

(37) Ibid., p. 21.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Molotov's statement to Italian Ambassador Augusto Rosso on
Soviet policy in southeastern Europe, Degras, op. cit.,
Vol. III, pp. 457-458.

[page 16]

RAD BR/83

Suceava [River] then northeast to Hertsa on the Prut
[River] whereby the Soviet Union would obtain a
rail connection from Bessarabia via Cernauti to
Lvovo. [40]

Even after Romania had received the Soviet ultimatum the
Romanian government called upon Germany "to make attempts to
have the Soviets agree to leave Romania Cernauti," noting that a
large part of its population was made up of Germans. [41] The
reply of the German Foreign Ministry to that question rend:

The question of Cernauti is not to be mentioned
under any circumstances whatsoever in the telephone
conversation with Minister Fabritius. [42]

Writing to Weizsaecker about the atmosphere prevailing in the
diplomatic corps in Moscow, von der Schulenburg remarked that news
of the action against Romania had been greeted with general surprise
precisely because the Soviet Union had also demanded the northern
part of Bucovina, although there had never been any earlier Soviet
claims to that region. In von der Schulenburg's opinion, this claim
had been raised by the Ukrainian circles in the Kremlin. Although
he could not say for sure which Ukrainian had so much influence in
the Kremlin, the German ambassador thought that young Pavlov, from
the Soviet Embassy in Berlin, could be the man: "he is a special
pet of Stalin and Molotov; Stalin once described him to me as
'our little Ukrainaian.'" [43] In any case the justification given
in the Soviet ultimatum for its claim to northern Bucovina was that.
acquisition of this territory would serve as compensation for the
damage caused to the Soviet Union and to the population of Bessarabia
by the 20-year-long Romanian "dominion" over Bessarabia. Therefore,
in addition to withholding the gold reserves of the Romanian National
Bank, the Soviet Union was granting itself compensation by occupying
a part of Romanian territory without any historical justification.
The occupation and exploitation of northern Bucovina as "compensation1
for the damage allegedly caused by Romania has now lasted 40 years.

Bucovina -- An Apple of Discord

After Molotov first claimed the entire territory of Bucovina
he then reduced his demands to northern Bucovina. Later, however,
he reverted to his original demand and, in a memo handed to von der
Schulenburg on September 21, also claimed southern Bucovina, so that
the Soviet Union could take possession of the entire province. This
new territorial claim was made after the Vienna arbitration and after
norther Transylvania had been surrendered to Hungary. Molotov
allegedly said that "for the present" the Soviet government had

-----------------------------
(40) Von der Schulenburg's Telegram to German Foreign Ministry,
Moscow, 26 June 1940, Documents..., op. cit., Vol. x, p 26.

(41) Telegram of German Legation in Romania to German Foreign
Ministry, Bucharest, 28 June 1940, ibid., p. 46.

(42) Rudolf Steg (assistant to Minister Schmidt), Note dated Berlin,
28 June 1940, ibid., p. 48.

(43) Von der Schulenburg's Letter to the State Secretary, Moscow
11 July 1949, ibid., p. 195.

[page 17]

RAD BR/183

confined itself" to claiming northern Bucovina, which meant that it
reserved for itself the right to raise the question of southern
Bucovina on another occasion. Von der Schulenburg declared,
however, that he could not remember this short sentence, a fact which
caused Molotov to draw in his horns a bit, saying that, "apparently,
he had made this remark in an indefinite form at the time." [44]

The claim to southern Bucovina was the subject of extensive
discussions during the meeting between Hitler and von Ribbentrop
with Molotov and Vladimir Georgievich Dekanosov (Deputy People's
Commissar for Foreign Affairs). On that occasion Molotov again
maintained that although the Soviet Union had at first confined
its claims to northern Bucovina, under the present circumstances
Germany must nevertheless understand the Russian interest in southern
Bucovina. Instead of replying to this point Germany guaranteed
the territory of Romania, "completely disregarding Russia's wishes
concerning southern Bucovina." In fact, Hitler answered that
according to an oval agreement the former Austrian territories in
that region should be included in the German sphere of influence.
The territories which were included in the Soviet zone were listed
by name (Bessarabia, for example),but there was no mention of Bucovina
as being included in the Soviet sphere of influence. The fact that
a part of Bucovina was nevertheless occupied by Russia meant "a
considerable concession on the part of Germany." So far as Molotov's
objection that the territorial revision claimed by the Soviet Union
was small when compared to the various revisions Germany had made
by force of arms, Hitler emphasized that the latter type of revisions
had not been the subject of any German-Soviet agreement. [45]

Therefore, Bucovina turned into an object of political
divergences between Germany and the Soviet Union, with Germany maintaining
that the claim on Bucovina constituted an encroachment of the
provisions of the Secret German-Sovie t Protocol of 23 August 1939 on the
delimitation of the zones of influence and spheres of interest of
the two big powers which had partitioned East Europe.

Consequences of the Ultimatum

According to Molotov, the immediate consequences for the Soviet
Union of the Soviet ultimatum were the annexation of Bessarabia, with
a surface area of 44,500 square kilometers and a population of
3,200,000, and Bucovina, with a surface area of 6,000 square
kilometers and a population of 500,000. "As a result the frontier of
the Soviet Union had now been shifted westward and has now reached
the Danube which, next to the Volga, is the biggest river in Europe
and one of the most important commercial routes for a number of
European countries." [46]

-----------------------------
(44) Von der Schulenburg's Memorandum to German Foreign Ministry,
Moscow, 21 September 1940, ibid., Vol. XI,
pp. 137-138.

(45) Memorandum by an official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat,
dated Berlin, 15 November 1940, ibid., p. 553.

(46) Von Ribbentrop to the German Embassy in Moscow, dated Berlin,
6 September 1940, Documents. . ., op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 30.

[page 18]

RAD BR/183

So far as Romania was concerned, it not only lost Bessarabia
and northern Bucovina but also northern Transylvania and Silistria,
for, as Ribbentrop put it:

It is right that the Hungarian and Bulgarian
revisionist. demands on Romania should be set in
motion by the occupation of Bessarabia and northern
Bucovina. [47]

This opinion was also shared by the German ambassador to Moscow, who
had played the role of an intermediary between Moscow and Berlin
during the surrender of Bessarabia. He said:

The Soviet Union really opened up a great complex
of questions by its settlement of the Bessarabian
matter with unexpected speed, and it has thereby
forced us, in order to avoid military complications
in the Balkans, to take quick decisions on the matter
of the Romanian-Hungarian dispute. [48]

The third Reich's unfriendly attitude to Romania was explained
by both Ribbentrop and by Hitler as being due to the pro-Western
policy adopted by Romania between the two world wars, and especially'
on the eve of Warld War II when Bucharest accepted the French-
British guarantees (1939). Ribbentrop said that

Romania must blame its own policy for the crisis
caused by the Bessarabian problem. Last year
the Romanian government accepted England's promise
of a guarantee and welcomed it very enthusiastically
in both official statements and in the press, though
this promise of a guarantee was aimed directly against
Germany. [49]

The same argument -- Romania's anti-German policy, based on the
acceptance of the British guarantee -- was also used by Hitler. [50]

While Romania, as a victor state of the first world war, had
generally followed a pro-Western policy and was part of the French
alliance system during the interwar period, the real reason for
its dismemberment was that its geographical location, oil, and
agriculture made it an important bargaining chip in a redivision of
Europe between two totalitarian, aggressive states.

- end -

-----------------------------
(47) Von Ribbentrop to the German Embassy in Moscow, dated Berlin,
6 September 1940, Documents..., op. cit., Vol. XI, p. 30.

(48) Von der Schulenburg's Telegram to the Foreign Ministry, dated
Moscow, September 1940, ibid., p. 18.

(49) Von Ribbentrop's Telegram to German Legation in Romania, dated
Berlin, 27 June 1940, ibid., Vol. X, p. 35.

(50) Adolf Hitler's message to King Carol II of Romania, dated
Fuc??rer's Headquarters, 29 June 1940, ibid., Vol. X, pp. 58-59.
(According to a notation on the document, this message was
telephoned to Fabricius at 2000 hours.)

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