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BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 80-3-141
TITLE:             Growing Tension in Relations Between State and Churches in Yugoslavia
BY:                Zdenko Antic
DATE:              1972-11-9
COUNTRY:           Yugoslavia
ORIGINAL SUBJECT:  Internal affairs

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1598

YUGOSLAVIA: Internal
affairs

9 November 1972

GROWING TENSION IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATE
AND CHURCHES IN YUGOSLAVIA

Summary: In the past year, a degree of
deterioration has occurred in the relations between the
Yugoslav state and the two major religious
communities, the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox.
Increased anti-religious propaganda in the regime
press has been observed, and most recently there
have been attacks and legal measures against
bishops. Both the Serbian Orthodox and the Roman
Catholic Church are accused of nationalism. On
the other hand, the regime is apparently afraid
that the religious communities, while defending
religious liberties in the, present situation, may
also become defenders of constitutional and
individual rights.

Relations between the state and the religious communities in
Yugoslavia have recently undergone a period of serious crisis.
Persistent and increasing criticism of religious arid church
activity in the press, trials of priests and a ban on religious
publications have borne witness to an obvious deterioration of
relations between the party and state authority and the religious
communities in Yugoslavia.

[page 2]

This is particularly true of the state's relations with the
two largest religious communities in Yugoslavia, the Catholic and
Orthodox churches.[1] Communist party representatives from all
Yugoslav republics and provinces, summoned recently in Zagreb to
discuss religion, clericalism, youth problems and the pertinent
tasks of party members, warned the party organizations and public
opinion "against political activity by the Catholic and Orthodox
churches in Yugoslavia."[2] Croatian party CC member and leading
Yugoslav party theoretician Stipe suvar (shu-var) told the meeting
that especially within the Catholic and Orthodox churches, "there
had been nervous incidents of a political nature."[3] The next
day, from another part of Yugoslavia, the Serbian province of
Vojvodina, an almost identical tune was heard A report is sued
by the provincial conference of the Socialist Alliance of Vojvodina
noted that "an ever-greater incursion of the church into the
province's political life has been evidenced."[4] intra-national
relations, which are otherwise very good, "are the very area the
church is deliberately infiltrating," the report stated.

These and other similar statements were preceded by several
incidents during the past few months. In April his year the
Archbishop of Zagreb, Dr. Franjo Kuharic (ku-ha-??? was sharply
criticized in the press for his alleged "violation of the agreed
and natural limits of the church and religious activity in actions
and sermons."[5] Shortly thereafter, Serbian Orthodox bishop
Vasilije (va-si-li-ye) was sentenced to 30 clays' imprisonment for
having publicly expressed sharp criticism against the educational
and youth policy currently pursued in the republic of Serbia.[6]
Finally, in October this year, the largest Catholic fortnightly,
Glas koncila, published by the Arcbishopric of Zagreb was banned. [7]
The paper was incriminated for "inciting believers to disobedience
and disrespect of the Constitution and laws in Yugoslavia and
Croatia." The ban of Glas koncila was the first in the eleven-year
history of this respected Catholic paper.

GrowingReligious Activity

What is the reason for the sudden deterioration of church-state
relations in Yugoslavia? This question appears to be justified,
since the church-state relations in Yugoslavia were developing very
satisfactorily in past years for both the state and the church. This
is particularly true as far as relations with the Catholic Church
are concerned.

After the agreement between Yugoslavia and the Holy See was
signed in June 1966, the activity of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia
had been developing in a relaxed atmosphere of tolerance and mutual
respect. Not infrequently did high Catholic prelates express their
loyalty to the Yugoslav state and Yugoslav system. The Archbishop of
Split, Msgr. Frane Franic (fra-nich), stated in an interview that
"the self-management system could also be considered as a Christian
ideal."[8]

[page 3]

The communist officials similarily expressed their satisfaction
with the development of relations with the Catholic Church following
the 1366 Belgrade agreement, Dr. Ante Fiamengo, a Croatian party
theoretician said in an article that "the socialist community, while
opposing the Church as a political institution, respects its
involvement in dealing with problems of war and peace, racial conflicts,
famine, etc."[9] He added that the activity of the "Catholic Church
on the international level in dealing with important world problems
can be welcomed." In Yugoslav conditions, he said, "special
importance should be attached to the activity of the church in dealing
with the inter-national relationship. "[10] Several party documents
stressing the same policy were issued during the years that followed.
As a result of this spirit of tolerance and mutual respect, the
tension between the state and the Catholic Church which existed in
the immediate post-war period has been gradually reduced. The
activity of the Catholic Church increased considerably, while the
state, as stipulated in the 1966 Belgrade agreement, provided for
non interference of the Church in political life.

Similar relations developed between the state and Yugoslavia's
largest religious community, the Serbian Orthodox Church. Although
numerically the strongest religious group in Yugoslavia, the Serbian
Church falls clearly behind the Roman Catholic Church as far as
activity, religious education and general influence are concerned.
There are, however, serious historical reasons for the present
position of Serbian Orthodoxy in Yugoslav society. Certainly the
most important is the fact that as a consequence of the war-time
persecutions, involvement in the civil war and post-war emigration
of priests, the number of Orthodox clergy in Yugoslavia was reduced
to just about one half of its pre-war strength. The Orthodox
Church also suffered tremendous material losses during the war and
under the communist regime as well. The greatest part of its property
has been nationalized.

Due to its weakened position in the country, and failing the
international backing that the Catholic Church has enjoyed, the Serbian
Orthodox Church was obliged to adopt careful tactics in its religious
activity as well as in its relations toward the state. Nonetheless,
the more liberal religious policy implemented by the Yugoslav
authorities since the early sixties, and the 1966 agreement signed
by the Yugoslav government and the Vatican regulating relations
with the Catholic Church also indirectly benefited the Serbian
Orthodox Church. In the last few years, its activity has increased
considerably not only within the strictly religious sphere, but also in
publishing and other social activities.

Churches Accused of Nationalism

The growing activities of both the Roman Catholic and the
Orthodox Church have been followed carefully and with obvious suspicion
by the communist party and state apparatus. The communist suspicion
and nervousness has become particularly evident since last year's
inner-party struggle and increased nationalistic agitation culminated
in the ouster of the Croatian party leadership in December, and since
the introduction of increased control over the press and other mass
media in the country.

[page 4]

The communist nervousness could easily be explained for two
reasons, The first was the fear that churches, the Roman Catholic as
predominantly Croat, and the Orthodox as predominantly Serb, may
become a potential ally of Yugoslavia's growing nationalism. The
second reason was the suspicion that the churches, while defending the
religious rights of individuals, would become eo ipso defenders of
constitutional and individual rights.

These two suspicions that the Yugoslav communists harbor
toward both the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox church have
been mirrored in the Yugoslav press, which frequently accuses both
churches of alleged "nationalistic propaganda" and of "interference
into non-religious affairs." Concurrently, since the. beginning
of 1971 an increase in anti-church propaganda has become apparent.
The Serbian Church has been increasingly accused of exploiting
Serbian nationalistic feeling for Church purposes. According to
a report by Vukoje Bulatevic, the secretary for information of the
Serbian government, there were 46 religious publications in Serbia
at the beginning of 1971. He admitted that there were few cases in
which these organs conflicted with the existing legislation (sic!).
However, he spoke of witnessing "an ever-greater involvement of
religious groups and individuals in a nationalistic and chauvinistic
policy."[11] Such accusations became more directly formulated in
the months that followed the Croatian crisis in December 1971 and
the subsequent anti-nationalistic campaign. In October 1972, on
the eve of the Serbian crisis, the Belgrade weekly Nin accused the
Serbian Orthodox Church of propagating racism and great-Serbian
nationalism, and of collaborating with the war-time people's enemy.[12]
Even Patriarch German of the Serbian Church was attacked in this
connection for having "anathematized the [separated] Macedonian
Orthodox Church," and for having treated "Macedonian people as art
ethnic group."

No less violent was the criticism directed against the alleged
non-religious activity of the Catholic Church and against the
Archbishop of Zagreb, Msgr. Franjo Kuharic (ku-ha-rich). In this case
also, amid the anti-nationalistic campaign at the beginning of
1972, Msgr. Kuharic was directly attacked for his concern with the
moral, economic and social problems of the Croatian people, which
was expressed in one of his pastoral letters,[13] It was clearly
stated that he did not have the right to interfere in non-religious
affairs whatsoever, "The Pharisaical love-thy-neighbor attitude of
the Zagreb Archbishop is manifested as an excessive deviation from
the agreed upon norms of behavior by a distinguished representative
of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia," stressed the Zagreb daily
Vjesnik.

Much more violent was the recent attack by the Secretary of
the Croatian CC, Josip Vrhovec (vr-ho-vetz), against the Catholic
fortnightly Glas koncila. Speaking recently at a meeting of the
republican board of the veterans of Croatia, Vrhovec said that
Glas koncila wishes "to take the place of the enemy who was
recently removed from the political scene in Croatia. This paper
and quarters standing behind it are attacking under the guise of
religion the self-management system, just as Croatian nationalism
had done under the guise of the national interest,"[14]

[page 5]

Chunches Defend Constitutional Rights

This angry reaction by the Croatian CC Secretary reveals,
as already mentioned, communist fears and suspicions that both
the Roman Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox church may, in the
present situation, become defenders of constitutional and individual
rights. Such fears and suspicions may be easily understood in the
post-Karadjordjevo period of Yugoslavia's political development.[15]
In this period, when the strengthening of party control over public
life and serious restrictions in the sphere of individual rights
have been taking place, attempts by the church press and church
prelates to argue on non-religious issues usually tolerated in
the past, are feeding suspicion and causing hpstile reactions on
the part of the communist leaders.

Thus the angry statement made by Croatian CC Secretary Vrhovac
was actually just a reaction to an attempt by the Catholic Church
to defend individual rights. He was arguing with an article
published in Glas koncila in which the rights of the Church to protect
the "inalienable rights of the human being" were strongly defended [16]
Commenting on the anniversary of St. Polion, a Christian martyr who
died in north Croatia, Glas koncila stressed that he died just
because he, as a believer, "interfered in the solution of secular
problems." According to the Catholic paper, St. Polion was
concerned with:

The moral life of youth, relations between man
and wife, and social equality. Further, Polion
stated that there are just laws, which should be
respected by Christians. However, the same
authority may promulgate orders which are not
just and laws which cannot be respected by
believers. And because of such a stand, because
of freedom of their conscience, believers prefer
death to submission... Because of its religious
conviction, the Church defends the inalienable
rights of the human being.

The message addressed to the communist party and state authority
is quite clear: believers, i.e., citizens, should distinguish between
good and bad laws and take their position accordingly. This is a
firm rejection of any totalitarian practice and an encouragement to
believers to defend their inalienable rights in resisting bad,
inhuman laws. It was not astonishing that the party officials
reacted angrily, branding the Catholic authorities for making 
"propaganda for the Catholic political movement," [17]

Interestingly, a few months earlier, the Serbian Orthodox
Church also stressed, although on a more practical issue, the right
of the Church to defend constitutional and individual liberties.
This was in the case of the aforementioned Serbian Bishop Vasilije of
Zica, who was accused of having expressed sharp criticism of the

[page 6]

Serbian government at a meeting in October 1971. Bishop Vasilije
spoke to a gathering of some 1,000 people on the occasion of the
completion of a church in the village of Brezna, in central Serbia,
He "worried about the fate of Serbs and their children. He saw
very few students at the gathering, and then he attacked the entire
system of education and upbringing, and accused and insulted the
educational and cultural workers," the Belgrade Politika reported[18]
As a result, the district prosecutor of the city of Cacak lodged
criminal charges against Bishop Vasilije. Ultimately, the bishop
was sentenced by a communal judge to 30 days imprisonment.

Although the reaction of the Orthodox Church to the attacks in
the press and other mass media in the past was rather careful and
flexible, this time, in the case of Bishop Vasilije., the Church
authorities are seemingly no longer willing to tolerate such
anti-church activity. The reaction was indeed fast and serious. At
the May 1972 meeting of the Holy Council of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, the highest Church body categorically defended the accused
and sentenced Bishop Vasilije.[19] The Holy Council stated that
Bishop Vasilije "was provoked by the local authority," and expressed
its deep regrets about the attitude of the authority toward a bishop
of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The Holy Council called for the
charge and the sentence to be annulled.

Seizing the opportunity provided by the Bishop Vasilije case,
the Holy Council also referred openly to other violations of
individual rights and liberties granted by the Yugoslav
Constitution. [20] Thus the Holy Council

expressed its deep regrets because of violations of
legal and constitutional rights, which are also valid
for the Serbian Orthodox Church, and which have,
according to reports from many bishops, been jeopardized
in recent times. All of this concerns the Holy
Council and [it] expects from the state authorities nothing
but respect for state laws and regulations, in
particular as far as religious liberties are concerned, which
are valid for all, including school children.

This open reminder from the Serbian Church of the necessity
to respect constitutional rights and religious liberties in
particular is significant. It must be noted that although there
have in the past been many conflicts between the religious and
state authorities in the press, as well as among individuals,
the Holy Council as the highest body of the Serbian Orthodox
Church has never before taken such a clear, authoritative stand.
It has usually tried to avoid sharpening any conflict. This time,
however, it took a firm, unequivocal position, just as had the
Roman Catholic Church.

[page 7]

Conclusions

The most recent developments in Yugoslavia have certainly
attested to a cooling and deterioration of relations between
Yugoslavia's larger religious communities and the state
authorities. In implementing the policy of strengthening the party's
role in society and restricting individual liberties, the party
and state apparatus inevitably collided with both the Roman
Catholic and the Serbian Orthodox Churches. The regime is
obviously trying to roll back the churches' activity into the
strictly limited sphere of religious life. In this newly formed
anti-church and anti-religious policy, the Yugoslav communists
are using accusations of "nationalistic propaganda" allegedly
carried out by both churches as an instrument of intimidation.
Nationalism, which in Yugoslavia's past indeed caused so many
problems and catastrophies, has always been a serious political
argument. This is all the more so since both cnurches--the
Roman Catholic among Croats and the Serbian Orthodox among
Serbs--are strongly identified with the respective national
communities and, at least in the past, were frequently involved in
nationalistic movements.

Now this is certainly not the case. The lesson learned from
past errors by both churches was to be extremely careful in
dealing with nationalism. It could indeed be said without
qualification that in the past period of increased nationalistic
agitation in Yugoslavia, both churches have carefully avoided
any direct involvement. On the contrary, both sides have shown
much more evidence of open warnings and appeals to calm.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the position of
both the Roman Catholic and Serbian Orthodox churches has in
past years improved considerably in society and vis-a-vis the
state. There are many political and sociological factors
contributing to such a development. Both the Roman Catholic and
Serbian Orthodox churches are conscious of this improved
position and are using it when necessary and with caution in defense
of constitutional rights and individual liberties rather than
in defense of a narrow national interest. This can only
strengthen further the position of both churches. Confronted
on this battleground, the present anti-church and anti-religious
offensive may taken an extremely risky and uncertain course.
Zdenko Antic

----------------

(1) The official statistical sources in Yugoslavia usually avoided
publishing data on religious groups. However, according to
data collected during the 1953 census, 7,011,00, or 41.4
percent of all Yugoslavs were Orthodox. The second religious
group was the Roman Catholics with 5,383,000, or 31.8
percent of the population. About one million Macedonians should
be deducted from the Orthodox total, as they have their own
Macedonian Church.

[page 8]

(2) Radio Belgrade, 27 October 1972, 1500 Hrs.

(3) Radio Zagreb, 27 October 1972, 1500 Hrs.

(4) Tanjug in Serbocroat, 28 October 1972,

(5) Vjesnik, Zagreb, 10 April 1972.

(6) Pravoslavlje (Orthodoxy), Belgrade, 1 June 1972. See also
Zdenko Antic, "Serbian Orthodox Church Protests Against
Condemnation of Bishop," CAA Research Report No. 1441, 8 June
1972, Radio Free Europe Research.

(7) Radio Belgrade, 23 October 1972, 1930 Hrs.

(8) Vjesnik, 25 November 1969. See also Zdenko Antic "Yugoslav
Archbishop Pleads for Self-management," CAA Research Report
No. 0406, 28 November 1969, Radio Free Europe Research.

(9) Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, 20 December 1967.

(10) Ibid.

(11) Vecernje novosti, Belgrade, 1 April 19 72.

(12) Nin (Nedeljne ilustrovane novine), 8 October 1972.

(13) Vjesnik, 10 April 1972.

(14) Tanjug in English, 20 October 1972.

(15) Karadjordjevo, a place in northern Serbia where, in December
1971, several Croatian party leaders were accused of "having
tolerated nationalistic agitation," at a meeting summoned by Tito.

(16) Glas koncila, Zagreb, No. 21 (241), 22 October 1972.

(17) Tanjug in English, 20 October 1972.

(18) Politika, Belgrade, 15 October 1971.

(19) Pravoslavlje, 1 June 19 72.

(20) Ibid.

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